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Abstract  
“Medically unexplained symptoms” or “MUS” has been constructed as a term to 
describe persistent physical symptoms for which no medical aetiology can be found. 
“MUS” account for at least 20 per cent of UK medical consultations, yet fit uneasily 
within a biomedical discourse where illness is legitimised by medical diagnosis. 
“MUS” supposedly operates as a neutral category, yet critical review of the literature 
problematises this so-called neutrality: it fails to be neutral whilst avoiding depicting 
the situation as it is. There is widespread conflict about terminology and aetiology, 
which results in the subjective creation of legitimacy criteria; disavowal of a 
psychological dimension; and patients receiving costly and ineffective treatment. 
This research, motivated by the need within this conflict to better understand the 
implications of how we talk about “MUS”, explores how practitioners are 
constructing “MUS”. Four semi-structured interviews with GPs and counselling 
psychologists were undertaken and analysed using Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. 
Alongside underlying biomedical discourses, discourses of separation, mindbody 
dualism, psychology and holism were identified. These contributed to various 
constructions of “MUS”, including “MUS-as-choice”, “MUS-as-challenge”, “MUS-
as-unreal”, “MUS-as-placeless” and “MUS-as-untold-story”. This research 
problematises the separation of illness into categories, the psychologisation of 
“MUS” and the lack of availability of an acceptable holistic discourse with which to 
construct illness. It emphasises the performative nature of our talk about “MUS” and 
the importance of discourse awareness for deepening our understanding of social and 
cultural influences on how we see the world and act within it. Exclusive biomedical 
and psychological constructions of illness displace “MUS” as legitimate illness and 
limit opportunities for constructive dialogue. As practitioners, we need to resist 
getting caught up in these frameworks. Suggestions are made for how practical 
disturbances of current working practices might be achieved. 
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1. Introduction 
“Medically unexplained symptoms” as a term (hereafter referred to as “MUS”) has 
been constructed to describe a heterogeneous group of conditions characterised by 
persistent physical symptoms that cannot be accounted for by any known physical 
disorder (Brown, 2006; Webb, 2010). Symptom severity ranges from mild to 
extremely debilitating (Brown, 2007). There has been extensive research on “MUS” 
and the term is widely recognised, yet there is no clear definition or agreed 
classification criteria and it is used, received, criticised and rejected in many 
different ways.  
In taking on the challenge of exploring “MUS”, a label that is well recognised whilst 
its legitimacy is debated, it is easy to become confused. However, it is this 
ontological paradox that provides justification for further exploration of the topic. 
This research will attempt to understand some of the controversy around “MUS” by 
exploring usage of the term and the implications of this. The term itself - “medically 
unexplained symptoms” - will be used in this study without any attempt to define it 
further, i.e. to limit it to specific types of symptoms; to do so would be to miss the 
point that it is this widespread and sometimes vague usage which influences this 
research. Therefore, only literature which explicitly uses the term is explored in 
order to maintain this focus. Nevertheless, other terminology will be discussed in the 
context of “MUS”. 
The use of “medically unexplained symptoms” has gained popularity over the last 
twenty years but has a long history of conflicted terminology (see 2.2). Situating 
“MUS” within its historical context is useful because it reflects the changing nature 
of terminology and its relationship to wider societal structures. According to 
Foucault (1973) the development of medical science within modern western society 
constructed standards of normality against which people situated themselves. 
Diagnosis by a medical professional via a physical examination became the way of 
legitimising illness. Foucault (1973) referred to this as the epistemological privilege 
awarded to the visible. Diagnosis was constructed through labels that were 
constructed through diagnosis. An illness needed a name to be legitimate. The 
changing nature of diagnostic terms, and the urge to name undiagnosable symptoms, 
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reflects the extent to which diagnosis is now embedded in societies and the difficulty 
of incorporating “medically unexplained symptoms” into this structure. 
1.1 Healthcare and psychological frameworks 
The impact of “MUS” on healthcare systems is worrying. “MUS” is the most 
common single category of complaints in general medical practice (Kirmeyer & 
Taillefer, 1997). In the UK it accounts for approximately 20% of GP and 50% of 
secondary care outpatients consultations (Chitnis et al., 2011). Estimated annual 
healthcare costs range from £3.1 billion (Chitnis et al., 2011) to £8.5 billion (Webb, 
2010). “MUS” patients receive symptomatic treatment, repeated investigations and 
multiple specialist referrals. This suggests needs are not being met and costly 
resources used ineffectively (McGorm et al., 2010; Webb, 2010). In response, the 
Department of Health is beginning to prioritise improvements in service provision 
for “MUS” and Commissioning Support for London (2010) has produced 
commissioning guidance outlining best practice management which takes a holistic 
approach to health and wellbeing. There is a commitment towards a drive for mental 
and physical health being treated together in the NHS Five Year Forward View 
(Care Quality Commission et al., 2014). 
“MUS” is widely referred to in the western psychological literature. Various 
psychodynamic and cognitive behavioural therapy models of “MUS” exist. What is 
apparent across both theoretical modalities is a contemporary shift towards 
integrated mindbody frameworks. Psychoanalytic and psychodynamic therapy has 
consistently recognised the somatisation of emotional distress from Freud’s early 
work on hysteria and conversion (Freud, 1923) to early deficit models focusing on 
object relations (Winnicott, 1958; Mahler, 1967) and attachment theory (Bowlby, 
1977), which has more recently been associated with secondary gains (Blaustein & 
Tuber, 1998). Current understanding of emotional processing based on advances in 
neurobiology suggests associations between affect regulation phenomena and 
“MUS”. Within contemporary psychoanalysis disturbed attachment behaviour 
(Mikulincer, Shaver & Pereg, 2003; Luyten et al., 2012), impaired affect regulation 
(Taylor, Bagby & Parker, 1997) and disturbances in mentalisation (Fonagy & Target, 
2000; Luyten et al., 2012) are viewed as causal mechanisms for “MUS”. Edwards et 
al. (2010) also report on a link between “MUS” and alexithymia, whereas Waller 
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and Scheidt (2006) see it more specifically as a reduction in emotional awareness 
and capacity to identify emotions and distinguish them from physical states. 
According to Griffies (2016), people with “MUS” “do not convey their inner 
affective worlds through the use of words or other symbols” (p.60). “MUS” are 
common among people with a trauma history (Gillock et al., 2005) and Scaer (2014) 
postulates an association between the somatic symptoms in complex PTSD and the 
dysregulation of the autonomic nervous system resulting from extreme or chronic 
stress. 
Early CBT models focused on symptom perception and assumed the 
misinterpretation of minor, benign physical symptoms (Barsky, 1992; Mayou, Bass 
& Sharpe, 1995, Kirmayer & Taillefer, 1997). Rief and Barsky (2005) later produced 
a psychobiological model of “MUS” in which potential physiological processes were 
identified. There is growing evidence that “MUS” is associated with biological 
disturbances, such as central sensitization (Yunus, 2008, 2009) and allostatic load 
(McEwan & Wingfield, 2003). This acknowledgement means such models may have 
more face validity with patients. As a result Katsamanis and colleagues (2011) view 
them as “Trojan horse” techniques to help confrontation of underlying emotional 
issues (p.219). Contemporary information processing models focus on the role of 
memory and expectations (Brown, 2004; Rief & Broadbent, 2007); whilst elaborated 
multifactorial models of “MUS” attempt to integrate earlier models (Brown, 2006; 
Deary, Chalder & Sharpe, 2007). Risk factors such as familial dysfunction, sexual or 
physical abuse and major life events or dilemmas have been identified (Edwards et 
al., 2010; Deary et al., 2007).  
Some attention has also been focused on patient engagement and GP:patient 
relationships. Patient motivation has been identified as a barrier to engagement 
(Chianello, 2010), and practices such as reattribution (reattributing causes of 
symptoms) (Edwards et al., 2010) and emotion-focused interviewing (Abbass, 2005) 
have been developed. Balabanovic (2016) has recently created a model for engaging 
patients with “MUS”. Focus on engagement models is beyond the scope of this 
study, but it is relevant to note that challenging relational dynamics are suggested as 
barriers to engagement in both client:therapist and patient: doctor relationships 
(Luyten et al., 2012; Maunder & Hunter, 2004).  
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Both outcomes-based and practice-based research, largely quantitative, have 
identified moderate benefits from CBT treatment (Kroenke, 2007; White et al., 
2013), and there is emerging evidence for the potential of psychodynamic treatment, 
particularly for specific disorders such as IBS (Guthrie et al., 1991). Models 
incorporating mind-body approaches and extending the focus beyond exclusively 
medical psychological interventions are being reviewed. Both the BodyMind 
approach (Payne, 2016) and body-oriented psychological therapy (Röhricht 
&  Elanjithara,2014) found significant reductions in somatic symptom levels within 
the small-scale service contexts under study, including a reduction in service 
utilisation in the latter study. There is clear need for further research. Further 
discussion on the psychotherapeutic models and treatments for “MUS” is also 
beyond the scope of this review, but it is useful to note that the contribution from 
applied psychologists has largely come from the clinical discipline. Contributions 
from counselling psychologists appear entirely absent which is surprising given the 
discipline’s holistic focus. It might reflect their smaller presence in healthcare 
settings or perhaps a discrepancy between theoretical position and practice.  
For over 100 years “MUS” in various forms has challenged practitioners and been 
the subject of widespread study and debate. Despite all this its use remains 
controversial and tension and confusion remain. This research will attempt to explore 
what it is about “MUS” that maintains this paradox.  
1.2 Historical, Cultural and Theoretical Frameworks 
The task of locating “MUS” within historical, cultural and theoretical frameworks is 
complex and involves recourse to some fluid and dynamic terminology. To do it 
justice would require a much deeper focus than is possible here. Nevertheless, I have 
tried to briefly outline some specific historical and theoretical shifts and conceptions 
within western society that are particularly relevant to this discussion (see Appendix 
G for a more detailed outline). 
Modernism 
Modernism, marked by “the Enlightenment”, brought an emerging belief in the 
power of science to understand human bodies. Health became something that 
occurred in the body independently of the patient’s emotional and spiritual life 
(Radley, 1994). There was a drive to uncover specific aetiology of disease by 
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examining bodies. Findings were named and medical labels were constructed. This 
laid the basis for the biomedical model, which looks to biological factors – 
physiology, anatomy and biochemistry - for diagnosis and treatment (Radley, 1994). 
Medicine became established as the dominant healing system in western society and 
the elevation in status of the practitioners working within it. Modern psychology has 
also been profoundly influenced by the emphasis on objectivity and observability 
(Orlans, 2013).  
Within modernism the humanist and structuralist movements developed in the mid-
twentieth century. Humanist psychology, emphasising free-will and human potential, 
challenged the determinism of behaviourism, psychoanalysis and the biomedical 
model. Humanistic counselling was seen as “a reaction against the disease model of 
mental distress that divided people into those with problems and those without” 
(Donati and Legg, 2011, p.261). However, like most other psychological therapies, 
in focusing explicitly on mental distress it maintained body-mind dualism.   
In contrast structuralism emphasised that understanding human nature was 
dependent on recognising its relationship to larger, overarching systems or structures 
(Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). These frameworks were constituted and brought into 
reality via language (Burr, 2003), which was considered the link between individual 
psychology and social structures (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). The 
biopsychosocial model (Engel, 1977) reflects a structuralist framework, recognising 
the impact of psychological and socio-cultural factors in determining illness and 
treatment. Nevertheless, although the biopsychosocial model is widely recognised 
within social sciences and healthcare (Burr, 2003), the biomedical model still 
appears dominant in current medical practice (Stacey, 1988). 
Postmodernism 
Postmodernism represents a rejection of modernism’s grand theories or 
metanarratives espousing ultimate truths and underlying structures, stressing 
pluralism or the co-existence of a multiplicity and variety of situation dependent 
ways of life (Burr, 2003). Counselling psychology embodies a postmodernist 
perspective in its encouragement of the deconstruction of arguments and questioning 
of notions of universal truths (Orlans, 2013). This suggests it could have a useful 
role in relation to “MUS”, partly because of its characteristics which reject 
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generalised theories, such as the biomedical framework, in favour of subjective and 
intersubjective narratives, attention to language and a reflexive approach.  
Against the backdrop of postmodernism, poststructuralism and social 
constructionism have developed.  
Poststructuralism 
Poststructuralism views meanings as carried by language and always contestable and 
temporary (Burr, 2003). Language is seen to operate within smaller systems or 
“discourses” which Foucault (1972, p.49) described as “practices which form the 
objects of which they speak”.  Burr (2003) suggests a discourse refers to a set of 
meanings and representations which together construct versions of events. Within a 
discursive framework “MUS” would be seen as a discursive object influenced by and 
influential on various discourses. 
Foucault saw the Enlightenment as a shift in the structure of knowledge. The science 
and practice of medicine developed within this wider structure of organising 
knowledge which in turn rationalised its structure and experience (Foucault, 1973, 
1976, 1979). These wider epistemological structures or discourses enabled medical 
investigation, diagnosis and treatment to become acceptable, respectable and 
expected under the “medical gaze”. Foucault argues this biomedical way of viewing 
the body is connected to a system of ordering related to social control (Burr, 2003). 
Work, domestic and political behaviours are regulated using classifications such as 
normal/ abnormal, healthy/ sick, sane/insane. For example, without a sick note from 
a doctor a person may be forced to work. It is arguable that “MUS” has thwarted the 
existing biomedical structure by eluding the current criteria for investigation, 
diagnosis and treatment. Therefore post-structuralist thinking and discourse analysis 
are useful frameworks for exploring “MUS”. 
Social constructionism 
Poststructuralism, along with critical psychology and discourse analysis, has a social 
constructionist orientation (Burr, 2003). Social constructionism has no one fixed 
definition but is applied to approaches that adopt a critical stance toward assumed 
knowledge, assume constructions of knowledge sustain or exclude patterns of social 
action and assume knowledge is historically and culturally specific and constructed 
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through social processes (Gergen, 1985). This fits with counselling psychology’s 
model of not assuming “the automatic superiority of any one way of experiencing, 
feeling, valuing and knowing” (Orlans, 2013, p.2). Social constructionism is useful 
for exploring how and why meanings are constructed. From both a social 
constructionist and counselling psychology stance it is inappropriate to accept 
“MUS” as a concept just because it is deemed the most suitable term and widely 
used. Instead it is recognised that “MUS” has been constructed through social 
processes with a wider social purpose within a historical and cultural context. Most 
importantly, it is recognised that this has real consequences for social action and 
power (Burr, 2003). 
Social constructionism frames illness as a social matter (Burr, 2003). Disease can be 
established without the physical experience of illness; “illness” can be granted to a 
person or the self via individual judgements. These judgements are seen as 
dependant on cultural prescriptions, norms and values around ability to function. 
Hardey (1998) argues that it is the reaction to symptoms rather than the experience 
of them that depicts illness. If illness is socially constructed then “MUS” needs to be 
explored within its wider social context, including the discourses within which it is 
located. Therefore this research adopts a social constructionist approach to exploring 
how practitioners construct “MUS” and the implications of this, particularly in 
relation to counselling psychologists who theoretically embrace this approach. 
The following eight chapters set out the research process. Chapter Two critiques the 
literature on “MUS”. Then in Chapter Three I reflect on the reflexive position I 
assume before embarking on the data collection and analysis stage. Chapter Four 
explores the epistemological basis; then the research method is set out in Chapter 
Five. Chapter Six presents the analysis of the interview transcripts and Chapter 
Seven discusses these findings in relation to the contribution they make, implications 
for practice, limitations and recommendations for further research. Further 
reflexivity is explored in Chapter Eight.  
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2. Literature Review 
This chapter critically reviews literature focusing on using “MUS” terminology and 
the implications, then hones in on more specific research which is influenced by a 
social constructionist perspective and focuses on language, structures, systems and 
the wider socio-cultural environment within which MUS is situated. 
2.1 Method 
Initial material was obtained from searching the PsycInfo database. Search criteria 
always included the term “medically unexplained symptoms” or “MUS”; other terms 
added to narrow the focus were “terminology”, “discourse”, “psychology” and 
“counselling psychology”. This generated approximately 750 articles. Based on title 
relevance 250 abstracts were skimmed and about 80 articles identified that exposed 
the use of and conflict around “MUS”. Further articles were identified from 
references within these articles. It became apparent that despite a recognised conflict 
around medical and psychological aetiology, psychological perspectives were 
missing from the debate. Therefore, I then focused in on three pieces of literature 
that in different ways implicitly suggest a need for a wider more critical focus.  
2.2 Terminology 
It is argued that the term “medically unexplained symptoms” (“MUS”) emerged 
from dissatisfaction with other terms. However, despite widespread usage, there is 
no consensus on how medically unexplained symptoms should be diagnosed and 
categorised (McFarlane et al., 2008; Smith & Dwamena, 2007), nor as to whether 
“MUS” refers to a single syndrome or several different ones (Greco, 2012). Brown 
(2007) suggests terminology is determined by the medical speciality within which it 
is encountered rather than the symptoms presented. There is consensus that the term 
is at best controversial (Greco, 2012) and at worst unsatisfactory and stigmatising 
(Guthrie, 2008). Therefore, there appears to be as much dissatisfaction with the term 
created to allay dissatisfaction as there was around previous terminology. 
There is a complex history of constructing new labels to describe physical symptoms 
in the absence of existing diagnostic labels. “MUS” is associated with “hysteria”: 
Freud (1896) believed that unresolved intrapsychic conflicts were unconsciously 
converted into somatic symptoms. According to Stone et al. (2002), “hysteria” has 
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become unacceptable and offensive to the vast majority of patients, presumably 
because of its lay connotations around uncontrollable female emotion.  
Outside of psychoanalytic discourse, “hysteria” then became known as “Briquet’s 
Syndrome” and later “somatoform disorder” in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM) III and IV respectively (APA, 1980, 1994). 
“Somatoform disorder” diagnosis involved excluding “the conscious fabrication of 
symptoms” which positioned doctors in moral arbitration roles and patients as 
potential malingerers (Greco, 2012, p.2366). The exclusion of organic factors was 
also required, suggesting organic and psychological factors are mutually exclusive 
and knowledge about organic factors is full, final and complete. “Conversion”, 
“dissociation” and “somatization” are psychiatric terms commonly applied to 
“MUS”. Brown (2007, p.773) criticised them for implying “unproven psychological 
mechanisms”, suggesting psychological mechanisms need to be proven to be viable. 
“Psychosomatic”, despite being linked since the early twentieth century to a 
prestigious academic field of medicine, is considered offensive by some patients 
(Stone et al.,2002). DSM-5 (APA, 2013) replaced “somatoform disorder” and other 
related classifications with “somatic symptom disorder”. Interestingly, diagnosis no 
longer requires somatic symptoms are medically unexplained. Instead, emphasis is 
on the degree to which thoughts, feelings and behaviours about symptoms are 
deemed disproportionate or excessive.  
“MUS”’ origins are also found in less explicitly psychogenic (having a 
psychological rather than physical cause) terms such as “functional nervous 
disorder”, first used in the late nineteenth century (Stone et al, 2002). “Functional 
somatic syndromes” is now an umbrella term constructed to cover a number of 
distinctly named conditions, such as irritable bowel syndrome, fibromyalgia and 
myalgic encephalopathy (ME). Fink et al. (2007) claim there are sufficient 
similarities between these conditions to justify the category; Trimble (1982) sees the 
term as too broad, encompassing all conditions characterised by disturbances in bio 
functioning, some of which would not normally be regarded as medically 
unexplained. Brown (2007) argues there is little direct evidence of a physical cause 
and their existence as distinct conditions is disputed. Therefore, the term appears as 
controversial as “MUS”. 
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Stone et al. (2002) and Brown (2007) both suggest patients are more comfortable 
with “functional” terminology because of its medical rather than psychological 
implications. What is interesting is their implication that a medical basis is preferable 
to a psychological one, not because it is necessarily aetiologically correct, but 
because it can be more comfortably related to.  Nevertheless, Greco (2012) argues 
that the term is used as a code word for psychogenic among doctors and that there is 
significant ambiguity among both doctors and patients as to its meaning. The 
necessity for a code word implies doctors feel the need to hide psychogenic 
plausibility from patients, even when they identify it themselves. More recently, the 
term “persistent physical symptoms” has been introduced, commended and criticised 
for similar reasons (Morton et al., 2016). Whereas this medical terminology and the 
debate around it is situated within medical or psychological boundaries, neither 
explanation necessarily mirrors the limits of patients’ understanding of their 
symptoms. In a small-scale qualitative study with Danish patients, Risor (2009) 
found patients drew on personal, social and moral idioms, as well as symptomatic 
idioms, to explain their illnesses, suggesting that in debating terminology there might 
be a need for further consideration and deconstruction of psychosocial aspects 
beyond the current polemical debate about whether aetiology is biological or 
psychological. 
Nevertheless, causal implications fuel criticism of the above terminology. McFarlane 
et al (2008) believe competing systems of classification are the problem: 
somatoform disorders in psychiatry and functional disorders in medicine.  He 
believes that “insufficient cross-reference […] creates idiosyncratic and overlapping 
approaches that lack consensus”(p.369). It is, therefore, unsurprising that “MUS” 
gets favoured for its neutrality (Stone et al., 2002). According to Creed and Guthrie 
(2010), “MUS” implies no current organic cause has been identified but leaves open 
the potential aetiology of the problem. In addition to aetiological neutrality, Greco 
(2012) adds it implies attributional neutrality: the patient may as yet be right that 
their symptoms have a physical origin and the doctor implies the symptoms are as 
yet unexplained. “MUS” both anticipates and diverts a conflict (Greco, 2012). The 
term “MUS” appears to contain the problem so that recognition of the complexity of 
treating it does not have to be faced. Yet, if practitioners are using the “MUS” label 
to avoid alluding to a psychological dimension which they believe to be there then 
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they would be deceiving patients. They would be potentially colluding in a 
stigmatising portrayal of psychological problems, closing down psychological 
treatment opportunities and maintaining costly and ineffective biomedical treatment 
strategies. There are also complex negative implications of diagnostic uncertainty for 
patients (Hills, Lees, Freshwater & Cahill (2016), such as stigma, and uncertainty 
has been argued to have a negative effect on patient outcome (Deary, Chalder & 
Sharpe, 2007). To this extent “MUS” is not a neutral term and this is not an abstract 
debate about terminology. The way we use terminology has real implications for 
patients and their lives. 
To address the problem of terminology and disputed aetiology, McFarlane et al 
(2008) call for the development of psychophysiological models; Creed and Guthrie 
(2010) suggest an approach which focuses solely on symptom description (avoiding 
aetiological assumptions), whilst Brown (2007) calls for further efforts to find a set 
of mutually acceptable and meaningful terms. These integrative suggestions seem to 
make sense in the light of problematic aetiology, and are more in tune with 
increasing understanding that bodily symptoms reflect the brain’s integration of 
multiple aetiological factors (Sharpe et al., 2006; Damasio, 1994). However, they 
fail to recognise that models, approaches and terminology are constructed within 
wider structures and limited by existing discourses. If one of the fundamental issues 
is that existing structures and related discourses cannot accommodate a complex 
biopsychosocial problem then developing new models, approaches and terminology 
alone will not resolve this. If terminology is being constructed to restrict debate, 
deceive patients, maintain positions and avoid aetiological conflict, particularly at 
the very first stage of patient/doctor encounter, then opportunities for effective 
treatment responses could be severely limited. There is first a need to acknowledge 
and better understand the relationship between language, medically unexplained 
symptoms and the social, political and historical environment within which they are 
situated. Counselling psychology, with its critical relationship to both research and 
practice and emphasis on social context, is well placed to make a valid contribution 
to this, but CoPs would need to critically engage with the issues and put themselves 
forward to work in this area.  
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2.3 The role of language 
The previous section shows that it is not possible to review the use of “MUS” 
terminology without exposing conflict. This conflict reflects the power of language 
to construct, position and legitimise phenomena. The way we use language has 
significant implications for what we can think, say, do and can be done to us. 
Ultimately “MUS” challenges the existing structures within which it has been 
constructed. Yet there has been little critical attention to the way that terminology 
and classification feed into the conflictual dynamic and are in turn informed by it 
(Greco, 2012).  
Legitimacy 
Greco (2012) notices discrepancy between professional knowledge and lay 
experience: “MUS” can be both medically suspect and experientially devastating 
(Barker, 2008). This paradox is embedded in the wider role of diagnosis and debate 
about legitimacy. According to Stone et al. (2002) a diagnosis signifies to the patient 
and their significant others that the complaints are viewed as real and the problem is 
being taken seriously. This relates to what Nettleton et al. (2005) describe as the 
pressure to be “successfully ill” and avoid becoming a “medical orphan”. Although 
patients might be experiencing profound and debilitating symptoms, without a 
diagnosis they may have no medical language to draw upon to communicate this to 
others and possibly no system to turn to for support. This illustrates the power of 
discourse to construct meaning and reality. Without a diagnosis patients can struggle 
to position themselves in a society which expects legitimate sickness to have a name.  
In the context of a qualitative symbolic interaction study among a small sample of 
Danish GPs, Mik-Meyer and Obling (2012) found that GPs’ criteria for judging 
legitimacy among patients presenting with “MUS” and unable to work was not 
always limited by a biomedical framework: they subjectively constructed additional 
criteria from which to judge the legitimacy of patient sickness. Drawing on a 
biopsychosocial discourse, decisions seemed influenced by whether or not they 
identified social problems and “problematic personality traits”.  
Further research would be necessary to explore exactly how widely used such 
criteria are. However, in this sociological study it appears the GPs felt empowered to 
legitimise sickness based on psychosocial criteria. Yet this criteria needs critical 
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examination. Patients’ personalities are explicitly referred to in terms of traits and 
types and explicitly constructed as different and separate from social problems. GPs’ 
phrases that are categorised as implying problematic personality include “personal 
shortcomings”, “pre-morbid psyche”, “low threshold for adversity”, “whiners” and 
“inept at living”. Such language appears unsophisticated, unprofessional and 
pejorative. It suggests that both the GPs and the authors are constructing “MUS” as a 
problem of personality by deferring to an over-simplistic personality discourse 
(which the authors describe as “common-sense psychology” without further 
explanation) (Mik-Meyer and Obling, 2012, p.1028). “Problematic life 
circumstances” and “violent family histories” are classed as unrelated social 
problems. 
This is an essentialist way of viewing personality which constructs personality traits 
as stable, unified and uninfluenced by social factors. Several psychological positions 
have questioned the idea of a stable personality across situations and over time (Burr, 
2003). For example, psychoanalytic theories stress motivational concepts and social 
learning theory refers to the situation specificity of behaviour. A social 
constructionist approach construes personal qualities as a function of the specific 
historical, cultural and relational situation in which we are located (Burr, 2003). 
Counselling psychology reflects this position with its own emphasis on social 
contexts and engagement with subjectivity and intersubjectivity (BPS, 2005; Orlans, 
2013). By drawing on alternative psychological discourses those same GPs’ 
descriptions might be viewed as signs of depression or anxiety rather than 
problematic personality, and the patients’ behaviour explored in terms of distorted 
cognitions or internal conflicts, possibly resulting from difficult or complex social 
experiences. This illustrates the powerful influence of discourse and the very real 
social consequences. For example, if problems are constructed as transient and 
changeable rather than innate and constant they are more likely to be viewed as 
treatable.  
Mik-Meyer and Obling’s (2012) research suggests psychologically uninformed GPs 
are subjectively extending their legitimacy criteria with potentially ineffective and 
irresponsible consequences. However, unless the psychological dimension to “MUS” 
is explicitly recognised it is unlikely that GPs will become better psychologically 
informed. The question of current medical systems’ ability to accommodate “MUS” 
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needs to be acknowledged. Wider contributions to the debate from outside the 
medical and sociological disciplines would be valuable. The questioning culture of 
counselling psychology has the potential to provide critical resistance to some of the 
underlying and damaging assumptions around “MUS”.   
Disavowal of the psychological 
As has been highlighted, the “MUS” debate is fuelled by aetiological conflict 
between the medical and psychological. Patients are often positioned as resisting a 
psychological classification. Nettleton et al. (2005) found that a salient concern of 
the neurology patients in their study with unexplained, undiagnosed symptoms was 
that their symptoms might be viewed as psychological. Tucker (2004) argues 
patients have to position themselves as physically ill to avoid the stigma of a 
psychological disorder and Horton-Salway (2007) describes a “moral ordering” by 
patients and GPs that places physical above psychological illness in terms of 
genuineness. The stigma of mental health problems charges suggestions of a 
psychological character to “MUS” with “potentially explosive connotations” (Greco, 
2012 p.2368). Given these sensitive findings it is understandable that caution is 
given to psychological dimensions, but Greco (2012) suggests this caution leads to a 
lack of critical examination. She critically reviews debates around the use of medical 
terminology from a social theoretical perspective. 
Greco (2012) argues that in articulating patients’ experiences of delegitimisation and 
marginalisation social scientists have made vital contributions to the “MUS” debate, 
however in so doing they have reinforced the position of patients as such and 
therefore potentially contributed to the polemical situation. She suggests that the 
political commitment towards validating lay narratives has involved epistemological 
neutrality in relation to aetiology. Greco is arguing that social scientists implicitly 
avoid taking a position on aetiology by treating this as outside the realm of their 
work; yet they represent the voices of patients who largely disfavour a psychological 
aspect to their suffering. She implies social scientists perform this caution 
uncritically and without sufficient understanding of the psychological dimension, 
whilst their choices implicitly perform the role of maintaining the polemical 
positions of dismissive doctor and delegitimised patient. 
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Greco (2012) also argues that medical discourse displays resistance to psychological 
explanations (despite doctors’ talk of patients’ resistance to psychological 
attributions). The introduction to DSM IV (APA, 1994, p.xxx) recognises that “there 
is much ‘physical’ in mental disorders, and much ‘mental’ in physical disorders” but 
goes on to only discuss this in relation to mental disorders. This persistent disavowal 
of a psychological dimension to other physical illnesses might be what constructs a 
psychological dimension to “MUS” as frightening. The supposed neutrality of the 
“MUS” term fuels the conflict and poses barriers to potential implementation of 
psychological interventions (Greco, 2012). 
Greco (2012) sees this cautious approach to “MUS” within medicine and social 
scientific research as both performative and paradoxical: “neutrality” is a strategy to 
reduce clinical conflict but it avoids acknowledging a potentially “difficult truth” 
creating a deadlock. Greco locates this within wider political fields where 
epistemological privilege is still awarded to the visible (Foucault, 1973) and recourse 
to a biomedical discourse constrains the exploration of the psychological within all 
symptoms, not just “MUS”.  Greco is not implying a psychological over a physical 
nature to MUS, but highlighting a collusion which reinforces negative and reductive 
connotations of the psychological. She calls for “a problematisation” of the 
psychological dimension (2013, p.2368). This involves acknowledging internal 
differences, tensions and paradoxes and defining assumptions that may hold across 
apparent conflict. The aim would be “to assert that the psychological is relevant 
everywhere and to render it discussable in its multiple versions and implications” 
(Greco, 2012, p.2368). Such an approach would involve moving beyond the 
polemical positions of dismissive doctor and difficult patient which maintain a 
polemical deadlock.  
However, despite calling for a problematisation embracing multiple versions and 
different values, Greco limits her invitation to social scientists, even suggesting it to 
be unrealistic and possibly unreasonable to expect “clinical researchers” to get 
involved. There appear several limitations to this. By excusing the need for “clinical 
researchers” Greco fails to recognise the importance of the involvement of the 
medical profession and a focus on both psychological and physical dimensions. 
Greco does not distinguish between the different kinds of social scientists nor 
actually define who she means by clinical researchers. Nor does she recognise the 
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absence of distinctly psychological research. She is critical of social scientists, 
largely sociological, for colluding in the disavowal of the psychological, but looks to 
them to open their perspective to a psychological dimension rather than calling on 
psychologists and psychotherapists to enter the debate. Social scientists’ contribution 
is important, but in order to critically explore the psychological dimension it is 
necessary to open up the debate to new voices and the opportunities for resistance 
and facilitation that their versions might bring.  
2.4 Structures and systems 
In his article on “MUS” in Therapy Today, psychiatrist Tim Webb (2010) argues that 
20 to 50 per cent of all medical problems relate to “MUS” and that the case for 
improving approaches to the psychosomatic component of medicine is clinically and 
financially sound as well as increasingly topical. He also believes that evidence 
exists to suggest we know enough about psychological therapies and drug treatments 
to impact on patient recovery, clinician satisfaction and cost reduction. What could 
be seen as potentially scandalous is that current structures do not allow for it. For 
example, conventional medical formulations do not allow for understanding a 
problem in both psychological and physical terms; structures locate physical and 
mental health specialists’ work in different fields resulting in a lack of integration of 
knowledge; specialities are largely divided by parts of the body with an onus on 
increasing specific separate knowledge about that area; techno-medically trained 
doctors are uncomfortable with conditions that cannot be diagnosed using objective 
tests (Webb, 2010). 
Webb (2010) believes that to deal effectively with “MUS” it is necessary to 
transform healthcare delivery to create a system that involves both medical and 
psychological practitioners, including psychotherapists, and positively identifies and 
treats the psychological causes of “MUS”. This will involve a major restructuring at 
several levels involving an unprecedented level of teamwork. Both medical and 
psychological practitioners will need to acquire new knowledge and skills to enable 
them to work at the biological/psychological interface. Webb fears the complexity of 
the challenge may maintain inertia whilst recognising the cost implications of not 
acting to be a powerful motivator against this.  
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Webb’s article provides disturbing insight into the current situation. He does not 
refer directly to the power of discourse; yet he situates “MUS” within its political 
and socioeconomic context and his pragmatic arguments reiterate that current 
structures and systems are ill-equipped to manage “MUS” because they cannot 
accommodate symptoms which might involve both psychological and biological 
dimensions. Therefore, Webb reemphasises that approaches to “MUS” are 
influenced by the context within which they operate, and vice versa. Therefore it 
seems that further consideration of discourse would be helpful in the exploration of 
practice and needs to extend beyond the medical domain. “MUS” exists within 
social, economic, political and cultural structures and its use can be both restricted 
by them but also used to uphold them.  
2.5 Summary, Conclusion and Research Question 
It is clear from the literature reviewed that there is a lot of dissatisfaction with the 
term “medically unexplained symptoms”. “MUS” hides meanings, neutralises 
conflicts, acts as a code word, hurts feelings, implies legitimacy, insinuates 
delegitimacy, suggests a psychological dimension, avoids a psychological 
connotation, humiliates patients, confounds doctors, maintains structures, challenges 
political assumptions and creates meaning in many other different and conflicting 
ways. Fundamentally, “MUS” masks paradoxes, inconsistencies and contradictions. 
Nevertheless, despite this performative dimension, there is limited exploration of 
“MUS” from a discursive perspective. 
The Enlightenment contributed to the construction of an environment where the 
biomedical model and the status of observation and science flourished. As doctors 
and diagnosis became the source of legitimacy the space for symptoms which could 
not be accommodated within the biomedical discourse diminished. This has 
contributed to a long and problematic history as to how to accommodate unexplained 
symptoms within this context. It appears “MUS” was constructed as a concept in 
order to fit patients and their symptoms into existing structures, even when these 
structures cannot respond adequately to them. Therefore, there is a need to 
understand further how “MUS” is situated within its discursive environment, and 
how this generates both constraints and opportunities. 
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Despite a long history of recognition that psychological distress can result in 
physical symptoms, and widespread agreement among practitioners that a 
psychological dimension to at least some “MUS” exists, an inability to officially and 
explicitly accommodate this is troublesome and has particularly significant 
consequences at the GP/patient interface. Approaches appear constrained by the 
dominant biomedical discourse. This is highlighted by Webb (2010) who 
compellingly argues that fundamental restructuring of patient services needs to occur 
before “MUS” can be appropriately responded to, including greater involvement of 
psychological therapists in any new structure. Mik-Meyer and Obling’s (2012) 
research suggests that the limitations of biomedical discourse can force GPs to 
subjectively construct their own criteria in order to position patients as legitimate or 
not. This opens the potential for GPs to unilaterally draw on social and psychological 
discourses of which they may not have appropriate experience or be sufficiently 
trained to defer to. This in turn has significant risks for the positioning of patients. 
Greco’s (2012) review highlights the existence of a polemical deadlock that she 
believes is fuelled by a disavowal of a psychological dimension. She argues that the 
danger of the current approach is that it avoids psychological exploration, limiting 
understanding of “MUS”. This lack of psychological exploration and the need for it 
provides further rationale for this research. 
The literature reviewed approaches “MUS” from different angles; yet it all highlights 
how difficult it is to accommodate “MUS” within dominant biomedical discourse. It 
also implies that that significant perspectives are missing from the discussion and 
significant others need to contribute to the debate in order that resistance to the 
current situation can be created, change can occur and patients can be better 
accommodated. 
Clinical psychologists have been active in developing models and theories, and 
psychotherapists and applied psychologists have been involved in providing therapy. 
However, unless they are prepared to engage with the current debate and the 
challenges to effective primary care it exposes, many patients will not get to benefit 
from psychological interventions because they will remain stuck in a primary care 
structure within an unaccommodating biomedical discourse and never receive any 
psychological intervention. It is particularly disappointing that CoPs have not 
contributed to this discussion. As research-practitioners they are encouraged to 
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appreciate, as well as critically explore, the complexity of problems: to accept the 
co-creation of meaning and consider the existence of multiple perspectives within a 
socially constructed world. Alongside others they are therefore, arguably, in a good 
position to resist uncritical endorsement of “MUS” and contribute creatively and 
constructively to the situation. Given this position, this research will include CoPs as 
participants, in order to explore how they are constructing “MUS” and what 
contributions their voices can add to the discussion. Therefore a significant part of 
this research will be exploration of the psychological dimension, from a 
psychological perspective, involving psychologist participants. 
This literature review has strongly identified the relevance of discourse to the topic 
of “MUS” and the usefulness of situating “MUS” within its discursive environment 
in order to better understand how it is being used and why. Therefore this research 
explores how GPs and CoPs are constructing “MUS”, what might be the 
implications and how might CoPs respond to this? Both GPs and CoPs are included 
in order to encompass voices across the traditional medical/psychological divide, 
rather than from one particular professional domain.   
2.6 Reflexive statement: Part 1 
In choosing this topic for my counselling psychology doctoral research my curiosity 
around “medically unexplained symptoms” was mainly twofold.  
Firstly, it stemmed from personal experience of uncomfortable “neurological” 
symptoms that resulted in secondary care referrals and various tests over several 
years; they were never “medically explained”, nor was it ever suggested there might 
be a psychological dimension. In hindsight I believe they were maintained by a 
misunderstanding that unusual physical symptoms ought to have a medical 
explanation, resultant health anxiety and interactions with medical staff that neither 
hinted at the possibility of a psychological dimension nor normalised what I was 
experiencing. Overall I remember a persistent fear that I was seriously unwell, a lack 
of reassurance from medical staff that I was not and an embarrassment around 
having an illegitimate sickness with no name. These are the memories and feelings I 
remained aware of as I began this study. 
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Secondly, and partly influenced by my personal experience, I believed that a 
pervasive mind-body dualism that is detrimental to wellbeing prevails in our 
society’s approach to health. On first reading Foucault (1973) over a decade ago I 
remember being drawn to what he had to say about the genealogy of medical 
practice, positioning it as a “disciplinary regime” which had contributed to the 
objectification of bodies through the “medical gaze”.  As a result of my personal 
experience I could particularly relate to the legitimising power of the medical 
establishment and how illness has become dependent on a doctor’s diagnosis rather 
than subjective experience. Later on when I learned about the existence of the term 
“medically unexplained symptoms” (something I had never heard of as a term nor a 
concept before embarking on my counselling psychology training) and the debate 
around its legitimacy I was quickly drawn to the social constructionist literature to 
explore the topic. It seemed to offer a useful and relevant way in which to explore 
the wider subject in the same way that it had provided a context for my own 
“illness”. To this extent I was implicitly choosing a stance that provided a framework 
within which I could comfortably explore and start to make sense of my own 
experience and, in FDA, a method of analysis with a history of scepticism towards 
medicine. My desire to deconstruct “MUS” was perhaps part of an unconscious 
personal need to critically explore a system that had not served me well personally.  
Social constructionism also fitted with the prevailing philosophy of counselling 
psychology that I was critically adopting as a new trainee. I was disappointed to find 
a lack of counselling psychological contribution to the topic. In hindsight I think that 
by undertaking this research as a CoP and involving CoPs in my research I hoped to 
match CoP values and skills to the gaps and difficulties identified in the literature 
review. Perhaps I also hoped to encourage CoPs to become more aware of and 
involved with “MUS”, and others to become more aware of what CoPs could offer in 
this area. To this extent my implicit motives may have been to match my own 
interests with a role for them in my new profession.  
As a result of these personal influences and academic interests I understood that I 
was vulnerable to certain biases, potentially defensive responses and other 
presuppositions and preconceived ideas about what I was investigating, such as those 
discussed above.  Initially I therefore attempted to adopt the phenomenological 
strategy of epoché (or bracketing) (Langdridge, 2007). I tried to maintain doubt 
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about my own knowledge and examine material from a variety of perspectives. Like 
the existential phenomenologists I did not believe that you can ever completely 
bracket off your presuppositions (Langdridge, 2007), but thought I understood the 
importance of attempting to do so in research as a necessary part of being open to 
others’ perspectives and experiences. Therefore I attempted to conduct my research 
with an awareness of my personal biases and an open attitude towards all relevant 
perspectives. 
Exploration of this topic turned out to be more personally challenging than expected. 
It was the first time that I had chosen to study a topic with such personal resonance. I 
had thought that enough time had passed since my own experience of “MUS” that 
my relationship with it would fuel my interest without exposing me to emotionally 
charged responses. I underestimated how challenging I would find reading some of 
the literature. I was reminded that resolution is not necessarily final and learnt that 
epoché is not easily practiced. 
I had been unaware of the link between “MUS” and hysteria and felt affronted 
(perhaps ignorantly) by its lay connotations. I had been unaware of the way that 
doctors referred to patients with “MUS” as “heartsink patients” and “frequent flyers” 
(Greco, 2012). This did not fit with my own experience at the time – I had received 
kindness and support from medical staff. I recoiled at the thought that I might have 
been viewed in this way. Mik-Meyer and Obling’s (2012) research and 
interpretations were particularly challenging to digest: GPs’ descriptions of patients 
with “MUS” as “joyless”, “inept at living” and “pitiable people” were difficult for 
me to read as were their findings that GPs discover fundamental human weaknesses 
on both a social and personal level in these patients.  
As a trainee counselling psychologist, I realised the relationship I needed to develop 
with this topic was not that different from a challenging relationship with a client in 
therapy. I could notice the way the material was making me feel. Then by treating 
my feelings as a kind of academic countertransference I could use them in 
understanding potential positions and explore more deeply what the significance of 
them was for my research.  
Fortunately, there was research that showed a more compassionate approach to a 
complex phenomenon and as the complexity of “MUS” became increasingly 
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apparent I felt more intrigued and less challenged by these perspectives. This 
position felt closer to my starting one. I could never personally relate to the positions 
of dismissive doctor and misunderstood patient. I had experienced both interest and 
kindness from doctors and had felt firmly and exclusively positioned as a physical 
health patient. I had never considered that this had anything to do with mental health. 
It was the idea that my experience, and possibly that of my doctors, had been 
constrained by a limited view of illness drawn from a broader biomedical, western 
cultural discourse that fuelled my interest in the topic. 
I began to see the confusion and complexity surrounding “MUS” as further 
indication that the current situation is problematic, and my own emotional response 
as further indication that the topic evokes strong reactions and needs further 
exploration. This strategy helped me to focus my energy on developing an open 
understanding of the topic. Some evidence of success became apparent as I found 
myself letting go of some of my more rigid ideas about the pervasiveness of 
body/mind dualism and the dominance of the biomedical discourse and developed a 
more sophisticated understanding of the complexity of the polemic and nascent 
efforts that are being made towards integration and anti-polemical engagement. A 
passionate belief that this topic needs wider, critical attention remained and 
accompanied me into the research phase. 
Nevertheless, it seems important to note where I was at this stage in my research in 
relation to two significant processes. Firstly, at this point in my research my 
understanding of illness had shifted from an understanding that physical symptoms 
result from biological malfunctioning to one that psychological difficulties can cause 
physical symptoms. As a result I now see that I was constructing “MUS” as a 
psychological problem stuck in a medical dimension because of a cultural 
misunderstanding of illness.  
Secondly, at this stage of my research I was unaware of the more implicit and 
unconscious ways that I was influencing the research, particularly the choices I was 
making at each stage of the process and how these would influence the direction and 
shape of the research. To this extent, the reflexive relationship I could have with the 
research process was constrained by the limits of my own knowledge and 
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understanding of the process, the discourses that were available to me at that time. 
This is discussed further in reflexive statement parts 2, 3 and 4 (chapters 3, 4 and 5).  
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Epistemological position 
This research focuses on how “MUS” was constructed during interviews with four 
practitioners and some of the possible influences on and consequences of these 
constructions. A qualitative methodology was used because it allows for exploration 
of meaning and subjective interpretations of phenomena. It also allows for personal 
and epistemological reflexivity. Burr (2003) argues that qualitative methods are less 
likely to decontextualize experiences and this is important for this research as the 
context is a crucial part of the exploration. 
“MUS” is mediated historically, culturally and linguistically. Therefore its meaning 
is created and negotiated through discourse and conversation (Willig, 2001). The 
term “MUS” does not represent a social reality, but constructs one. That is why a 
social constructionist epistemology guided the exploration of this topic. A social 
constructionist stance is concerned with identifying the available ways in which 
“MUS” is constructed, how these enable and disable opportunities and the 
implications for human experience and social practice (Willig, 2001). It 
demonstrates how categories like “MUS” construct realities as well as reflect them. 
Nevertheless, social constructionism is not a methodology, but a theoretical position. 
It is guided by criticality and a rejection of universal truths. Its suspicion of taken-
for-granted knowledge allows for the exploration of uncritical use and endorsement 
of “MUS”. Counselling psychology reflects a social constructionist epistemology in 
the way it holds criticality as a key principle in the context of exploring “truths” 
(Orlans, 2013). Counselling psychology also places significant value on the 
phenomenology of our clients’ difficulties (Corrie, 2010); however, a 
phenomenological stance would be less appropriate for the purposes of this research 
where the focus is on the influence of social and cultural forces. 
3.2 Method of analysis 
Discourse analysis (DA) takes a social constructionist approach to research (Coyle, 
2007), exploring how language constructs versions of the world and the 
consequences of this.  It encourages us to explore how we use and are used by 
30 
 
language in society and how language positions individuals in relations of power 
(Davies, 2000). Therefore it offers a way to question and resist powerful images that 
circulate in society (Willig, 1999). Foucault (1972, p.49) described discourses as 
“practices which form the objects of which they speak”, whereas Burr (2003) 
suggests a discourse refers to a set of meanings and representations which together 
construct versions of events. Discourses are ways of thinking, feeling, talking about 
or imagining something, but unlike an individual perspective or attitude they draw 
on a broader sociocultural framework and in turn, through their use, they strengthen 
and reinforce that framework of meaning within the society in which its use is 
situated. 
Discourse constructs our experience of the world. For example, if we discuss “MUS” 
in a way that suggests people with “MUS” are not experiencing real symptoms this 
might encourage an environment in which little time or resources are focused on 
“MUS” or people with “MUS” are dismissed as illegitimate patients or 
“malingerers”; if we discuss “MUS” as a genuine biopsychosocial problem affecting 
many people this might influence the attention given to the issue and encourage a 
more sympathetic response. Discourses are powerful influences with powerful 
consequences and deserve significant attention when exploring a matter. 
There are several forms of discourse analysis in use. In the UK discursive 
psychology (DP) and Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) are most common 
(Coyle, 2007) and both emphasise the linguistic construction of social reality. DP is 
interested in the negotiation of meaning within interactions in everyday contexts.  It 
focuses on what people do with language and stresses the performative qualities of 
discourse (Willig, 2001). It enables better understanding of different ways of talking 
by deliberately systematising them (Parker, 1992).  Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
(FDA) emphasises the limitations set by the language that is available to us and how 
this affects the way we think, speak, what we do and what is done to us (Burr, 2003). 
FDA also recognises the dynamic political influences on the world we live in. It 
recognises how discourses construct a structural reality which holds power over how 
we understand and talk about the world (Burr, 2003). FDA is influenced by the work 
of Michel Foucault and other post-structuralist writers (Willig, 2001). It is used by 
those interested in issues of identity, subjectivity, personal and social change and 
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power relations (Burr, 2002). Unlike DP, FDA explores the implications of discourse 
for possible ways-of-being, for limiting subject positions and the implications of this 
for selfhood and subjective experience (Willig, 2001). “MUS” can be located within 
powerful discourses that have implications for how it can be constructed and affect 
those involved, such as patients, practitioners and their practices. Therefore, FDA 
was the qualitative method chosen to explore how practitioners construct “MUS”. 
3.3 Participants and Recruitment Strategy 
The participants for this study were 2 general practitioners (GPs) and 2 chartered 
counselling psychologists (CoPs) who had experience of working in a professional 
capacity with people with “MUS”. Both professions work directly with people with 
“MUS” and it was thought it would be enriching to involve both in the interview in 
order to deepen the analysis. Different professions are likely to be influenced by 
different discourses, both individually and as a group, and therefore it was hoped to 
encounter a variety of different constructions across the medical/psychological 
divide which might enhance understanding about the different versions of “MUS” in 
use and the discourses they draw upon. 
Participant eligibility criteria 
All participants were professionally registered in the UK and had a self-declared 
interest in working in “MUS”.  To potentially allow for a range of experiences they 
were all at least two years post-qualifying and had experience of working in their 
professional capacity with at least two persons with “MUS”. To confer eligibility, 
participants needed to exhibit a sufficient level of English language proficiency to 
undertake the interview. These criteria were stated in the “call for participants” 
advertisement (Appendix B) and the participant information sheet (Appendix C) and 
reconfirmed by email prior to the interview.  
The strategies used to recruit participants were dissemination of the advertisement 
(Appendix B) at the British Psychological Society’s counselling psychology 
conference, through the Division of Counselling Psychology’s newsletter, at a 
university medical school, through a hospital interdisciplinary psychosomatic group 
and via professional contacts. A participant information sheet with further 
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information was provided to potential candidates who were interested in taking part 
(Appendix C). What constitutes “MUS” was left to the participants to decide to 
allow for their subjective understanding of the term, i.e. if they thought they had 
encountered “MUS” in their practice then their experience of what “MUS” is and 
means will be reflected in that encounter and therefore relevant to this study. GPs 
and CoPs who consented to participate attended a face-to-face interview which 
lasted approximately one hour. It took 9 months to recruit all the participants and 
therefore there was a gap of 7 months between the first and last interviews. 
The sample size was small to allow for detailed analysis of the data gathered, as is 
acceptable practice in DA (Coyle, 2007). Four participants were deemed sufficient to 
provide enough text to consider a variety of discursive forms and practices. Due to 
time constraints more participants would have limited the opportunity to analyse the 
interviews to such sufficient depth.  
The participants recruited were Helen, Hannah, Tom and Maggie (pseudonyms). 
Helen and Maggie are both GPs, although Maggie also trained as a psychodynamic 
psychotherapist. Both are practicing in the NHS, but Maggie now works in a 
voluntary position as a GP seeing patients for extended (45 minute) appointments. 
Hannah and Tom are both counselling psychologists with experience of working in 
the public and private sector. 
3.4 Data collection and materials 
This research was interested in how the participants constructed “MUS”, how they 
positioned the role of themselves and their profession in relation to “MUS” and the 
implications of this. Therefore, data was collected via semi-structured interviews. 
DA favours naturally-occurring texts and it is sometimes questioned whether 
interviews can be classed as such because they are researcher-instigated (Phillips & 
Hardy, 2002). However, these interviews were constructed as actual examples of 
language in use and therefore deemed an appropriate method for collecting this data.  
Although the interviews are referred to as “semi-structured” because they were 
guided by a framework (see below), some of the discussion that emerged was 
unstructured as it arose from participants’ responses. The aim was to try to conduct 
an interview which naturally evolved within the boundaries of the topic. These 
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boundaries were subjectively imposed by both the researcher and participant 
according to our understandings of the topic “MUS” and were contained by the 
available discourses. There was no attempt to disguise the fact that this was an 
interview. Nevertheless, I attempted to keep the interview informal by allowing it to 
flow from the participants responses to my initial questions.  
I had developed a flexible interview guide to support the interview as needed. Its 
content reflected the gaps that had emerged from the literature review and the 
resultant research question: How are GPs and CoPs constructing “MUS”, what might 
be the implications of this and how might CoPs respond to this? Five areas framed 
the discussion: “MUS”, language, medical/psychological split, discourses and roles 
(Appendix F). Several questions relating to each topic were constructed. The guide 
was not designed to be used in any particular order, and not all topics needed to be 
covered. All questions were open-ended to encourage participants to construct their 
own opinions and perspectives and additional probing questions were asked as 
appropriate to aid clarification and encourage elaboration. The aim was that talk 
would flow freely and be allowed to take a direction of its own within the topic 
boundaries. Single or correct answers to questions were not assumed; what was 
produced was and could only be considered as possible versions (Wood & Kroger, 
2000).  
It is recognised that, due to reflexivity, interviewers cannot be uninvolved or neutral.  
Therefore the interview was seen as “active”, involving both interviewer and 
interviewee co-constructing meaning (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995). I acknowledge 
that I brought prior expectations and agendas to the interview (Burman, 1994), 
although I chose to restrict my role to the task of asking questions (as opposed to 
commenting or sharing my own ideas). 
The interviews were digitally recorded with participants’ prior consent. They were 
transcribed verbatim and anonymised to protect confidentiality. Materials for this 
study included: advertisement for participants, participant information sheet, consent 
form, debrief form, interview schedule and digital audio recorder (see Appendices B, 
C, D, E and F). 
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3.5 Data synthesis, analysis and interpretation 
The analysis of the interview transcripts was guided by a six stage FDA process 
developed by Willig (2001). Burr (2003) stresses such conventions steer “what is in 
the end a subjective, interpretative analysis rather than providing recipe-type 
instructions” (p.160) and to this end Willig’s (2001) “procedural guidelines” were 
helpful. Other FDA procedures (Parker, 1992; Kendall & Wickham, 1999) identify 
more steps, but Willig’s were deemed appropriate because they allowed for 
identification of discursive resources, the subject positions they contain and 
exploration of the implications for subjectivity and practice (Willig, 2001). Therefore 
they provided an ample and suitable framework to guide this analysis.  
Having identified “MUS” as the discursive object to explore, the first stage involved 
highlighting references to “MUS” and identifying the different ways in which 
“MUS” was constructed in the texts. For example, was “MUS” being constructed as 
a biomedical disease process? Or as the somatic manifestation of psychological 
traits? Or in other ways? In the second stage I attempted to locate “MUS” within 
wider discourses. I tried to identify which discourses the interviewees were drawing 
upon when they talked about “MUS” in the way that they did. In the third stage, 
relating to “action orientation”, I explored what purpose and function these 
constructions served.  I considered what might be gained from looking at “MUS” in 
a particular way at a particular point and how this related to other constructions 
formed in the text. For example, was it to attribute responsibility or emphasise a 
contribution? The aim was to get a clearer understanding of what various 
constructions of “MUS” are capable of achieving within the text. 
In the fourth stage different subject positions offered by discursive constructions of 
“MUS” were explored. Discourses construct subjects as well as objects; they make 
certain positions available to be taken up (Willig, 2001). For example, within the 
biomedical discourse it could be suggested that “MUS”-as-physical-illness 
constructs a legitimate patient; “MUS”-as-psychological-problem constructs an 
illegitimate one. The way the interviewees construct “MUS” has implications for 
their own subject position as well as that of others. In turn this has implications for 
how their professional role is constructed and viewed. 
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In stage five I looked at the practices of the subjects positioned within the discursive 
constructions of “MUS”. This stage explored the way in which discursive 
constructions and the subject positions contained within them open up and close 
down opportunities for action (Willig, 2001). This is where the implications of 
discourse for practice were investigated and is key to the FDA approach. So, for 
example, “MUS” has been found to be bound up with a biomedical discourse that 
constructs illness as requiring an observable physical cause and therefore 
incompatible with “MUS”. Thus “MUS” needs to suggest neutrality in order that 
“MUS” can retain a potential position within the biomedical discourse. Otherwise 
the biomedical discourse would be seen as incompatible with large amounts of 
illness. Thus discourses limit what can be said and done and practices reproduce the 
discourses which legitimise them (Willig, 2001). 
The final stage explored the relationship between discourse and subjectivity. It 
investigated the implications of taking up various subjective positions for the 
interviewee’s subjective experience. It explored what can be felt, thought and 
experienced from within different discourses and subject positions (Willig, 2001). 
For example, a patient may feel legitimately sick if their symptoms are positioned 
within a medical discourse. This stage emphasised the construction of social and 
psychological realities and contributed significantly to an understanding of power 
relations and what might be maintaining or challenging the current status quo. 
Using these stages enabled me to explore constructions of “MUS” from several 
different angles to get a fuller picture of the discursive practices that are evident 
within them and the implications of these according to the GPs’ and CoPs’ 
constructed versions. 
3.6 Ethics 
Potential participants were fully informed about the purpose of the study without any 
obligation to participate (Appendices B, C and D). They had the right to withdraw 
from the study for up to two months following the interview and were clearly 
informed of this, both verbally and in writing. This was in order to prevent 
participants withdrawing once the process of analysis had begun. Consent to 
participate was gained in writing; permission to audiotape the interviews was 
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explicitly requested (Appendix D). Participants were asked not to intentionally 
provide any personally identifying information about themselves or patients. Any 
personally identifying information that was accidentally provided was deleted from 
the transcript. All data remained completely confidential and was securely stored in 
my home. Permission to use anonymised quotations from the transcript and to 
comment on the transcript was explicitly requested. Audio recordings will be 
destroyed as soon as my doctoral qualification has been conferred, and anonymised 
data will be destroyed within five years of research submission (by September 2021), 
according to London Metropolitan University’s (2014) Code of Good Research 
Practice. 
The participants for this study were not considered vulnerable, nor was participation 
anticipated to cause distress, but participants were nevertheless debriefed and a 
follow up contact provided (Appendix E). The research project did not involve 
deceiving participants; it did not require the disclosure of confidential or private 
information; it did not lead to the disclosure of illegal activity or incriminating 
information and no potential conflicts of interest were anticipated nor occurred. 
This research abided by the British Psychological Society’s (BPS) ethical guidelines 
as set out in the Code of Human Research Ethics (BPS, 2010). This research 
received ethical approval from the Research Ethics Review Panel (RERP) at London 
Metropolitan University. It did not need approval by an NHS research ethics 
committee (REC) as “REC review is not normally required for research involving 
NHS […] staff recruited as research participants by virtue of their professional role” 
unless “the project raises significant issues which cannot be managed routinely in 
accordance with established guidelines and good practice” (NHS, p.13). This project 
was not deemed to pose such risks. This clause supersedes the clause in the BPS 
Code of Human Research Ethics which advised NHS ethical clearance was needed 
for interviewing NHS staff by virtue of their professional role (BPS, 2010). 
3.7 Reflexive Statement: Part 2 
DA encourages a reflexive approach to research. Without fixed institutionalised 
techniques it becomes necessary to take responsibility for the texts and decide how 
to customise work (Philips & Hardy, 2002). In the spirit of DA it was important in 
37 
 
this research to allow for multiple meanings and interpretations at the same time as 
recognising that discourse can never be studied in its entirety and that my work is 
another incomplete version of the situation (Philips & Hardy, 2002).  
As has already been reflected on in 2.6, with hindsight it is possible to see how a 
social constructionist stance was implicitly adopted, in part, because it provided me 
with a framework to explore my own personal experience and therefore was deemed 
helpful for broadening this exploration out to the research. Nevertheless, my 
confidence in choosing the most appropriate methodology and method of analysis 
did not extend far into the process of actually using them. On reflection I can see 
how I took decisions at several stages of the research process that offered the safe 
option and kept me closer to a more structured, guided approach than I would have 
anticipated given my idealised stance. For example, the initial decision to create an 
interview schedule was driven by a lack of confidence that I could manage an 
interview without one. This in turn was probably influenced by a traditional 
positivist academic discourse, which instilled in me a sense that there was a right 
way to do this research and a fear of not doing it properly. I would have needed to 
get outside of this discourse in order to trust a less structured approach and 
understand that the material, for the purposes of this research, would have been 
relevant however the interview had progressed.  
This mistrust of a less structured process led me to reject more radical approaches to 
interviewing, such as Parker’s (2005) suggestion to invite participants to question or 
interview the interviewer. Such a process creates a structure more like a discussion 
than an interview, in which the interviewer voices their opinions too. Instead, the 
more formal interview structure I chose to impose would have constrained what 
could be explored in the interview. For example, in a less structured discussion, my 
participants would have been free to bring up anything they thought was relevant to 
the topic rather than being limited to answering my questions. More importantly, 
such an approach would have forced me to make visible my own assumptions about 
the topic (Parker, 2005) and allowed participants to directly question and respond to 
these. This would have forced me to consider my own ideas and opinions more 
thoroughly and could have opened up an engaging, reflexive process. However, at 
the stage of research design I was less aware of how my own assumptions were 
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shaping the interview schedule and what could be gained by bringing them more 
explicitly into the interview.  
Similarly, Willig’s guidelines offered a structured, comprehensive, coherent way of 
analysing the data. I flirted with using Parker’s (1992) twenty steps in the analysis of 
discourse dynamics but, at the time of consideration, they seemed to add a level of 
detail and complexity that felt unnecessary to a study of this size; similarly I knew I 
did not possess the “advanced conceptual understanding of Foucault’s method” that 
Willig (2001, p.109) suggested was needed to use Kendall and Wickham’s (1999) 
approach. What I failed to understand at the time was that Parker’s (1992) 
complexity existed with good reason - it reflected the complexity of undertaking a 
macro discourse analysis - and therefore by choosing Willig’s approach I was not 
only restricting my analytic focus to the focus of those guidelines, but I was failing 
to negotiate territory and engage with a complexity in the initial stages that would 
nevertheless catch up with me later on.  
An example of this is Parker’s (1992, p.15) twelfth step which is to reflect “on the 
term used to describe the discourse, a matter which involves moral/political choices 
on the part of the analyst”. Although not an explicit part of Willig’s approach, it was 
nevertheless a fundamental part of stage two as the identification of the discourses 
involved a morally and politically subjective decision on how to name them. 
Similarly, Parker’s ninth and tenth steps deal with contrasting and overlapping 
discourses. This was another challenge I was nevertheless confronted with, despite 
having chosen not to follow Parker’s guidelines. To this extent, my choice to use 
Willig’s approach, influenced by its supposed greater simplicity, left me less 
prepared for the complexity that I would nevertheless face as part of doing the 
analysis. 
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4. Analysis 
Foucauldian discourse analysis of the four interview transcripts was steered by 
Willig’s (2001) procedural guidelines, as described in the previous chapter. These 
helped to frame the process of analytic thinking and led to identification of several 
salient discourses and constructions of “MUS”. Nevertheless, these constructions 
and the discourses they drew upon were not clearly definable categories, but 
overlapped, contradicted one other and were associated with others in myriad ways. 
Attempts to reduce them to single coherent themes appeared futile and to contradict 
the aim of this study. The challenge of structuring this chapter may indeed reflect the 
struggle to define what “MUS” is. This is discussed in more detail in 6.9. 
As a result the structure reflects an attempt to arrange the material in a readable 
manner, rather than to distinctly limit text to specific categories. The first three 
sections (6.1-6.3) relate to dominant macro discourses that are drawn upon in 
constructions of “MUS”: dualism/separation, psychological and holistic discourses. 
The influence of biomedical discourse is not specifically explored within a single 
section, but is observable and highlighted throughout the chapter. The remaining 
sections (6.4-6.8) focus on different constructions of “MUS” that seemed to be 
repeatedly created within these discourses: “MUS-as-choice”, “MUS-as-challenge”, 
“MUS-as-unreal”, “MUS-as-placeless” and “MUS-as-untold-story”. 
4.1 Mind-body dualism and the separation of illness into categories 
In analysing the interview transcripts, it is apparent that the notion of mind-body 
dualism pervades constructions of illness and seems to drive an active process of 
separation that extends beyond the division of mental and physical health. Reductive 
categories of illness seem to get constructed in an attempt to classify and over-
simplify illness.  
Hannah situates this in a historical context when asked about the notion of a 
medical/psychological split: 
It’s it’s interesting because um, it’s always kind of held up to be a kind of 
Cartesian split, but Descartes never said that, he never said that they’re not 
related, he saw them as separate systems, yes [Marianne: Mm hm], but he didn’t 
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say that there there was a total split but I think that that’s what’s come to be, and I 
think that, in the west anyway, that’s how we see it. (Hannah, 257-260) 
Drawing on a philosophical discourse, Hannah refers to the “Cartesian split” which 
has influenced western cultural notions of separate mind and body systems, even if 
this was not Descartes’ original meaning. The location of what has become a “total 
split” within historical and geographical contexts emphasises its social construction 
as a modern western phenomenon. This dualistic discourse can have implications for 
how we think about, see and can be with our minds and bodies and consequences for 
how illness can be understood, i.e. as distinctly a problem of the mind or body, and 
this appears to be what Hannah is keen to emphasise. It comes across in the way 
Tom talks about working with people with “MUS”:  
[…] the way I talk about it is that we we generate hypotheses, so we say ‘look’, 
let’s say for example erm a client comes with I don’t know, numbness in a limb or 
something [Marianne: Mm hm, mm hm] We could say you know there’s two 
possible hypotheses here. One is that it isn’t a medically unexplained symptom. 
There’s just no medical professional who’s been able to get to the bottom of 
what’s going on […] Or that this medically unexplained symptom has something, 
has a has a psychological base to it (Tom, 36-44) 
Drawing on a separation discourse, Tom can reduce symptoms to either “MUS” and 
therefore having a psychological base or not “MUS” and therefore having an 
undiscovered organic base. Further drawing on a scientific discourse of reductive 
explanation, it seems that distinct hypotheses get generated based on this 
categorisation, closing down opportunities for both Tom and his clients to think 
about symptoms as anything but exclusively medical or psychological. “MUS” gets 
constructed as a psychological problem, created by the exclusion (definitive or not) 
of a medical cause. Diagnosis by exclusion could limit the possibility of “MUS” 
being construed as a diagnosis in its own right (through what it is rather than what it 
is not). This could maintain a notion that clients can have either a medical or a 
psychological problem, but not both. For clients this suggests that to accept one 
means to reject the other, probably making it harder and perhaps more frightening to 
consider a psychological element as it suggests they need to give up on any further 
medical investigation or care.  
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A discourse of separation can also limit practitioners’ subjective experience:  
So I think there’s some constraints about that because then obviously if the client 
then wants to engage you in a, a medical-based conversation, um, I feel relevantly 
impotent (Marianne: Mm) and I’m actually very kind of scared to say anything or 
you know, you know I would very much then redirect them to their GP 
[Marianne: Mm] um, or I would say look I can go and find some of these answers 
out. Um, so I think there’re some limitations into what type of conversation you 
can have with clients. (Tom, 184-188) 
If “MUS” gets constructed as a medical issue, then Tom appears to want to remove it 
from his remit and he redirects the client or himself to a doctor. Within distinct 
professional or separation discourses, Tom can limit his remit by the boundaries of 
what he sees as his job. By drawing on these discourses, he is perhaps clearly and 
comfortably stating his remit and area of expertise and excluding himself from 
others. They appear to create a professional comfort zone; to venture into another 
domain leaves him feeling “impotent” and “scared”.  
This separation might restrict talk and the relationship he can have with clients.  It 
creates a belief that there is only a certain “type of conversation” he can have, one 
that draws exclusively on psychological knowledge. This positions the person with 
“MUS” as either his client or not, and himself as either the expert or not, depending 
on how symptoms are constructed. Professional responsibility is taken up by either 
the doctor or the psychologist, but not jointly held. Again, this is likely to have 
implications for people with “MUS” who may feel they have to trade in the support 
of one professional in order to get support from another, and to choose whether they 
are a medical patient or a psychological client, because practice suggests they cannot 
be both. 
Tom’s clients’ desire to “engage” the psychologist in a “medical-based 
conversation” suggests they are also drawing on a popular cultural discourse of 
separation that mirrors a biomedical, institutional one. Within a western cultural 
discourse of illness, a physical symptom implies a medical problem, and therefore 
would likely lead to expectations of a medical-based conversation. Therefore, a 
discourse of separation is likely to influence the available ways both clients and 
practitioners can think and talk about symptoms. Tom’s clients are not necessarily 
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free to think about their physical symptoms within a psychological framework as it 
goes against a cultural understanding of illness that is familiar to them. In this way 
the biomedical discourse creates a tension between those who culturally adhere to it 
and those that do not.  
Still drawing on a discourse of separation, Hannah demonstrates further 
implications:  
But because of the lack of parity of esteem, if you like, between physical health 
and mental health, whereby physical health is accorded much much greater um 
(…) authenticity I suppose, um, people need, I think, or a lot of people need to 
hang on to the fact that there is a physical cause. And (..) because of the stigma 
(..) and also if there’s a physical cause (..) I, the patient, don’t have to change. 
And I can keep my emotional difficulties at bay, and that’s, you know, short-term 
as usual, that’s a short-term fix because it does keep them at bay, I’ll just have 
one test after another. But in the long-term it doesn’t help the individual, the 
person achieve a better quality of life. (Hannah, 73-79) 
By drawing on a separation discourse, Hannah can draw attention to the distinction 
between physical health and mental health problems and suggest implications from 
this.  Hannah constructs physical health problems as being positioned as more 
authentic, legitimising the physical health patient. This legitimacy might encourage a 
person with “MUS” to position themselves as such. It would mean they could then 
adopt a passive role and attribute responsibility for diagnosis and treatment (“one test 
after another”) to doctors. A physical health diagnosis might mean people are less 
likely to feel responsibility for their problems (they “don’t have to change”).   
In contrast “MUS” gets constructed as a mental health issue and a mental health 
diagnosis can be constructed as something unpleasant that you need to avoid (“keep 
at bay”). The “need to hang on” to a physical cause suggests a fear of entering the 
mental health realm where there might be stigma and authenticity might be 
questioned. It is suggested that being positioned as a mental health patient involves 
exploring “emotional difficulties”, opening oneself up to discrimination and/or 
feelings of shame and taking responsibility for change. Behaviour could therefore be 
shaped by inequality within a healthcare system that encourages people to construct 
their difficulties within a physical health framework. However, Hannah depicts the 
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consequences of this as limiting opportunities for “a better quality of life”. It might 
only offer a short-term fix (via repeated diagnostic tests) as any psychological 
dimension is being ignored.  
4.2 Deconstructing the psychological 
So far the analysis suggests that a separation discourse leads to a distinction between 
mental and physical health, and that “MUS” often gets constructed as a mental health 
problem within that framework. However, whereas much of the debate around 
“MUS” has focused on dualistic concepts of medical or psychological, body or 
mind, this analysis disturbs that binary further by exposing the complexity and 
multiplicity of psychological constructions within it. A variety of psychological 
constructions of “MUS” have already been identified: “emotional difficulties”, 
“mental health” issue and having a “psychological base”. This multiplicity and the 
variety of meanings that are created by it highlight the potential risks of simply 
constructing “MUS” as a singular psychological phenomenon. This section further 
analyses psychological constructions of “MUS” and exposes the potentially negative 
implications of exclusive psychological constructions.   
Helen describes how “MUS” used to be constructed within an accident and 
emergency service, and in so doing introduces the idea of “MUS” as 
“unconventional mental illness”: 
And, you know, I just knew, I knew that a lot of those patients would be mentally 
ill patients. Either conventionally mentally ill, and under mental health teams, but 
still presenting in A & E with mental health symptoms, or people who are not 
conventionally mentally ill [Marianne: No] presenting with chest pain. And, you 
know, when we started the group I’d be looking at, there’d be some 30 year old 
guy coming in with chest pains: ECG, ECG, ECG, ECG. And nobody thinking he 
hasn’t got anything wrong with his heart. For God’s sake. What is a 30 year old 
man going to have? Exclude the rare stuff. You have. This is anxiety or, in this 
area, cocaine use (laughs). I mean, it’s gonna be. Neither of which is helped by 
repeated ECGs and or bloods for, to see if he’s had a heart attack. [Marianne: 
Mm. Mm.] But that’s how he was treated. (Helen, 237-248) 
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Helen constructs “MUS” as mental illness. However, it was not construed as such 
within the A & E service, which appeared to be governed by a biomedical discourse 
that dictated medical intervention for physical symptoms. A discourse of 
conventionality also seemed to govern the service, perhaps influencing ways of 
thinking: “And nobody thinking he hasn’t got anything wrong with his heart”. 
People were treated in accordance with what was generally and historically done, 
seeming to uphold institutional conventions rather than questioning historical 
process. For example, the patient described was positioned as a physical health 
patient (“that’s how he was treated”), which prevented him accessing mental health 
support. Alternative positions were not opened up to him and so he probably 
positioned himself as a physical health patient too as his understanding probably 
reflected that of the A & E department. Repeated diagnostic interventions with 
inconclusive results might fuel anxiety about symptoms and potentially lead to 
increased health service usage. 
The patient’s behaviour can also be constructed within a cultural discourse that 
encourages and expects people to respond to physical health symptoms by seeking 
medical support. His response to chest pain was to repeatedly go to the accident and 
emergency department where he was repeatedly given an ECG. This suggests that 
health behaviour is maintained by cultural discourses (within which biomedicine is 
enmeshed in popular understanding) and psychological understanding of physical 
symptoms is a scarcely available discourse.  
In challenging discourses of conventionality and biomedicine, possibilities for a 
different understanding of physical symptoms were opened up. Change occurred via 
questioning and disturbing taken-for-granted procedures. Nevertheless, the 
construction of “MUS” as unconventional mental illness enabled “MUS” to be 
reconstructed exclusively as a psychological phenomenon despite not conforming to 
conventional ways of constructing mental illness. Conventions are challenged but it 
avoids any need for practitioners and patients to acknowledge both biological and 
psychological elements and for a mind-body construction of “MUS”. To this extent 
the disturbance of organisational culture is limited as it continues to conform to a 
discourse of separation.  
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Although Helen talks about “MUS” as a “psychological” and “mental health” issue, 
she also refers to “MUS” as “the emotional”, seemingly to draw attention to how 
others construct it. In this extract, drawing on a gendered discourse Helen endows 
“MUS” with potentially sentimental, sensitive, feminine, impassioned and non-
rational characteristics.  She tells the following story:  
… when I was training I did gynaecology and […] my consultant was a, 
er, a conventional male gynaecologist. He had no interest whatsoever in 
the emotional. He was interested in gynaecology. He was interested in 
taking things out, mainly. He was a very good surgeon. [Marianne: 
Mmhm] That was his limit. [Marianne: Mm] And he would look down 
the list, and he would look down at the GP letters, and anyone he 
vaguely thought, so he was quite capable of knowing from the list which 
was likely to have a non-organic basis, I would get: XXX [name of 
participant], you go and see them because they’ll just cry. And I would 
sit there, with my clinic, women with chronic pelvic pain, with my box 
of tissues, and they would all cry. And I didn’t learn much gynaecology 
but I certainly learnt a lot about, erm, (laughs) distress. [Marianne: Yes] 
So, er, er, he made his choice. He wasn’t going to go there. But at least 
he vaguely thought, well, somebody else better do it. (Helen, 277-292) 
An emotional construction of “MUS” could indicate understanding and recognition 
of the legitimacy of subjective experience; however in this instance it appears 
reductive, denying the physicality of the symptomatic experience and potentially 
reinforcing distress. By using it, Helen shows how it can close down opportunities 
for “MUS” to be considered a serious medical subject and therefore how the 
conventional male gynaecologist could be dismissive. He had “no interest 
whatsoever in the emotional”. This suggests “MUS-as-the-emotional” can position 
people with “MUS” as less worthy of professional attention within a medical 
discourse that privileges physical health. 
In contrast, the gynaecologist is said to have been interested in “gynaecology” and 
“taking things out”, on which his good surgical reputation was based. It seems a 
conventional biomedical discourse, with its rational and reductive focus on the 
biological aspects of illness, allows him to take up the position of medical expert 
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despite his limits. There seems little expectation to consider psychological aspects of 
problems, especially when they are constructed as sentimental. He is not obliged to 
“go there”, a construction which clearly positions emotional aspects as external to 
gynaecology (see also 6.7). He can justify choosing to do “gynaecology” and avoid 
“the emotional” without guilt or professional negligence.  
This extract highlights how a biomedical discourse can fuse with wider cultural 
discourses around gender. There seems to be a clear mobilisation of a conventional 
gendered discourse which produces rational men who do the real medical work using 
physical methods (his tool is the scalpel with which he removes the problem); 
women do the emotion (the box of tissues is assigned to a female trainee, for use 
with the female patients who will “just cry”). Women are “lists” and their bodies 
contain “things” to be taken out (and tears which can be wiped away). The 
gynaecologist does not engage subjectively with the whole person. This appears 
unnecessary within cultural norms around identify and conduct. Instead he is 
permitted power and an emotional detachment.  
Even Helen, who takes up the position of emotionally orientated practitioner, 
positions the gynaecologist as “a good surgeon” and reports that she did not learn 
much “gynaecology”. This suggests her version of “gynaecology” and surgery 
remains limited within the same dominant medical discourses, strengthened by a 
gendered cultural discourse that normalises women as emotional and in turn 
potentially belittles or neglects their psychological difficulties. It suggests “MUS” is 
still situated outside of conventional medical practice, and this appears maintained 
by sentimental, psychological, gendered constructions that do little to address or 
validate the pain and distress experienced by these women.  
Tom talks about how he makes sense of “MUS” as a psychological issue: 
Well, I suppose I have to work, you know if if I believe that it is a diagnosed 
MUS and there is, and you know everything has been ruled out, you know I I 
have to operate on that there is some sort of psychological involvement in there. 
(Tom, 142-144) 
Two contradictory constructions of “MUS” are apparent here. Resonating with a 
positivist diagnostic discourse, on the one hand Tom constructs “MUS” as a concrete 
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entity: “a diagnosed MUS”. Yet drawing on a discourse of reality, this is countered 
with the use of “if I believe it is”, which seems to open up the diagnosis to doubt and 
subjectivity. Tom can then overrule this by believing in it. Both constructs empower 
him to take up the expert position: he can endow himself with it in relation to 
believing this to be an “MUS” or be endowed by others who have diagnosed this as 
“MUS”. Taking on an expert position can empower practitioners to “rule out” certain 
phenomenon, even where doubt exists. “Rule out” draws on discourses of 
measurement and sovereignty, providing further authority to the practitioner, 
empowering them to overcome further uncertainty. This might be deemed as 
important or helpful if practitioners want to maintain authority in a culture that 
respects expertise and certainty, or avoid engaging with the uncertainty of “MUS”.  
Tom’s use of “I have to” and “I suppose” further implies a tension between 
constructions of “MUS” as either a concrete or abstract phenomenon. The former 
draws on a positivist, biomedical discourse, but the latter exposes weaknesses in this 
position. “MUS” as a psychological problem appears again constructed or 
“diagnosed” by exclusion of a medical aetiology. Underlying these constructions is a 
separation discourse that constructs “MUS” as psychological because of what it is 
not rather than what it is. Such a process is likely to maintain, rather than overcome, 
doubt and uncertainty. 
4.3 The holistic discourse 
Analysis of the transcripts suggests attempts to construct versions of illness that 
resist categorisation and attempts to draw on alternative discourses. Naming 
discourse that constructs the body and mind as one system was particularly 
challenging and reflects the lack of culturally available and mutually acceptable 
ways of thinking about the body and the mind together in the singular. Therefore, I 
draw on the elusive concepts of integration, bodymind, mind-body, biopsychosocial 
and holism interchangeably here as signposting tools.  
Hannah defers to a painting by Egon Schiele to represent the distress embodied in 
“MUS”:  
[One reason that my interest in “MUS”] just goes to the heart of being human is 
that we are (..) connected, we are we are (…) one system. We’re not discrete 
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systems. And to pretend that everything is either in the body or in the mind (..) is, 
is ridiculous. And so the evidence is there [points to painting]. And I know that 
you can’t bring that up but this painting here is a fantastic piece of work that 
shows the distress of the person through the body. It’s a self-portrait by Schiele, 
and I just love it and erm, and you can just see how kind of contorted and twisted 
he is. But it’s emotional distress. [Marianne: Yes] And it kind of typifies 
everything I think about erm and we can’t call them medically unexplained 
symptoms. I think that’s very stigmatising as well. (Hannah, 39-47) 
“MUS” is constructed as emotional distress embodying both physical and 
psychological aspects. Hannah represents this integrated construction of distress 
visually, possibly because she cannot find words to make her point. This implies art 
can depict “MUS” in a way that words cannot. Even the term “MUS” is 
“stigmatising”. Yet Hannah also draws on a scientific discourse to present the 
painting as confirmation of the mind-body relationship, perhaps attempting to add 
value to her point by recourse to “evidence”. This construction of “MUS” resists 
separation and opens up opportunities for a more embodied way of viewing 
emotional distress. However, a lack of language within which to do this is a 
significant limitation. How can “MUS” be addressed if there is no acceptable 
language or discourse with which to discuss it? 
Hannah constructs the notion of a separate body and mind as ridiculous and positions 
people who do this as practising pretence. “To pretend” suggests actively denying 
the existence of an integrated mind-body system despite knowing it to be so. 
However, continuing to construct the mind and body as separate systems avoids 
challenging the dominant biomedical discourse and all the systems, structures, 
knowledges, models and professional roles that are maintained by it. It avoids 
disturbing the current status quo and the power balances within it. It also positions 
patients as victims of deceit. 
Hannah’s response to a question about which professional roles are important in 
working with “MUS” (lines 215-216) draws on a holistic discourse: 
Ok, so for me, so it has to be anybody who has the time to listen [Marianne:  Mm 
hm, mm hm]. I’m not sure about, er, physicians because I think that people who 
are, who espouse the medical model are are going to struggle […] Um, I would 
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say psychologists wouldn’t I? I don’t think it, er, it’s (…) Care coordinator? 
Anybody who is respectful, has time, can be very boundaried, is very boundaried 
(…) and is interested. [Marianne: Mm mm] And I suppose it doesn’t really matter 
what profession you are, but I think it, I’m going to say psychologist because I 
thinks it’s the, that’s the profession that’s interested in the, um, how how people 
make sense of their lives, and I think because I work in the service I do, which is 
the integration of physical and mental health, um, somebody who works in in in 
those areas, in both those areas, because that’s how I’m trained to look at 
problems. (Hannah, 224-249) 
In this extract, Hannah constructs “MUS”  as both an integrated physical and mental 
health issue, and as something to do with “how people make sense of their lives”. 
These constructions open up possibilities for working psychologically with people 
with “MUS”, although Hannah hesitates to position “MUS” as the limited domain 
for psychologists. Although I have inadvertently framed my question in relation to 
distinct professional roles, Hannah partially resists deferring to discourses of 
professionalism or expertise and instead opens up the position to the available, 
interested, curious practitioner. It becomes about a way of being (“respectful”, “has 
time”, “boundaried”) rather than about profession. These values are nevertheless 
drawn from a therapeutic relational discourse familiar to counselling psychologists. 
By constructing these values as important practice in working with “MUS”, Hannah 
can implicitly justify and advocate for the role of psychological practitioners and 
challenge the role of some medical practitioners. In turn, such practice could 
contribute towards the construction of “MUS” as something to do with “how people 
make sense of their lives” strengthening such a construction within a wider holistic 
discourse. 
Two subject positions are offered as helpful: the curious practitioner who is 
“interested in […] how people make sense of their lives” and the expert practitioner 
who is trained to work in this area. The latter position draws on a knowledge 
discourse and is constrained by the specific discourse within which the position is 
taken up. Practitioners who “espouse the medical model” are “going to struggle”; 
those who have an important role to play are those who “look at problems” from the 
perspective of “the integration of physical and mental health”. Therefore 
practitioners who rigidly restrict their practice to a single domain are positioned as 
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less able to work with “MUS”. Being “interested and curious” in people’s lives is 
made possible within a holistic discourse and is more likely to encourage the person 
with “MUS” to be interested in themselves, their bodies and their minds. 
The following extract illustrates how the construction of physical symptoms has 
changed within the A & E service following the formation of a multidisciplinary 
group which considers “MUS”: 
Fantastic. Brilliant. Um. It runs. We meet every couple of months. It’s 
multidisciplinary […]so there’s an A & E consultant, there’s the guy who runs it 
(..) there’s the first response team so that’s an admission avoidance team (…) 
There’s everyone. There’s community matrons. There’s XXX [name of location] 
ambulance. There’s mental health. There’s myself. There’s somebody from the 
XXX [name of mental health service]. Er, there’s the alcohol nurses. It’s a big, 
big group and it has changed over a couple of years. When we first started there 
was very little talk of mental health. Very interesting. Or MUS. And now it’s 
really changed. And people are (..) assuming that somebody might have an 
emotional need as well. […] So you really change things, it’s dramatic. I think. 
It’s absolutely wonderful. And the A & E consultant, who before was a very A & 
E consultant, you know, he’s really changed too. He sees the value of considering 
mental health. [Marianne: Mm] And not just now because it gets people out of his 
A & E and into the community mental health team. He’s actually very much more 
in tune with the sorts of symptoms people present with and why. (Helen, 250-265) 
Drawing on an integrative discourse, staff are now assuming people might have 
emotional as well as physical needs. “MUS” is being reconstructed as a regular 
occurrence that needs multidisciplinary consideration. This opens up the opportunity 
for a variety of practitioners (“everyone”) to engage with “MUS”, especially now 
that the service recognises “MUS” as part of their remit. The option to opt-out or 
focus on only physical needs has been closed down. An economic discourse 
constructs this engagement as a value driven consideration – the numbers in A & E 
are reduced. However, Helen also believes a shift in ways of seeing and being with 
“MUS” has occurred. Positive change figures predominantly in this construction 
(“fantastic”, “brilliant”, “absolutely wonderful”), emphasising a “dramatic” 
difference between before and after. It seems a difference in understanding has 
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occurred as a result of the availability of a holistic discourse. Helen is excited about 
this change, suggesting a broader discourse can lead to changes in attitude as well as 
working practice. This difference in understanding and mood among practitioners is 
likely to have positive effects on their engagement with patients.  
When asked about constraints to working with both medical and psychological 
aspects of “MUS”, Hannah responds:  
Um, okay, so the most obvious one for me is knowledge [Marianne: Mm hm] 
You know, I’m not medically trained, I kind of learn on the job. Um, but I’m 
lucky, I can always ask, because I work in a hospital, yeah. [Marianne: Mm Mm] 
Um, I can do joint work if I feel that will help. (Hannah, 297-302) 
In contrast to Tom, Hannah seems to want to defer to a biopsychosocial discourse. 
She sees it as a constraint that she cannot draw on medical knowledge or training, 
suggesting these would be helpful in working with “MUS”. This mirrors the barriers 
highlighted by Helen and Maggie, who position doctors as constrained by a lack of 
psychological training (see 6.7). Practitioners appear to be challenged because of the 
discrete focus of their professional training. Knowledge that separates mental and 
physical health is likely to produce professionals who view people and their 
difficulties in the same way. The participants seem to be resisting these constraints: 
Hannah through “joint work”, Helen by calling for a broadening of medical training. 
Neither want to take up the position of limited expert who cannot work with “MUS” 
because it is outside their field of expertise. This suggests both see it as possible to 
broaden their understanding, further challenging the hegemony of the discrete expert.  
4.4 Interest, choice and engagement: “MUS-as-choice”/”MUS-as-interesting” 
Being interested in “MUS” is a feature of the transcripts, as is “MUS-as-choice”. 
This section analyses this relationship between interest, choice and engagement. The 
gynaecologist referred to by Helen had “no interest in the emotional” and “made his 
choice” not to engage with “MUS”. Hannah argued that practitioners need to be 
interested in making sense of people’s lives in order to work effectively in this area. 
Helen seems to identify choice, interest and its impact on engagement on both sides 
of the patient/doctor relationship: 
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I mean, I think some people are more (…) gravitate towards the emotional 
wellbeing, the mental health side of things and I think it’s very interesting as a GP 
how patients choose you. […] I mean it’s quite interesting looking at people’s 
lists and seeing who’s with different doctors and why. They obviously get 
something from the relationship. But I think that some doctors are much more, 
um, interested in that side of it. Erm. I think all GPs, of course, recognise the 
importance of the psychological, the emotional. But, as I said, I mean we have 
time constraints, perhaps lack of interest, perhaps you don’t want to go there. 
(Helen, 269-276) 
By constructing “MUS” as an issue of “mental health” and “emotional wellbeing” it 
is distinguished from physical health and made a distinct psychological problem that 
permits a distinct way of working. This might open up the possibility for 
engagement to be considered as optional. Helen’s use of this discursive construction 
might be partly in defence of doctors who choose not to engage.  She is drawing on a 
separation discourse which seems to privilege physical health and might allow 
doctors such choices because it places “MUS-as-emotional-distress” outside of their 
primary professional remit.  
Despite doctors recognising “the importance of the psychological”, they seem to be 
allowed to choose to adopt or reject the position of available practitioner when 
encountering a person with “MUS”. They can choose not to work in this area simply 
because of “lack of interest” or not wanting to, resulting in unequal treatment of 
patients. Would such choice be available if a patient had cancer or diabetes? It seems 
a psychological construction of “MUS” can diminish doctors’ responsibility, perhaps 
without any guilt or liability. Doctors can make their choice. Only those who are 
interested need engage. However, perhaps in order to counteract any impression of 
neglect on the GPs’ behalf, Helen positions doctors as sometimes being drawn to 
that side, perhaps as if it is a different skill set or a natural calling.  
How doctors practice then influences whether people with “MUS” choose to see 
them or not. Patients are positioned as having choice over which doctors they visit, 
however only some doctors offer the “interest”, “time” or inclination to engage with 
“MUS”. By referring to “time” alongside “interest” and “want” Helen might be 
emphasising the institutional constraints of time alongside individual choice or 
53 
 
interest to remind us that engagement can be socially influenced. Therefore, there are 
limited options available to the person with “MUS”, particularly if positioned as a 
“mental health patient”. This is likely to contribute to so-called resistance. 
However, Helen also implies that interest is something that can be captured when 
teaching GPs, and that lack of skills might affect interest, choice and engagement: 
But when we were teaching GPs, you have to, you have to do it in a way that 
captures the GP interest. So we did a MUS audit a couple of years ago which was, 
basically we got practices to look at their frequent attenders and then to look at, of 
that list, who they thought, possibly, had medically unexplained symptoms. And 
then decide, whether they could talk to the patient about that. And we gave them 
little scripts, just like we were talking about earlier. What to say. What not to say 
and what to say. [Marianne: Mmhm] What they could be offered. So, if it turned 
out that they thought this was an anxiety er disorder and the patient was amenable 
they could refer them to IAPT. If the patient was amenable for more 
psychotherapeutic input they could be referred to XXX [name of psychotherapy 
service]. Or the patient could just say no. That’s fine. (Helen, 301-310) 
Drawing on a discourse of diagnosis, in this extract “MUS” is constructed as 
identifiable. This suggests it can be recognised, listed, audited and characterised, in 
this instance as generally something difficult to talk about. The GP is positioned as 
having authority to pronounce it an “MUS”, and once given that label it becomes 
legitimised as difficult to talk about and people with “MUS” get positioned as 
difficult to talk to. By constructing “MUS” in this way, Helen might be avoiding any 
conflictual discussion about what an “MUS” is or is not. She appears to be 
conferring GPs this power, in keeping with a cultural positioning of GPs’ role as 
diagnostician.  
Once “MUS” has been constructed as challenging in this way, the strategy to capture 
GPs’ interest is to develop communication skills and enable them to better engage 
with people with “MUS”. This focus of Helen’s draws on a relational discourse and 
seems to shift the problem from lack of interest to lack of communication and 
engagement skills. It suggests the current discursive resources available to GPs are 
not sufficient to enable them to discuss “MUS” with patients and there is a need for 
new ways of talking that could reduce resistance to engagement for both patients and 
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practitioners. In order to influence engagement GPs were given “little scripts” of 
“what to say” and “what not to say”, as if being prescribed conversation, a specific 
language for use with “MUS” patients. With new resources to draw upon which open 
up rather than close down engagement and therefore widen GPs’ remit, there may be 
less need or desire to opt out of working with “MUS”.  
Patients who are open to being referred for psychological support are positioned as 
amenable - compliant and manageable. It is implied they have a choice, but if they 
do not choose psychological support this suggests they might be implicitly being 
positioned as unwilling. Perhaps this is how it feels to doctors, particularly if their 
work with “MUS” is institutionally limited by time and skills. It seems that patients 
are being asked to consider their “MUS” as an emotional or psychological problem, 
yet the system within which they are being treated is itself constructing engagement 
with “MUS” as optional and sometimes denying its existence as a real problem. GPs 
are being given scripts in part because the discourse is new and unfamiliar. It is 
likely to be the same for patients. So it seems that patients are being asked to accept 
a psychological dimension that only some doctors choose to engage with and only 
some services choose to recognise. Both doctors and patients are positioned as 
resistant and needing support to open up to new perspectives. The parallels in their 
separate processes are likely to reflect the constraints imposed by biomedical 
discourses as well as suggesting a need to create and nurture alternative discourses. 
Predominantly, “MUS” appears to be constructed as a distinct emotional, 
psychological or mental health problem which can empower or disempower patients 
and doctors with choice. However, it is not just individuals or individual groups, but 
the services and structures within which they are players, that might impact on and 
be impacted on in relation to opportunities for choice. Helen draws explicit attention 
to the issue of services engaging or not with “MUS”:  
I think there’s a lot of doctors, when we went to er the XXX [name of hospital] I, 
I, to say that we were interested in putting a psychologist into our patient teams, 
um, the people, very interesting about who (..) so, so, which outpatient 
consultants leapt at that and which said, what? So, erm, gastroenterology leapt at 
it. Leapt at it. Oh my god, please come in. Please help us. Dermatology. Very 
interesting. Gynaecology? No. We don’t we don’t have any patients with 
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medically unexplained symptoms. Well, probably a third of your outpatients if 
research shows right. So, you know, it’s, it’s, it’s doing that work [I: Mm] to 
slowly, slowly move things and you you know you can push and open doors first. 
(294-301)  
Helen defers to a research discourse to construct “MUS” as widespread (“a third of 
your outpatients”) and a biopsychosocial discourse to acknowledge the need for 
psychological input. In doing this, she adds weight to her argument for the latter. She 
seems to be challenging the medical hegemony, by exposing a gap in service 
delivery that disturbs the professional power balance and can either be 
acknowledged or denied by the services. To admit a psychologist is needed is to 
acknowledge psychological aspects to patients’ presentations and limitations within 
the medical profession to address these. Gynaecology, in contrast to research 
evidence, denied the existence of “MUS” within their department. This suggests that 
within a biomedical discourse services can be limited to biomedical treatment and 
opportunities for psychological support denied to people with “MUS”. It also 
suggests a biomedical discourse can protect doctors from having to relinquish the 
position of omnipotent practitioner and acknowledge the limitations of their 
knowledge/practice. They do not need to share their professional power base. By 
highlighting these discrepancies Helen seems to be assigning responsibility to 
services (perhaps away from individual doctors) to engage with “MUS” and 
exposing the challenges on a wider structural, rather than an individual, level.  
On the other hand, these constructions seem to open up opportunities for services to 
recognise limitations. Gastroenterology enthusiastically “leapt at it”, as if in answer 
to their prayers (“Oh my god. Please come in”), creating space for joined up working 
practices and opportunities to support people with “MUS”. The different choices for 
engagement that are made reflect the tension between the biopsychosocial and 
biomedical discourses. Opportunities for patients and practitioners are either opened 
up (like the doors “you can push and open”) or closed down by the discourses that 
get drawn upon. 
Tom positions his role as “about giving people choice” and suggests some people 
might benefit from an alternative way of thinking about their “MUS”:  
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I think it’s about (…) providing a narrative that everything sort of happens for a 
reason, and that there’s (..) uh, I think it’s just about giving people choice, to be 
honest [Marianne: Mm hm], choice that they can, that there’s other ways of 
thinking about their problem, that there’s actually other ways, that that western 
medicine doesn’t necessarily, isn’t a panacea for everything that might might go 
untoward in our bodies and our minds. (Tom, 237-241) 
Drawing on a philosophical (Aristotelian) discourse, “MUS” is constructed as 
happening for a reason. This opens up different ways of thinking about and 
understanding “MUS” and potentially provides an opportunity for reflection and 
insight. A biomedical discourse creates an expectation that “western medicine” 
should provide “a panacea” for all difficulties, yet cannot offer alternative choices 
when it does not work. This creates frustration for people with “MUS” as it conflicts 
with their subjective experience. An alternative therapeutic discourse provides 
different knowledges and opens up other options for people to construct “a reason”, 
“a narrative” and “other ways of thinking”. It empowers people to think and act in a 
different way and to make different choices. Within this discourse Tom can take up 
the position of empowering practitioner by “providing a narrative” and “giving 
people choice”. However, although recourse to a discourse of alternative medicine 
opens up alternative frameworks to “western medicine”, it does not directly 
challenge national health services about the positions they take or the limitations of 
the support they provide.  Unless this happens, choice becomes limited to those who 
can afford to access alternative services. 
4.5 Challenging “MUS”: “MUS-as-challenge 
This section explores the different ways in which “MUS” gets constructed as a 
challenge and how the meaning of the challenge can be dependent upon the 
discourses within which it is constructed.  Hannah constructs “MUS” as a challenge 
for doctors because they defer to a “pure” positivist biomedical discourse in which 
all symptomatic problems should be resolvable via biomedical solutions: 
My understanding of the research is that this is the patient group that causes the 
most dissatisfaction among GPs because you cannot apply this, what they call the 
house model, this idea, House as in the Hugh Laurie character, of find it and fix it. 
There’s a symptom we will find er a solution. So, really, it really tests people who 
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um espouse those kind of pure science approach, who try and problematize 
everything according to anatomy. (Hannah, 29-33) 
Drawing on a biomedical discourse, Hannah suggests doctors want to be presented 
with symptoms they can diagnose and successfully treat so they can take up the 
expert position. Yet “MUS” challenges this (“really tests people”) because “MUS” 
cannot be approached successfully in this way. Therefore “MUS” and people with 
“MUS” become challenging as doctors become unsuccessful. “MUS” becomes 
synonymous with failure and this leads to feelings of dissatisfaction. Hannah draws 
on a media discourse (“House”) to show how the “find it and fix it” biomedical 
discourse is adopted by and reinforced through the media: Dr. House always finds a 
cause and solution in the end. Such reinforcement maintains a cultural faith in the 
biomedical discourse and is likely to influence patient hopes and expectations as 
people further buy into this discourse through the media. 
Hannah contrasts this portrayal of the medical model by drawing on what might be 
seen as a psychological discourse of acceptance. She positions psychologists as 
sometimes taking on a spectator role and accepting impotence: 
And I guess that the challenge with psychology or psych psychologists, 
sometimes we have to witness the tragedy, when actually we just wanna jump in 
and sort it. But that that goes with the, ooh I’m going to use a nice word for you, 
I’m going to say goes with the territory (laughs). (Hannah, 332-334) 
[…] you’ve gone all that way and nothing’s shifting [Marianne: Mm mm] 
because everybody, well I only speak for myself, I want to think I can help 
somebody. So there’s that, that’s the grandiosity (Hannah, 321-323) 
Yet this position is also construed as challenging as Hannah recognises a desire, 
drawing on an expert discourse, to “jump in and sort it”. In this way there is 
similarity with the doctors: accepting not being able to help is difficult. However, 
psychological discourse (“the territory”) can allow for such a position, whereas a 
biomedical discourse does not. Therefore doctors struggle to accept helplessness 
within the comfort of their zone of expertise. Nevertheless, discourses of expertise 
can both drive expectations to be able to help and sanction the power to resist 
helping (similar to the gynaecologist’s choice not to engage with “MUS”). In this 
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way, these discourses empower practitioners with decisions over who gets treatment 
as well as what that treatment is and this can engender grandiosity. 
The participant’s use of a discourse of tragedy reflects the patients’ suffering, but, 
drawing on its theatrical origins, also implies it results from a combination of social 
and psychological circumstances. Hannah constructs “MUS” as a psychosocial issue 
which also reflects a more counselling psychology position, her “territory”. Doctors, 
psychologists and patients are all positioned as struggling with helplessness, 
equating the challenge of “MUS” with the challenge of helplessness. Hannah is 
including herself in this, but distinguishing herself from doctors by drawing on a 
psychological discourse within which such a position is more permissible.  
Maggie also refers to helplessness: 
there are people who, whose need is quite specific (Marianne: Mm hm) and 
difficult, um and somehow as a team we’ve got to treat them with with respect 
and find a way to help, even though we feel helpless. And of course, professionals 
hate feeling helpless. [Marianne: Mm hm, mm hm] Uh, as a GP I hate feeling 
helpless, I hate having to say well I don’t know what it is and I don’t know what 
to do. But I don’t often get thrown into that, because because I I have got, always 
got a psychodynamic. (Maggie, 423-430) 
The “MUS- as-challenging” construction offers the subject position of “difficult” 
with specific needs to people with “MUS”. Such a construction engenders 
impotence, suggesting GPs not only feel helpless, but hate having to acknowledge 
this (unacceptable within a biomedical discourse). However, as a trained GP and 
psychodynamic therapist Maggie can draw on a psychotherapeutic discourse and 
distance herself from this position because she can access a different 
knowledge/power bases. She can avoid having to take up a helpless position, as she 
is not restricted by a purely biomedical approach. Most GPs do not have this option 
available to them and are left with “hate”. Maggie’s repetition of “hate” perhaps 
suggests that this is what is being experienced and avoided, and might reflect the 
fear, anxiety and helplessness caused by discursive limitations. 
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“MUS-as-challenge” is influenced by the institutional environment within which it 
exists and is manifested through logistical constraints, such as time, resources and 
protocols: 
Um, so there’s a whole lot of stuff going on when someone is talking and I think 
GPs are very used to management and so medically unexplained symptoms is 
more difficult because the management pathways push you into a medical model. 
(Helen, 35-38) 
Helen’s construction of “MUS” as challenging (“difficult”) draws on an institutional 
discourse. The challenge is how to manage “MUS” within management constraints. 
Perhaps by using this construction Helen is emphasising the limited options available 
to doctors and to herself. Positioning “MUS” or people with “MUS” as objects to be 
managed restricts what practitioners can do to the options available within a 
management pathway dominated by a medical model. This is despite recognition, 
drawing on a social, or perhaps holistic, discourse, that “there’s a whole lot of stuff 
going on when someone is talking”. Perhaps by drawing on these discourses Helen is 
showing that she knows there is more going on than the biomedical discourse can 
accommodate. Helen continues: 
So, you come and see me with headaches. Well, do I send you for an MRI? You 
say to me you want an MRI because you think you have a brain tumour. I think 
you have no symptoms of brain tumour. Do I just give in and do it anyway? Er, or 
do I say let’s look at what other things could be causing your headaches? 
[Marianne: Mm Mm] And, you know, so (…) we’re trained in a biopsychosocial 
model, um, as GPs and that’s very good, but what you tend to fall into, in a 10 
minute consultation, is a bit of a bio (laughs) [Marianne: Yes]  because that’s 
comfortable and quick and it also it has to be done because you don’t want to 
miss the brain tumour. So actually that takes predominance. (Helen, 38-47) 
An institutional discourse allows Helen to take up the position of dutiful protocol-
driven practitioner. An MRI “has to be done” in order not to miss a brain tumour. 
However, Helen thinks there are “no symptoms” and positions her actions as 
surrendering (“Do I just give in”), implying she is not a free agent but controlled by 
the systems. There is a contradiction between what she thinks and what she does, 
between her subjective opinion (based on a biopsychosocial discourse) and the 
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institutional knowledge/power and the latter is dominant. Drawing on a satisfaction 
discourse, she is also influenced by patient desire. The patient is positioned as 
empowered and asserting their needs. Again, Helen is assigning power away from 
herself. Yet this position of empowered patient, made available by the discourse of 
satisfaction, seems restricted by a biomedical discourse which guides what doctors 
can do and patients expect. Is anybody really able to “look at what other things could 
be causing” the symptoms? 
And the psychosocial bit is, the GPs are very well aware of it, it’s just, I think 
there’s a bit of learned helplessness. You kind of think, well, what’s the point 
because, you know, I don’t know, who is going to help these people? Um, who 
can, you know, if this lady discloses domestic violence now what am I going to 
do? Who is going to see her quickly to help? Who is going to help with her 
housing or her refugee status? (Helen, 49-53) 
Helen suggests GPs take up a deliberate position of “helplessness”, learned from a 
system that cannot accommodate psychosocial problems as factors in illness. 
Biomedical discourse does not allow for psychosocial influences. From within this 
discourse Helen can position herself as challenged or helpless, perhaps emphasising 
the institutional power of biomedicine to justify this position. The medical 
institutions make GPs responsible for treating physical symptoms; yet knowledge 
and practice is restricted within discourse that frames illness as the result of a 
biological aetiology. If physical symptoms are associated with social problems, and 
GPs are responsible for physical symptoms but not trained in or supported by 
systems that address social problems, there is no mechanism for these types of 
symptoms to be addressed. Therefore, it seems that GPs learn helplessness because 
they cannot address the causes of patients’ symptoms and patients remain 
unsupported.  
For Helen, the ten-minute appointment is a barrier; for Hannah it is a limited number 
of longer sessions. There is never enough time for the person with “MUS”. 
Um, the biggest constraint has to be (.) time. You can’t meet somebody in their 
twenties, thirties, forties, or more, and expect to get a sense of who they are in a, 
you know, two one hour sessions, [Marianne: Mm] you just can’t. And I think 
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because everything is reduced to, you know, targets and limits and, uh, I think the 
biggest constraint is resources and and and time. (Hannah, 302-306) 
Within an organisational discourse, people with “MUS” are reduced to objects of 
targets, limits, time and resources and Hannah, drawing on a psychological 
discourse, seems to contrast this with her need to get “a sense of who they are”. 
Developing a broader understanding is probably more difficult within the 
organisational constraints imposed by a system which does not recognise the need 
for this. To this extent a biomedical knowledge system will be limited to working 
effectively with illness which fits into a biomedical framework, and inept at dealing 
with illness that does not. Therefore Hannah’s work as a psychologist is limited by 
the institutional culture she works within which draws on biomedical discourse. This 
suggests that biomedical institutional power transcends beyond the medical 
profession and exerts itself on other practitioners working within the health system, 
such as CoPs like Hannah, who seems to feel restricted by it. 
Maggie also talks about how organisational culture constrains GP practice:   
Um, they’re very constrained for time. I think they feel they have lots of people 
looking over their shoulder. Not only their partners, but the commissioning group, 
er, which which says you cannot refer somebody, um, because you suspect a 
bowel cancer. Certain criteria must be met before you can refer them. (…..) They 
just work harder. They work harder and they have to work faster. And this 
leisurely thing that I became accustomed to of, I think, I think yes, there’s a, 
there’s a difference. Um, I would have been much more likely to say uh, here’s 
this medication, come back and see me next Tuesday, or come back and see me in 
ten days and tell me how it went. [Marianne:  Mm hm, mm hm] I think that 
luxury, it would be ha, much harder nowadays. (Maggie, 334-342) 
Maggie draws on an institutional discourse to construct the challenge of “MUS” as 
one of an environment in which GPs have to work harder and faster. She positions 
GPs as enslaved to the demands of commissioning groups, as well as monitored and 
judged by them. This positions GPs as controlled by the institutional power, rather 
than as free agents, and therefore not responsible for the situation. Their own 
individual professional expertise – “you suspect a bowel cancer” – appears to have 
been substituted for unitary institutional knowledge and practice governed by 
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criteria. Within this organisational culture, it seems that having time to talk to and 
follow up with a patient is seen as “leisurely” and a “luxury” and is not valued within 
this neoliberal culture. This will disadvantage patients who need more time and is 
likely to position them as challenging or demanding, something patients are likely to 
notice. 
Maggie tries to address how you establish an atmosphere of being “kind and patient” 
(lines 404-405) within such an environment: 
So how does the doctor establish that atmosphere in their practice, when 
everybody’s rushed and overworked, I don’t know. By example, and maybe by, 
I’d sometimes say they have little discussion groups with the receptionists about 
how to deal with difficult people (Marianne: Mm). You know that, that would be 
useful. Everybody that a patient comes into contact with has the potential to be 
plus or minus.  (Maggie, 410-414) 
It seems that part of the challenge is how to accommodate unexplainable problems 
within a system that only allows ten minutes for a consultation. Drawing on this 
institutional discourse, Maggie can position doctors as rushed, overworked and over-
monitored, perhaps in order to defend the profession from individual criticism and 
assign responsibility to the institutional culture influenced by a neoliberal discourse. 
Yet in so doing it seems that people with “MUS” can get positioned as the problem 
rather than the issue of doctors being under pressure. If the problem is “difficult 
people” then the way to deal with the problem can be to have “little discussion 
groups” about how to be kind and patient with them. Responsibility shifts to the 
receptionists to be a “plus”. The wider systemic problems can be disavowed and 
biomedical dominance maintained. So, the meaning of “MUS-as-challenge” gets 
reconstructed depending on which version of the problem is privileged. Within a 
demanding organisational environment, driven by neoliberal and biomedical 
discourses, it seems that “MUS-as-challenge” can lead to a culture of blame and 
ultimately defensiveness on all sides.  
4.6 Believing in “MUS”: “MUS-as-unreal” 
Maggie and Hannah both stress the importance of constructing “MUS” as real, 
implying this is necessary in order to legitimise it: 
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I would be more likely to say something like, I’m sure this pain is real [Marianne: 
Mm hm], we haven’t found the cause of it yet. Some pains have physical causes 
and some have other causes. (Maggie, 14-15)  
The third group [of GPs] are those that try […] to help the patient understand that 
the symptoms are real, the distress is real, the cause is real, it’s just not a medical 
cause. (Hannah, 69-71) 
Drawing on a biopsychosocial discourse, “MUS-as-real” opens up the notion that 
physical symptoms can have causes that are not biological and provides people with 
an alternative framework within which to understand and validate their symptoms. It 
is possible Hannah and Maggie use this construction in order to counter a 
predominant western cultural view of illness influenced by biomedical discourse and 
to legitimise the symptoms for both patients and practitioners. Drawing on a holistic 
discourse they are promoting a biopsychosocial construction of illness. Patients are 
positioned as needing help to understand that the notion of a non-medical cause is 
possible, highlighting the dominance of biomedical discourse in providing cultural 
meaning to physical symptoms.  This suggests that within a biomedical discourse 
“MUS” cannot be constructed as real because real illness means biological causes for 
physical symptoms. Therefore, it seems that the reality of “MUS” can be questioned 
within a positivist framework that ignores social and cultural factors and allows pain 
to be constructed as real or not as opposed to just painful. Whether patients can 
satisfactorily accept the so-called reality of their symptoms when not constructed 
within a biomedical discourse might depend on the extent to which the power of 
biomedical discourse and all its implications can be resisted. 
When asked what got Maggie interested in “MUS” she says: 
Well just being a GP. I mean you can’t avoid it. I I If you said to yourself I don’t 
believe in this and I will not do this, you’d be in trouble (Marianne: Mm hm) 
because a lot of the volume of work is (Marianne: Mm hm) a question of being 
patient, sitting it out with the patient who’s got this distressing symptom and 
saying, uhhh I haven’t figured out what it is yet but let’s wait and see, come back 
and tell me about it (Maggie, 149-153) 
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In contrast to constructions of “MUS” as a misplaced GP problem, Maggie firmly 
situates “MUS” as both “distressing” and part of GP work. This could close down 
opportunities to not “believe in this”. Such a construction seems to shift the focus 
away from resisting “MUS” on to the approach needed to practice in this area: 
“being patient”, “sitting it out”, “wait and see” and being honest about the unknown 
(“I haven’t figured it out yet”). It opens up the position of curious practitioner, able 
to accept a level of uncertainty within the remit of “just being a GP”. It broadens the 
professional discourse enough to encompass uncertainty. It also opens up the 
interpersonal space between doctor and patient to experience the problem 
intersubjectively by “sitting it out” together. Maggie suggests they are sharing the 
position of uncertainty: the doctor is closer to experiencing “being patient”. 
However, Maggie’s psychological construction of some “MUS” exposes a 
contradictory relationship between psychological and believability discourses: 
I’m just trying to think for instance think about working with people with (…) uh 
(..) chronic fatigue, say. [Marianne: Mm, mm.] Now I’ve got a prejudice about 
that, um, and I think there’s a whole industry been built up about it, and I don’t, I 
think it’s all secondary gain. [Marianne: Mm hm, mm hm.] Um, I I believe there’s 
such a thing as post-viral fatigue, you know, that’s something I can get my hands 
on and believe and understand, but people who spend years being waited on hand 
and foot by their families (Marianne: Mm hm), I believe that it is psychological 
rather than physical. [Marianne: Mm hm, mm hm] Uh, so with those people I, that 
that’s really the most extreme case I think, that’s the most extreme case of 
medically unexplained symptoms that I can come up with, and I’m angry about 
that because the associations, you know the patient groups for that, I think 
encourage people to be ill, (Marianne: Mm hm, mm hm) and encourage them to 
be belligerent. And I don’t think it’s any help to the patient at all. [Marianne: Mm 
hm.] I would say I’m a complete failure there, probably because I don’t believe in 
it. (Maggie, 60-71) 
Maggie draws on several discourses here in her construction of “MUS” as a 
psychological issue. A believability discourse allows her to question the existence of 
symptoms as an entity she can get her “hands on and believe and understand”. This 
suggests it is this lack of physical existence that leads her to exclaim “I don’t believe 
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in it”, as if only more concrete phenomena, such as “post-viral fatigue”, can be real. 
To this end Maggie also appears to be drawing on a biomedical discourse to 
construct her version of believable. She can believe in fatigue that is caused by a 
virus because it is biological and therefore ‘real’. Presumably she can then position 
and treat people with “post-viral fatigue” as legitimate patients with an explainable 
condition. She can be helpful to them. 
In contrast, chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) is constructed as “psychological rather 
than physical” and therefore unbelievable (“I don’t believe in it”). If “MUS” as 
psychological equates with unbelievability, this potentially leaves little space for 
suffering and distress to be acknowledged or validated. Drawing on a psychological 
discourse of secondary gain, patients are positioned as benefitting from “MUS” by 
getting everything done for them by their families. The bodily language (“waited on 
hand and foot”) suggests it is their bodies and not their minds which are receiving 
attention. Such constructions open up space for a deeper understanding of “MUS”, 
but could risk positioning people with “MUS” as illegitimate patients or malingerers, 
which, in turn, facilitates Maggie’s “prejudice”.  
However, this version contrasts with that of the patient associations who construct 
CFS as a purely physical entity. They have developed “a whole industry” which has 
actively resisted a psychological construction and promoted a biological one, thus 
closing down opportunities for symptoms to be construed as unbelievable and 
patients to be positioned as illegitimate (but also to access psychological support). 
Drawing on a political discourse, “MUS” becomes a cause that empowers patients 
and makes it acceptable for them to be ill and belligerent towards doctors who refute 
their construction. By positioning patient associations as encouraging illness and 
belligerence, Maggie can justify her own position and her anger.    
What these conflicting discourses seem to have in common is that they appear to all 
drive rigid, exclusive constructions that promote an either/or way of thinking about 
“MUS”. They seem to suggest physical/biological/medical equates with believable 
and therefore real. Maggie is disempowered by these exclusive discourses. She 
constructs CFS as psychological, but when confronted with patient resistance she 
feels unable to use this in practice, yet seems to find medical discourse unhelpful 
because she cannot believe in the framework it offers her (that this is physical 
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illness). This implies there is no acceptable language or discourse available to her 
which constructs illness in terms of an interaction of biopsychosocial factors. Maggie 
therefore takes on a position of impotence, feeling helpless and “a complete failure”. 
This is not likely to be helpful to her patients nor her practice, but it might protect 
her from conflict with the patient associations.  
This section highlights the lack of available discourse within which to helpfully 
construct “MUS”. The following two sections also highlight issues of ‘lack’ as they 
explore constructions of “MUS” which struggle to situate it within an appropriate 
location or service and frame it as the lack of opportunity or ability to talk about 
difficulties. 
4.7 No place for “MUS”: “MUS-as-placeless” 
Within the transcripts is the notion of place (“this” and “that”) and debate about the 
appropriate location of and for symptoms, practitioners and patients. It appears hard 
to situate “MUS”.  
Helen stresses the importance of “acknowledging the distress of the patient” (line 
97); yet she admits that this can be subjectively irritating and an intrusion into the 
consultation: 
[…]on a personal level, if you, if that’s intruding into your consultation it might 
be really irritating. And it often is. (Helen, 100-101) 
“Intrusion” implies imposition or infringement and that the distress does not have a 
valid place in the consultation. So Helen is both stressing the importance of 
acknowledging distress and implying it is an imposition. This highlights how 
“MUS” struggles for legitimacy in a GP consultation, even when the distress of the 
patient is being validated. Contradictory discourses are at play here: a 
biopsychosocial discourse opens up space for distress, but conflicts with a 
biomedical discourse which positions distress as an intrusion and having no place in 
the consultation. The latter is likely to affect validity and legitimacy and how 
patients construct their symptoms, including the meanings they are likely to consider 
or accept. Perhaps Helen herself is caught between these two discourses, unable to 
find an acceptable place within them from which to practice. The contradictory 
messages are also likely to leave patients confused about what their “MUS” is and 
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how it is being received. It suggests that responsibility among doctors towards these 
patients can remain ambiguous. 
Mimicking some doctors’ reactions, Hannah positions them as dismissive, 
suggesting there is no place for “MUS” within their practices: 
Nothing I can do. She needs or he needs to go and sort himself out. (Hannah, 136) 
The use of “go” rejects the rightful place of people with “MUS” in a medical 
location, whilst “sort himself out” implies there is no role for a doctor in their care. 
Hannah is positioning some doctors as dismissive and not taking responsibility for 
dealing with “MUS”. The place for that is elsewhere, or perhaps nowhere with the 
emphasis on the patient taking responsibility. Hannah’s version suggests the current 
situation is not working for people with “MUS”.  Similarly, Hannah suggests 
“MUS” can lead to anger among some physicians if the patient is not accepting of 
test results. Again, mimicking a doctor she says: 
Or there might be anger. I’ve told this person. I’ve done this test. Erm. He’s just 
got to accept the results. (Hannah, 138-139)  
Hannah is critical of a biomedical discourse within which negative test results 
signify the end of the doctor’s involvement. They appear to equate with truth or fact 
and therefore the patient is expected to accept them, whether or not they address the 
problem: an illness is only as real as its test results. Within this framework, patients 
with “MUS” can become dismissible. Through her critical portrayal of the 
biomedical model, Hannah seems to be implying the need for an alternative 
approach. 
Helen and Maggie further highlight how “MUS-as-a-misplaced-problem” creates 
potential barriers to working with people with “MUS”. 
A lot of doctors would say this isn’t what I went into medicine for. And I used to 
say that. I used to say that a lot. I would say why do patients come and see me 
about their housing […] Um, so there is that sort of irritation. I’ve done this 
training and what I’m good at is this and why aren’t people coming in with this? 
You know, they’re coming in with that. So, there’s, there’s that as a constraint 
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and so interest, I think, training, because if you have the training you feel more 
equipped. Not so scared at dealing with it. (Helen, 455-461) 
And I guess there’s a fear of ineptitude in the psychological. You know, it’s not 
much taught explicitly in your medical training. [Marianne: Mm hm.] And people 
do what they know they’re good at. (Maggie, 548-549) 
“MUS” is constructed as a psychosocial problem. By drawing on a separation 
discourse, Maggie and Helen are suggesting it can therefore get situated outside the 
scope of medicine or the doctors’ remit. By situating “MUS” as a misplaced 
problem, Helen might be trying to legitimise the “irritation”. Patients are “not 
coming in with” what doctors are “good at” (“this”), positioning doctors as not 
“good at” working with “MUS” (“that”). However by constructing “MUS” as an 
inappropriate problem, it could avoid doctors having to position themselves as 
challenged or question their own competencies. It might mean they do not have to 
relinquish the position of expert or question the usefulness of their biomedical 
model. They can blame the patient for coming in with the wrong type of problem and 
justify feeling irritated. Use of “this” and “that” distinguishes “MUS” from other 
physical health problems doctors are there to treat. A biomedical discourse 
empowers them to proclaim who and what they should treat.  
Helen and Maggie reconstruct the challenge of “MUS” as one of lack of knowledge 
and training rather than a misplaced problem. The medical discipline and its 
institutions regulate and normalise medical training. Doctors are drawing on a 
training/knowledge discourse to authorise their position. They want to apply their 
training, yet their training has not incorporated “MUS”. “MUS” sits outside of the 
traditional medical knowledge base and therefore practice is limited by the 
knowledges GPs can draw upon. This produces doctors who are ill-equipped for the 
challenge of “MUS”, creating fear and irritation and potentially resulting in them not 
engaging with “MUS”. Patients then get positioned as non-patients with illegitimate 
illnesses. However, Hannah (see 6.3) also talked about lack of medical knowledge as 
an obvious constraint to her work with “MUS”, suggesting that a separation 
discourse and the position of the discrete expert is a broader multidisciplinary 
limitation to working with “MUS”. 
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Helen positions herself as having changed. She “used to” talk and feel as she 
describes. By referring to this change, it suggests Helen is challenging the barriers 
and constraints to working with “MUS”. She also constructs training as both a 
limitation and an opportunity.  In so doing she opens up space for the possibility of 
wider resistance and transformation.  
4.8 Unspeakable “MUS”: “MUS-as-untold-story 
There seem to be lots of constructions of “MUS” as manifestations of something 
untold, unsaid or unspeakable. Maggie and Hannah appear to draw on a somatisation 
discourse to construct “MUS” as experiencing or communicating psychological 
distress in the form of somatic symptoms. In Maggie’s construction of “MUS” the 
symptoms “express” and “speak” of the distress: 
Um, but for some people, it’s a, well it’s used, it’s used to express other griefs, 
other damage, other anger. (..) It’s, it’s like speaking another language really. 
[Marianne: Mm hm, mm hm] It’s using the body to speak a language. (Maggie, 
212-214) 
By constructing “MUS” in this way, Maggie can enable it to be considered as a 
symptom of an underlying difficulty that is not physical in aetiology. This could 
open up space for a non-biomedical perspective and the exploration of unspoken 
distress. “Using the body” might imply the person with “MUS” is actively trying to 
communicate, consciously or unconsciously, but cannot use verbal language to 
express their distress (“It’s like speaking another language”). Acknowledgement that 
such a process occurs might help practitioners to explore underlying distress and to 
support people to become able to talk about their distress. This seems to be the 
version that Maggie is trying to promote through this construction.  
Whereas Maggie refers to “using the body” for expression, Hannah constructs 
“MUS” as inability to communicate because of the distress: 
 […] there’s also huge sadness, huge sadness on on my part, that somebody’s life, 
because I’m seeing them when they really really are very unwell. Somebody’s life 
can be so (..) impacted by what’s gone before, that they can’t even find the words 
to articulate it. That’s a huge sadness. [Marianne: Mm] If they had been able to 
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find the words to articulate it, they wouldn’t have a body-based disorder. 
[Marianne: Mm] It’s because they can’t. (.) That’s a tragedy. (Hannah, 323-330) 
Drawing on a psychoanalytic discourse, Hannah constructs “MUS” as a consequence 
of or a defence against the impact of past suffering that has been so great that the 
person cannot speak of it. As a result, their distress somatically manifests as “a body-
based disorder”. Psychological constructions of trauma and tragedy might open up 
space for a compassionate response towards people with “MUS” (“they really, really 
are very unwell” and “huge sadness”), which Hannah emphasises through reference 
to her own “huge sadness”. It suggests a need for therapeutic environments which 
enable opportunities for people to tell and explore their stories and encourage 
practitioners to take up a position of curiosity, interested in untold stories from the 
past and present.  
Constructing physical symptoms as influenced by untold stories could have 
significant implications for practice, such as the need to be able to hear these stories 
and to be open to hearing about emotional trauma. Hannah refers to her own sadness, 
highlighting how different constructions affect practitioners’ subjectivity. Openness 
to emotional distress might require openness to emotional countertransference, 
which might be what some practitioners feel unable to deal with or want to avoid. 
If people with “MUS” are unable “to find the words”, then a lack of acceptable 
language or discourse to frame or normalise somatic symptoms or illness as 
commonly occurring from distress is likely to exacerbate this situation. Exclusive 
discourses might even foster somatisation if they do not provide for cultural 
understanding or acceptable explanations for somatic symptoms. If a biomedical 
understanding of illness is dominant in a society, then people with “MUS” or the 
wider society they live in are more likely to understand it in this way. However, in 
order to construct illness less exclusively, the structures that maintain it as a purely 
biomedical phenomenon would need to be dismantled. 
Maggie remembers a woman who came to see her with “complete lassitude, 
depression. She sat all day, unable to do anything, no energy, low” (line 610). In this 
example “MUS” is constructed as an untold story: 
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You just have to ask, it’s part of the history, and I said um did you ever you know 
think of having another child, something like that, and she said well there was the, 
there was the abortion. And. And I don’t think she’d talked about this ever. 
Nobody had ever asked it in a way they were able to say it. […]So there was 
another child, there was a lost child that she told me the story, that was all, very 
matter of fact, didn’t do any interpretations. (Maggie, 598-608) 
Drawing on psychological discourse “MUS” is constructed as the somatic 
manifestation of emotional distress and as past trauma impacting on the present. 
These constructions appeared to enable Maggie to consider historical influences and 
facilitated a conversation about them (“You just have to ask, it’s part of the history”). 
In so doing the opportunity for the patient to talk was opened up too. 
The untold story is an unspoken secret (“I don’t think she’d talked about this ever”), 
again constructing “MUS” as resulting from something that is difficult to talk about. 
Maggie’s use of this discursive construction could be seen as influencing her way of 
being with the patient which was to: 
… present myself as trustworthy enough to hear that story, not to be judgemental, 
not to spread it any further. Um. So what did I do but be a listener and somehow 
ask the question in a way that enabled her to answer it. (Maggie, 615-618) 
Legitimised by a biopsychosocial discourse to be a GP interested in the patient’s 
broader story, Maggie was able to take up the position of curious practitioner and 
experience the patient as more than her symptoms. This seemed to enable the patient 
to feel that somebody was interested in and able to hear the story and therefore to 
feel comfortable enough to tell it. Her story became legitimate. Until then “nobody 
had ever asked in a way they were able to say it”, suggesting cultural discourses 
might have limited the exploration of somatisation.  
Maggie drew on a psychological discourse as a GP within a medical setting. This 
integrated, holistic approach appeared to bypass many of the obstacles to drawing 
exclusively on a psychological discourse. It did not involve dismissal, shame or 
referral elsewhere. It was not even named, but occurred as part of a consultation. 
However, Maggie’s sees her approach as made available because she took up an 
honorary position outside of the standard healthcare system: 
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No, it’s not general practice, [M: (laughs)] it’s not psychotherapy, it’s not 
counselling. It’s, it’s in a kind of tiny little overlapping zone where all those venn 
diagrams do overlap. And it’s only possible because I’m not paid (Maggie, 495-
497) 
From within a holistic discourse, Maggie can combine (“overlap”) different 
approaches. She also positions herself as unique because of this, separating herself 
from others. Such a position appears unavailable to most practitioners within an 
NHS entrenched in a biomedical discourse which seems to limit how practitioners 
can interact with their patients and how patients can be related to. This situation 
seems to be exacerbated by a neoliberal discourse that encourages fiscal austerity 
and reductions in government spending. If these discourses close down opportunities 
to support people with “MUS”, but a holistic discourse is supposedly not affordable 
within the NHS (unless you are lucky enough to have a psychodynamically trained 
GP volunteering in your practice) then there is little incentive to broaden the 
available discourses. Within a neoliberal discourse, Maggie can imply the needs of 
people with “MUS” are financially unviable. This would significantly 
limitopportunities to support people with “MUS” and render them powerless, but 
this perhaps appears acceptable within a neoliberal western culture that values fiscal 
efficiency above all else.  
However, Helen emphasises the need for GPs to remain curious and interested, not 
in the symptoms but in the people, their stories and their distress: 
So I think those are, those are important things. So, I think that the remaining 
curious about people. The remaining interested about people’s stories and the 
acknowledgement that the symptoms are distressing, but that you will look at 
other avenues. (Helen, 148-150) 
A biopsychosocial discourse is more likely to allow for a biopsychosocial focus, 
including recourse to a healthcare discourse of continuation of care, which not only 
facilitates “remaining” curious and encourages commitment to the process, it also 
acknowledges there is no quick, short-term solution for both the GP and the patient. 
This is the version that Helen appears to want to promote. This is further emphasised 
by her use of undertaking to “look at other avenues” suggesting there is both breadth 
and future commitment to supporting the patient. “Other avenues” implies 
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alternatives or additions to biomedical support will be explored. Nevertheless, this is 
only likely to happen if a biomedical discourse does not limit opportunities for 
practitioners to become curious in the first place. 
4.9 Reflexive statement: Part 3 
The act of doing the analysis and the challenge of structuring this chapter were 
unavoidably part of the same process because the complexity of the findings 
mirrored the complexity of structuring the chapter. If I could not make sense of the 
findings how could I present them? If I could not identify some coherent themes, 
how could my chapter have any coherent components? Therefore, the writing of the 
analysis chapter involved many versions and changed significantly as part of the 
developing process of doing the analysis. This process also mirrored the 
development of my own thinking about “MUS”.  
In addition, the choice to use Willig’s (2001) guidelines probably influenced the 
focus and structure of the ensuing analysis in other ways. With hindsight it is 
possible to see that perhaps by following Willig’s stages I became over focused on 
constructions of “MUS” as this was stage one, and all further analysis built on these 
constructions. Had I chosen to follow Parker’s (1992) guidelines I would not have 
started by asking how “MUS” is being constructed, but instead by accepting the 
whole text as the object of study and using free association to explore connotations, 
ideally with someone else. In addition, Parker, unlike Willig, advises researchers not 
to follow his steps sequentially. This is another way in which the procedural 
guidelines I chose influenced the analysis and both the findings and challenges that 
followed. 
 
I had expected the first two stages of the analysis - the process of identifying how I 
thought “MUS” was being constructed and locating these constructions within wider 
discourses (Willig, 2012)  – to provide me with components on which to both deepen 
my analysis and structure the chapter. As I began to identify recurrent discursive 
constructions, I started to draft a first version around “MUS-as-suffering-and-
distress”, “MUS-as-choice” and “MUS-as-test/challenge”. However, as I explored 
the constructions more deeply, I realised that they could merge with, overlap or be 
identified differently and that I could locate them within different macro discourses. 
74 
 
This highlighted the subjectivity of my analysis and the need for thoroughness and 
reflexivity.  
For example, “MUS-as-suffering-and-distress” appeared located in talk about 
whether or not the pain or distress was real and whether symptoms could be 
“believed in” or not (see 6.6) and this led to the identification of the discursive 
construction “MUS-as-unreal”. “MUS-as-suffering-and-distress” also formed part of 
the talk about conflict to do with the rightful place to support people with “MUS” 
and the identification of “MUS-as-placeless”; “MUS-as-emotional-distress” became 
associated with “MUS-as-challenge” as the former could be constructed as a reason 
for the latter. Locating these discursive constructions within wider discourses 
suggested the influence of two potential discursive frameworks: a psychological 
discourse that enables us to consider suffering and distress and a discourse of 
separation that enables some sorts of pain and distress to be considered differently to 
others.  
With so much overlap and so many entangled concepts, a large part of the challenge 
was to work with the complexity, and decide on a structure that would best reflect 
the texts and enable me to present the analysis in a readable format without losing 
their richness and complexity. In trying to deconstruct the texts my own thinking and 
understanding about “MUS” was developing. For example, it was in noticing that 
my participants were largely constructing “MUS” as a psychological problem, that I 
realised I was doing the same (see 2.6). However, in considering how this opened up 
and closed down opportunities and the consequences for positioning, practice and 
subjectivity, I started to challenge my own position. I realised the limitations of 
viewing “MUS” as a distinctly psychological problem, how this exclusivity could 
potentially encourage further resistance to a psychological dimension to physical 
symptoms. This also mirrored the change in focus in the “MUS” literature, which 
was increasingly highlighting biological components of “MUS” (e.g. Luyten et al., 
2012; Scaer, 2014; Yunus, 2008, 2009; McEwan & Wingfield, 2003). So as a result 
of the analysis my own thinking about “MUS” was changing; it was shifting from a 
psychological understanding of “MUS” towards a more holistic understanding of 
“MUS”. This shift probably impacted on my analysis, as I became more aware of the 
wider discourses that the participants were drawing on and the exclusivity of some of 
the ensuing constructions, and also on my therapeutic practice as I became more 
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interested in and focused on some of the biological elements of “MUS” theory and 
was able to consider these with my clients. 
As the process of analysis developed, I had to find ways of sharing my findings on 
the page. In doing so, I had to make subjective decisions about what I thought was 
most salient. At first, I had thought I would present my findings under the different 
discursive constructions of “MUS”, as I had seen other analysis presented. However, 
on its own this felt reductive as it missed an opportunity to focus on the macro 
discourses that seemed to be influencing participants’ talk. Yet, structuring the 
chapter around these macro discourses, as I had also seen other analyses presented, 
again seemed reductive as the discursive constructions formed within them seemed 
vast and varied and worthy of more specific focus. (I was also aware that this split 
between macro discourses and discursive constructions was adopted from Willig 
(2012) and was in itself full of overlap and contradictions and somewhat fabricated.)  
I therefore began to understand that I could not simply take on somebody else’s 
structure and would have to make my own. This provided a shift for me as I 
acknowledged I would have to move away from pre-given structure. This led to a 
structure that incorporated sections on macro discourses and on discursive 
constructions, and where the overlap was sometimes explicitly incorporated, e.g. into 
section 6.4 on interest, choice and engagement. The number of decisions that had to 
be made further emphasised the subjective nature of the work and how other 
versions could exist.  
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5. Discussion 
This chapter summarises the findings from this analysis, the unique contributions of 
this study, makes recommendations for practice and discusses the limitations of this 
research and the implications for further research.  
5.1 Comparison with previous research and the unique contribution of this 
study 
In several ways this research supports findings from previous studies. Like previous 
research (Stacey, 1988; Radley, 1994; Burr, 2003; Orlans, 2013) it suggests that 
conventional, biomedical discourses continue to dominate approaches to health 
systems, health problems, services, diagnosis, treatment and practitioner-patient 
relationships. Biomedical discourse seemed to influence how all the practitioners 
constructed “MUS” at times and they all referred to ways in which health systems, 
other practitioners and patients constructed “MUS” within biomedical discourses. 
Within this rational and reductionist discourse thoughts, beliefs and emotions do not 
seem to be considered part of the diagnostic and treatment process. The literature 
review explicitly highlighted how a biomedical discourse appears still so 
significantly dominant and rigid that efforts to accommodate “MUS” within it can be 
extremely difficult. This analysis identifies similar influences and implications. 
Although there are many attempts to practice outside of the biomedical framework, 
its overriding influence can conflict with alternative discourse and limit alternative 
practice, for example through the 10 minute GP consultation.  
What is also interesting about the biomedical discourse is how it appears to have an 
influence beyond that of institutional practice. It appears to have infiltrated much of 
western culture so that attitudes and behaviours towards health and wellbeing seem 
driven by it. The analysis suggested how discourse around gender and biomedicine 
appear interconnected, as women’s emotional distress became dismissible within a 
biomedical framework which favours a rational, coherent, unitary approach. Health 
behaviours, such as visiting the GP for physical symptoms, and health expectations, 
such as expecting diagnostic investigations, seem to be accepted as a normal part of 
western culture so that our thoughts and behaviours make sense within this 
framework and cannot be separated from it. Its dominance appears widely 
encompassing.  
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Dualistic mind-body conceptions of illness were also notably present, with particular 
significance for psychological constructions of “MUS”. The negative and reductive 
connotations of the psychological, as highlighted by Greco (2012), were implied in 
the prioritisation of physical health diagnoses, the fear of the psychological and the 
choices made by practitioners and patients, including how they were positioned or 
positioned themselves. Brown’s (2007) implication that a medical basis is preferable 
to a psychological one because it is more comfortably related to (rather than 
aetiologically correct) is apparent, as is Greco’s (2012) suggestion of the need to 
hide psychogenic plausibility on the part of both doctors and patients. 
The holistic and humanistic influence of counselling psychology was sometimes 
apparent in the language of the CoPs and their attempts to focus on the whole person. 
Subjective experience appeared valued by all participants, yet often in contradiction 
with the expert position that all participants seemed to adopt at times. It is suggested 
that recourse to an exclusive, distinct medical or psychological discourse contradicts 
a holistic perspective and influences the maintenance of a dualistic approach, for 
example Tom positioning his role as dealing with the psychological and not the 
medical aspects of “MUS”. 
The literature review suggested that if existing structures and related discourses 
cannot accommodate a complex biopsychosocial problem then developing new 
models, approaches and terminology alone will not resolve this conflict. This 
analysis suggests that existing discourses and related structures can limit, restrain, 
restrict and confuse constructions of “MUS”, and indicates how opportunities for 
effective treatment responses might be severely limited by the dominant medical 
discourses within which “MUS” exists. 
In addition there are also several ways in which this research has exposed further 
tensions, contradictions and complexity and made original contributions to existing 
research. These include restructuring the challenges of “MUS” within a discursive 
framework, deconstructing and problematising the psychological construction of 
“MUS” and identifying a lack of an available, culturally acceptable discourse within 
which to construct illness that results from biopsychosocial phenomena. 
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Restructuring of the challenges within a discursive framework 
Significantly, this research suggests how discourses and discursive constructions can 
shape how practitioners practice and experience people with “MUS” (and vice 
versa). This illustrates how important it can be to locate “MUS” within a socio-
cultural context. There is a wide variety of literature about terminology relating to 
“MUS”, but very little focus on the performative nature of this terminology (with the 
exception of Greco, 2012) and apparently none that situates practitioners’ talk about 
“MUS” within its discursive environment. This is a unique contribution of this 
research. Exploring the discourses which practitioners draw upon to construct 
“MUS” can open up a wider and deeper understanding of some of the issues and 
challenges.  
A good example of this is the identification of a discourse of separation. Whereas 
mindbody dualism and its influences are widely acknowledged, the reconstruction of 
this more passive discourse as separation seems to better encapsulate the active 
splitting of mind and body that occurs within the health service. It is as if the mind 
has been actively separated from the body by the creation of separate services, trusts, 
ministers, manifestos, policies, practitioners, training institutions, textbooks, 
buildings and patients. Most importantly, this discourse creates and maintains an 
understanding of mental health as an entirely separate system from physical health. It 
enables the discursive constructions of mental health and “MUS-as-mental-health-
problem” to exist. Therefore, the process of categorising illness is more active and 
complex than a dualistic construction allows for and appears to reflect a western 
cultural necessity for separation and classification. 
There appears to be a huge tension between exclusive medical and psychological 
discourses and how they construct “MUS”. A distinct psychological construction can 
exclude a person from being able to make sense of the physical nature of their 
symptoms and can open them up to mental health stigma. A distinct medical 
construction can limit them to a biomedical understanding of illness which might not 
explain their symptoms. Such exclusive constructions can be reductive, ignore social 
factors and limit access to medical or psychological support respectively. Neither, 
alone, seems helpful to the person with “MUS”. 
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A discourse of separation also encapsulates the process of categorisation that can 
occur within distinct physical and mental health environments. It enables a 
gynaecology service to deny the existence of “MUS”, whilst a gastroenterology 
service embraces it (see 6.5). It is so pervading that, if necessary, it can encompass 
symptoms that do not fit usual criteria, for example Helen’s classification of “MUS” 
as “unconventional mental illness”, an attempt to squeeze it into a category within 
which it struggled to belong. Paradoxically, it can create rigid criteria which results 
in people being denied access to services and support. It can enable a process of 
privileging, prioritisation, disavowal and stigmatisation of certain kinds of illness to 
occur. 
Not only did this analysis show how discourses of separation can permit some 
practitioners to construct “MUS” as choice, but it showed how this construction can 
relate to interest and engagement. Treated as individual processes such choices might 
simply evoke outrage – doctors should not be allowed to choose not to work with a 
patient; viewed with a social constructionist lens it becomes apparent how such 
practices get influenced by broader social processes. Interest, choice and engagement 
are constructed, negotiated, opened up and closed down within the socio-political 
environment in which they operate. Lack of skills, training, knowledge and systems 
to work with “MUS” can discourage interest, leading to aversive choices and lack of 
engagement, especially when, in turn, “MUS” gets reconstructed as avoidable. 
Further, given the relationship between knowledge and power, practitioners who 
proactively engage with the uncertainty of “MUS” may have to relinquish the 
position of expert and work outside their comfort zone. Therefore, without a change 
in discursive conditions, choice, interest and engagement with “MUS” remain 
unattractive. At the same time, resistance to exclusive biomedical or psychological 
discourses could open up opportunities for broadening working knowledge and 
practices, with potential positive influences on interest, choice and engagement. 
Helen, Maggie and Hannah all expressed enthusiasm for working with “MUS” when 
the work was situated in environments not restricted to biomedical treatment.  
Similarly, constructions of “MUS-as-challenging” hide the complexity of the 
problem. Simplistic constructions of the difficult patient and the dismissive doctor 
can mask broader discursive conditions, such as lack of psychosocial training and 
time restrictions, which might make it too easy for these positions to become 
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available. However, exploring discursive constructions exposes different versions of 
the challenge. For example, the analysis suggests that engaging with “MUS” 
involves engaging with uncertainty and helplessness. Within a biomedical discourse 
that values success and expertise, the idea of uncertainty and helplessness can be 
alien, frightening and equate with failure. 
Yet “MUS” defies the biomedical model so practitioners might not be able to be 
successful if they draw exclusively upon such a framework. “MUS” often does not 
respond to biomedical treatment (which is often how it becomes labelled as “MUS”) 
and therefore challenges the “truth” about medicine, bodies and illness, in turn 
challenging medical expertise and positions. “MUS” is complex because lives are 
complex and this research suggests that drawing on broader, more holistic, culturally 
new and unfamiliar discourses might change expectations of success and allow more 
space for accepting uncertainty and helplessness. Practicing within them could 
disturb the fear of failure and enable more curiosity and less frustration.  
According to Foucault (1972), discourse not only defines what can and cannot be 
said about a topic, it also defines the ‘truth’ about a topic and its ‘subjects’ by 
implication. Discourses socially construct realities. The reality debate around 
“MUS” is given space by a biomedical discourse that creates expectation about how 
symptoms should respond to treatment. Within this scientific framework illness can 
be categorised as real or not. Psychosocial and cultural meanings can be irrelevant. 
This can have significant implications not only for malingering, stigma and 
legitimacy, but also for practitioner-patient relationships (see below).  
It appears hard to locate “MUS” in terms of what type of problem it is and hard to 
situate people with “MUS” within existing service settings. This research suggests 
that a separation discourse, which suggests there should be appropriate groupings for 
everything, influences this. The analysis reveals how “MUS” can get constructed as 
an intrusion into the medical consultation and positioned on the outside of 
mainstream medicine. Whereas a biopsychosocial discourse opens up space for 
distress within an appointment, a biomedical discourse might position distress as an 
imposition facilitating opportunities for tension and contradictions. Such tension is 
likely to disturb the patient-practitioner relationship. Constructing “MUS” as a 
misplaced problem creates a barrier to working with people with “MUS” because it 
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positions their care outside the scope of medicine or the doctors’ remit, creating a 
struggle for legitimacy.  
There are alternative practices that are accommodating to “MUS”, but as long as 
they lie outside of the NHS, which is free at the point of delivery, access will be 
limited to those who can pay. Therefore, it seems important that a legitimate space 
can be constructed for “MUS” within primary care and beyond. This might involve 
opening up the NHS to a wider range of therapeutic services. 
Deconstruction and problematisation of the psychological 
Another unique contribution of this research is the deconstruction and 
problematisation of the psychologisation of “MUS”. From the beginning I wanted to 
interview people who worked at the interface between physical and mental health. I 
wanted to avoid reproducing the polemic debate – doctors vs patients, mind vs body, 
etc. What became increasingly apparent within this research was that the 
practitioners I interviewed seemed to mainly construct “MUS” as a distinct 
psychological problem.  
Drawing on psychological discourse “MUS” can manifest as somatisation or the 
conversion of emotional distress into physical symptoms and as the impact of past 
trauma on the present. This research suggests that such constructions open up the 
need to allow time and space for people with “MUS” to talk. This in turn means 
practitioners might need to position themselves as curious and interested in listening 
to peoples’ stories. If they position themselves as such, they are more likely to be 
positioned as such by the people they are talking with, encouraging a space for 
people to open up about their distress. A biomedical discourse can limit the length 
and breadth of conversation, whereas psychotherapeutic discourse tends to 
emphasise and value the creation of a trusting environment in which a therapeutic 
relationship can develop. The latter opens up opportunities for deeper exploration of 
subtle, but complex issues.  
This information complements the psychological research that suggests people with 
“MUS” are more likely to show signs of alexithymia (Edwards et al., 2010) or lack 
of symbolisation (Sloate, 2016). This research extends the problem of difficulty in 
emotional expression beyond the patients’ internal psychological world and 
highlights the external social forces that might also contribute to this difficulty. It 
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suggests a lack of curiosity, interest, time, space, communication skills, training and 
availability of a biopsychosocial discourse also restrict emotional expression for both 
patients and professionals. These ideas add a social dimension to the problem of 
emotional expression and contribute to a broader understanding of the issue. For 
example, a person’s emotional expression may be limited by attachment trauma and 
may manifest as somatic symptoms. However, if the cultural environment for 
emotional expression is also restrictive, this may further contribute to a lack of 
emotional expression and further manifestation of “MUS”.  
Considering that it seems unhelpful to approach “MUS” as a biomedical problem 
and that psychological discourse can lead to more useful and helpful insight, it is not 
surprising that practitioners have tried to reformulate “MUS” as a psychological 
problem. However, in so doing two key issues have been overlooked: the complexity 
of the psychological, and the biosocial elements of “MUS”.  
Firstly, a psychological problem is not a single coherent phenomenon. This analysis 
suggests a variety of psychological constructions of “MUS” were used from 
sentimental talk about the emotional, to health care service talk about mental health. 
The different ways of talking about the psychological in “MUS” appeared 
performative. They seemed to open up and close down options for practitioners and 
patients. For example, constructing “MUS” as “the emotional” drew on a cultural, 
gendered  sentimental discourse, which enabled practitioners to dismiss “MUS” as 
unimportant, leaving people with “MUS”, particularly women, unsupported and 
untreated. 
Secondly, through the process of separation, mental health is not only being 
distinguished from physical health, but it can also become disadvantaged. It gets 
deprioritised, marginalised, restricted, dismissed and delegitimised. Psychological 
constructions of “MUS” can equate with “unreal”, malingering, secondary gain, 
stigma and “all in your head”. Whereas the stigma around mental health is not 
limited to “MUS”, situating it within this context helps us to understand why there is 
resistance and a disavowal of the psychological (Greco, 2012). Therefore, it is 
hazardous to call for acknowledgement of psychological aspects of “MUS” without 
acknowledging what it means to label “MUS” as a psychological problem. To do so 
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casually is to invite resistance and uphold the dominance of biomedical 
representations of illness.  
Thirdly, the psychologisation of “MUS” might perform the substitution of one purist 
approach for another. Whereas it is important not to disavow the psychological 
(Greco, 2012) it is equally important not to disavow the biological and social in 
acknowledging the psychological. As well as highlighting the need for more careful 
constructions of psychological aspects of “MUS”, this research suggests the need for 
new discourse that allows for understanding illness within broader, inclusive 
frameworks. 
Holism 
Another unique contribution of this research is the identification of a lack of an 
available, culturally acceptable discourse within which to construct illness as 
resulting from biopsychosocial phenomena. Even in trying to write about this, it is 
difficult to know how to describe it, which reflects this lack of culturally established 
discourse. In using “holism” I am aware of its associations with so-called alternative 
therapies, which can be dismissed within so-called mainstream healthcare practices, 
yet in its usage I am partially trying to reclaim its relevance. 
It is nearly forty years since Engel (1977) formulated the biopsychosocial model as 
an alternative to the reductionist biomedical model that can neglect psychological 
and socio-cultural factors in determining illness and treatment. The biopsychosocial 
model was created to address the fact that patients’ problems are more complex than 
the biomedical model allows. However, this analysis suggests that practitioners are 
still drawing on biomedical discourse, and systems and practices are still being 
developed within it. It is also apparent that the participants are trying to approach 
“MUS” within broader multidisciplinary frameworks. However, it appears that there 
is no widely acceptable language to describe illness that combines biopsychosocial 
influences. There is no strong discourse to guide such an approach. We can talk 
specifically about the biopsychosocial model, multidisciplinary working, bodymind 
approaches and holistic perspectives in relation to specific services, models and 
approaches, but we seem a long way off a person experiencing a symptom and 
reflecting broadly on all these aspects of their life to understand what might have 
contributed to it. Western culture appears to have subsumed the biomedical 
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discourse. We identify difficulties with doctors talking to patients about psychosocial 
aspects of their illness, and patients understanding psychosocial aspects of their 
illness, but we do not tend to consider this as a wider problem of cultural discourse. 
Therefore, it is unsurprising there is much confusion, resistance and distress around 
“MUS” for both practitioners and patients, when the available cultural frameworks 
would suggest such illness cannot exist. For example, if practitioners largely 
construct “MUS” as psychological, but patients largely construct it as biological 
there is plenty of space for conflict. A culturally acceptable holistic discourse within 
which to construct illness could reduce this polarisation and conflict surrounding 
“MUS”.  
5.2 Implications/recommendations for practice 
From a social constructionist stance the main implication of this research is to 
critically highlight limitations of and tensions within current constructions of 
“MUS”, and to encourage critical questioning and exploration of the discourses we 
draw upon when working with people with “MUS”. Parker (1992) argues that it is in 
the identification of misused or oppressive practices and the objects of such practices 
that critical discourse analysis can contribute to practical intervention.  
Four areas of implications of this research are discussed below.  
How we talk about “MUS” matters 
This research highlights the extent to which how we talk about “MUS” matters. As 
practitioners the language we use is full of meaning, implications and consequences. 
Every time we refer to or do not refer to “MUS” we are suggesting and implying 
many things to the people we are talking to and we need to be considerate of this.  
This research suggests it would be helpful for practitioners to pay special attention to 
how we construct psychological aspects of “MUS”. In order to challenge 
psychological constructions of “MUS” as unreal, illegitimate, less important than or 
distinct from physical health, it may be helpful to acknowledge the biological and 
social aspects to symptoms at the same time. This could include acknowledging 
everyday examples of mindbody connection, such as how we blush when we are 
embarrassed, feel hunger when thinking about our favourite food or how our blood 
pressure goes up when we are stressed and our heart rate increases when we are 
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frightened. We can recognise how psychological factors affect the speed in which a 
cut heals and the likelihood of catching a cold. Talking about health and illness in 
this way not only opens up alternative ways of thinking and talking to people about 
“MUS”, but could demonstrate that this is how we, as practitioners, construct illness 
too. In doing so, less dominant discourses might become stronger and a 
biopsychosocial understanding of illness could potentially become more familiar and 
acceptable. This is important to address the deficit in culturally acceptable language. 
Significantly, we can ask people how they understand their symptoms and what the 
meaning they make of them is. 
In order to acknowledge wider influences on health and illness, this research 
suggests we need to ask about wider aspects of peoples’ lives, including symptom 
experience, emotional states, social situations, histories, trauma, etc. Not only could 
this reveal important information, but, by asking questions that are not exclusive to a 
single discipline, we would be drawing on wider discourses and constructing “MUS” 
as more than just a medical or psychological issue. This means some practitioners 
might need to practice outside of their professional comfort zone and be prepared to 
ask and learn about broader issues. Psychologists might need to ask and hear about 
their clients’ physical symptoms and doctors might need to ask and learn about their 
patients’ traumatic history, and both might have to consider and engage with 
people’s wider social situation. Perhaps we need to consider more process as well as 
content, and focus on how we ask about people’s stories. This might include paying 
attention to being curious, interested and listening to people, as was discussed in the 
analysis. By drawing on psychotherapeutic discourse, all practitioners can access 
knowledge and skills about therapeutic engagement such as listening, reflecting, 
mirroring and collaboration. However, a significant part of psychotherapeutic 
discourse is also the importance of supervision and reflexive space, and this could be 
incorporated more widely into general practice so that more practitioners have space 
to explore their own process. 
Talking does not have to occur in isolation. Considering the various restrictions on 
talk associated with “MUS”, talk can be one component within broader therapeutic 
approaches, such as body psychotherapy or dance movement therapy, both of which 
are used therapeutically with people with “MUS” (Rohricht & Elanjithara, 2014; 
Payne, 2015). Body psychotherapy already displaces the exclusivity of many 
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psychological and medical approaches as it takes a bodymind approach to distress. 
However, it is mainly accessed via private practice. 
None of this can happen, of course, if we avoid talking about “MUS”. Avoiding 
talking about the psychological aspects can maintain the illusion that psychological 
influences on illness are unusual or shameful; avoiding talking about the biological 
aspects can maintain the illusion that the symptoms are all in the mind (when the 
client knows they are in their body!). This research suggests it is also important to 
acknowledge the ambiguities, tensions and paradoxes; to be more honest and 
acknowledge the uncertainties and difficulties. Considering “MUS” is constructed as 
a difficult subject to talk about, patients are positioned as difficult to talk to and 
doctors’ positioned as lacking sufficient communication skills it would be helpful to 
train practitioners in ways to talk about “MUS”, as was being done for GPs by 
Helen’s service. For this to be significantly effective, it might need to be integrated 
early on into pre-service training, so that practitioners feel more equipped to engage 
with “MUS” from the start. It could be done on a multidisciplinary level so that 
different practitioners can all benefit from each other’s experiences. 
Nevertheless, what appears crucially important and is suggested by this research is 
that language and talk do not occur in a vacuum. What participants have to say 
“constitutes much more than simply an account of their personal opinions or beliefs” 
(Burr, 2003). Burr (2003) reminds us how social and material power structures can 
provide our talk with effectiveness which in turn reproduces these discourses. Given 
this constructionist and performative nature of language, communication strategies 
are likely to have much more impact when they are considered within the wider 
discourses in which they operate. For example, constructing “MUS” as a 
biopsychosocial phenomenon will be difficult as long as the concept of 
biopsychosocial illness remains culturally alien and unacceptable; yet if done it can 
contribute towards destabilising the biomedical hegemony.  
Awareness of discourses is important  
Foucault (1979) uses the term ‘power/knowledge’ to indicate that it is forms of 
‘truth’, knowledge and scientific understanding that establish power. If the power of 
the dominant discourses is to shift in order to allow space for alternative discourses, 
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which better acknowledge and support people with “MUS”, then better awareness of 
this power and how we draw on, engage with and reproduce discourses is crucial.  
In order to understand better our own engagement with discourse, as practitioners we 
might reflect on how we construct “MUS” and illness in general. Do we think about 
illness in a dualistic way? Are we quick to draw on a separation discourse and 
classify illness as either a physical or mental health problem? Considering that this 
sort of categorisation can limit or close down ways of understanding, being with and 
talking about symptoms for both patients and practitioners, we might need to 
consider the discourses we draw on and be wary of falling into the exclusion trap.  
Following on from this, greater awareness of how taken-for-granted biomedical 
discourses operate as business-as-usual, appear to have been subsumed into western 
culture and how this severely restricts the ways in which “MUS” can be viewed and 
treated would be important. Both GPs and CoPs are aware of and educated in the 
biopsychosocial model, but how many consistently draw on, engage with and 
reproduce a biopsychosocial discourse, even when they theoretically embrace it? The 
analysis exposed examples of GPs and CoPs’ understanding appearing influenced by 
purely biomedical or psychological frameworks. Considering these limitations in 
terms of discourse could help practitioners to reflect on their practice and critically 
question which discourses are influencing them and their environment. Ultimately, 
this might lead to greater congruence between values and practice, and the exposure 
of hidden agendas. 
Awareness of discursive influences seems helpful in identifying the broader issues. 
For example, Maggie positions herself as “helpless” when confronted with patients 
with CFS. FDA suggested the available discourses contributed to feelings of 
helplessness. A biomedical construction of CFS was unacceptable to Maggie, but a 
psychological construction was unacceptable to the patients and the patient 
associations that supported them. Drawing on a holistic construction of illness might 
have been more acceptable to both parties. The interesting question becomes how 
come constructions of “MUS” were seen as limited to these two discursive positions. 
Where is the holistic discourse that enables both aspects of illness to be recognised 
and accepted? Recognition that illness does not fit neatly into either physical or 
mental health categories would be likely to disrupt the political structures upon 
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which the national health service (NHS) is founded, from the training institutions to 
service delivery, from professional roles to budget allocations, from healthcare trusts 
to professional knowledge. And it would be likely to disrupt the power base of these 
social, political and economic structures. To remove the dominance of biomedical 
structure within healthcare would be to disturb those who control and have power 
within this structure. Is this why it is so difficult to shift our understanding of illness? 
This example highlights how a lack of consideration of discourse can limit 
understanding of an issue or problem and lead to a misplaced focus or practice 
recommendation. So, recommendations to change the way we talk about “MUS”, 
such as those above, are severely weakened within discursive environments that 
cannot support such practice. It is not sufficient to recommend GPs explore patients’ 
psychosocial narratives, if we ignore the values and systems that only allow them to 
spend ten minutes with a patient. It is not sufficient to recommend that psychologists 
explore medical issues with their clients, if there are few joined-up working practices 
in which professionals can work together and support each other. By considering 
discourse new dilemmas and tensions underlying a practice might be discovered and 
the understanding of a problem can change completely. 
Resistance (ask questions & challenge assumptions) 
Following a day of excellent presentations on small scale service provision and 
therapeutic approaches at the British Psychological Society’s Division of 
Neuropsychology’s (2015) conference on managing functional neurological 
symptoms (2015), I asked the panel of presenters the question: “How do we 
challenge the divisions in our healthcare institutions which separate patients, services 
and care into mental and physical categories?” The only response I received was 
“That is an excellent question”. Throughout the day these divisions had been 
highlighted as challenges and barriers to supporting people with “MUS”, yet nobody 
was actually thinking or talking about what could be done about them. 
Webb (2010) feared the complexity of the challenge of restructuring healthcare 
delivery to work at the biological/psychological interface would maintain inertia. 
Foucault (1976) believed that the possibilities for action and resistance lie in our 
capacities to recognise and question socialised norms and restraints. Therefore, 
resistance is about detaching the power of truth from social, economic and cultural 
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forms of hegemony. The biomedical discourse continues to thrive because its 
weaknesses are hidden and ignored, whilst its power is maintained by those who 
benefit from it through their own positions of exclusive power and expertise. Yet 
surely there is also scope to evade, subvert and contest the biomedical discourse, if 
those who question it use their voices and influence. This seems important for 
change to occur. 
CoPs are trained to work from a biopsychosocial viewpoint with a focus on 
subjective experience. In so doing, we are already theoretically challenging the 
biomedical discourse. However, such rhetoric needs to be reflected in practice, and 
the absence of counselling psychology voices in critical debate about “MUS” 
questions the extent to which we are promoting these values and transforming them 
into practice. Yet, CoPs are subject to the same discursive restraints and lack of 
available discourse as everybody else. If CoPs can stay faithful to their social 
constructionist values we might be able to influence resistance and shifts in culture 
by taking a critical approach to how we construct “MUS”.  
Nevertheless, this research suggests that tribalistic professional identities can be 
unhelpful in forming integrative working models and practices. It also suggests that 
counselling psychology values, such as a critical relationship to research and 
practice, attention to language, rejection of generalised theories, engagement with 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity and the questioning of notions of universal truths 
(Orlans, 2013; BPS, 2005), are useful for engaging critically with “MUS”, but that it 
might be about this stance, rather than any specific professional identity behind it, 
which can be beneficial. For example, the analysis revealed the potential for GPs to 
construct “MUS” holistically, and CoPs to limit their understanding to exclusive, 
reductive constructions, e.g. Tom’s either/or approach to “MUS”. Therefore, all 
practitioners have the potential to engage discursively with “MUS” and to 
deconstruct the notions of psychologisation, holism, choice, interest, emotional 
engagement, challenge, reality, displacement, language and somatisation that are 
suggested as relevant to “MUS” in this research. This research suggests it might be 
practice rather than profession that appears more important and this is the relevance 
to CoPs of this research. 
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There are a number of ways in which CoPs, GPs and other practitioners, service 
providers and healthcare managers might explicitly challenge restrictive 
constructions of “MUS” and open up discursive spaces which could allow for 
alternative experiences for people with “MUS”. We could encourage and participate 
in debate about “MUS”, both written and verbal, small and large scale. We could 
question existing approaches, acknowledging the weaknesses, constraints and 
limitations as well as opportunities and strengths. We could challenge the discourses 
powering services and resist practicing in incongruent ways, just because it has 
become the norm or because it seems too difficult to practice outside the box. We 
could demand training that encompasses the broader skills required to meet the needs 
of people with “MUS”. We could model and reflect on alternative practices and 
share the results. We could stand together to resist simplification and reductionism 
and engage with the tension and complexity around “MUS”. We could question 
outdated and ineffectual hierarchies and hegemonies and work together as healthcare 
practitioners to resist separation. We could resist knowledge/power that is being 
reproduced to protect convention. We could set up interdisciplinary working groups 
to discuss, debate and promote these issues. Active resistance could lead to change. 
Practical disturbances of current working practices 
This research has demonstrated how alternative holistic discourses, and the positions 
and practices they can offer such as joined-up working, extended GP consultations 
and multidisciplinary input, are challenging the dominant biomedical discourses and 
opening up opportunities for thinking about “MUS” in new ways. By highlighting 
these new ways of seeing and being with “MUS”, this research is making these 
opportunities available for consideration by others. Below are some possible 
considerations for ways of challenging restrictive discourses and restructuring 
services. Some of these practices already happen in isolation, but it is their existence 
on a larger scale, driven by shifts in discourse, that could lead to wider discursive 
change. 
GP practices are often the first point of call for people with “MUS”, yet discursive 
limitations to the support they can provide have been suggested, such as reductionist 
biomedical support, poor communication skills and lack of time, knowledge, interest 
and engagement. GP services could offer longer appointments to patients not 
responding to first-line treatments. To complement GP knowledge and skills, other 
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practitioners, such as psychologists, psychotherapists and social workers, could be 
invited to join consultations. This was part of the project of the Primary Care 
Psychotherapy Consultation Service (PCPCS) within the Tavistock and Portman 
NHS Foundation Trust, which resulted in improvements in mental health, wellbeing 
and functioning and a decrease in costs of NHS service use (Parsonage, Hard & 
Rock, 2014). Psychologists and other psychosocial practitioners could be based 
within GP services, extending first-stop primary care services beyond the 
biomedical. People could phone up and book an appointment with a psychologist, 
social worker or physiotherapist, normalising a biopsychosocial approach within an 
everyday service.  
Medical training could encompass sufficient psychosocial elements to equip doctors 
to engage with and respond to the psychosocial needs of their patients. Applied 
psychological training could incorporate greater emphasis on biological processes. 
Practitioners could receive joint training. Greater awareness could lead to further 
implications for practice, which might include increased understanding of mindbody 
systems, joined-up or multidisciplinary working, and/or the use of holistic 
approaches. It could include the involvement of a wider variety of therapeutic 
practitioners who are currently excluded from a lot of NHS services, such as 
psychotherapists, body psychotherapists, dance therapists, yoga therapists, etc.  
This is not to naïvely imply that all medical, psychological and social practitioners 
would need to become fully skilled in working across the whole biopsychosocial 
spectrum. All practitioners will have their limits, whether they fall within 
conventional boundaries or not. It is about moving away from exclusivity in 
healthcare provision so that one way of working or one type of support does not 
exclude all others. For example, a dualistic approach might mean that “a problem” 
gets handed over or handed back between professionals, whereas a holistic approach 
might include the continuing involvement of both practitioners. What seems 
important is openness and flexibility in the ways of seeing, thinking about and 
working with “MUS”, and this includes the recognition of limitations and an 
openness to working with others. To this extent tribalistic professional boundaries 
might need disturbing, particularly where conventional hierarchies are rigidly 
applied.   
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5.3 Limitations of current research and implications for future research 
By its very own social constructionist nature, this research has many limitations, or it 
could be said there might be many other versions of it. This is just one. It is a small 
study, intended to make a small contribution to the voice of resistance; to be a 
critical, questioning voice. Nevertheless there are certain limitations – both specific 
and broader – that are worth discussing. Some of these limitations highlight 
opportunities for further research. 
Firstly, the use of semi-structured interviews to collect participants’ data might have 
limited naturally occurring talk. An “interview” in itself creates a formal 
environment, further emphasised by the use of information sheets, audio-recording, 
consent forms and debrief sheets. The process draws upon an academic discourse 
that instils seriousness to the process. This could influence participants’ 
performance, limiting or moulding what they feel able or appropriate to say. 
Similarly, my own position as a trainee CoP might have positioned me at odds or 
alongside the participants, depending on such things as which profession they 
aligned to or what they thought a CoP might want to hear. Also, informing them I 
was undertaking an FDA might have influenced how they talked about “MUS”. In 
addition, I made the choice to interview GPs and CoPs, rather than any practitioner 
working with “MUS”. In this way, I was exclusively drawing on specific 
professional domains, even though this is something I go on to question. In so doing 
I also excluded other practitioners, such as psychotherapists or consultants, and 
limited the interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary voices I go on to promote. An 
alternative approach would have been to work with an interdisciplinary focus group 
or to collect data from discussions held by an existing multidisciplinary team. This 
would make interesting future research as it might allow for more naturally-
occurring talk, reduce the researcher role in the process and allow for 
interdisciplinary discussion.  
Producing such a piece of research as this, which challenges the way in which a 
society constructs illness, healthcare and “MUS”, could be construed as naïve. Willig 
(1998) refers to this as “inherent idealism” because of its recommendations’ reliance 
on the modification of discourses. For example, Parker (1992) reminds us that 
discourses are grounded in social and material structures, such as institutions, and 
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that access to alternative discourses depends upon changes in real conditions outside 
the text (Parker, 1992). One material constraint highlighted by Parker (1992) is the 
material organisation of space. Current institutional organisation of space within the 
NHS does not facilitate joined up working or training. It generally supports a 
construction of illness as either psychological or medical, to be treated by either 
mental or physical health practitioners, who are trained in and by separate 
institutions, in different modalities, to provide care in different services that are 
located separately. Thinking and practicing differently might necessitate a colossal 
reorganisation of space that could involve far-reaching social, legal and economic 
negotiation and coordination. 
Parker (1992) also sees the habitual, physical orientation of the individual to 
particular forms of discourse as a further social constraint. Therefore, for change to 
occur there is a need to break from past practices. “Discursive change does not 
precede behavioural and experiential change, but is bound up with it” (Willig, 1998, 
p390). This is why it is so important in discourse analysis to consider the 
implications of using different discourses and constructions in terms of 
opportunities, identity and practice, and to recognise the interrelated dynamic 
between them. The power of convention and habit should not be underestimated, 
which is why discourses can become so rigid, all-encompassing and dominant. 
Willig (1998) believes such idealism can be countered by actively addressing 
material and social structures as part of any interventions that follow. For example, 
small-scale interventions are being developed that provide organisational space for 
joined-up, multidisciplinary working practices and allow for alternative ways of 
thinking and talking about illness. These working practices need to be shared and 
discussed as they challenge the hegemony of the dominant discourses and their 
reproduction can slowly begin to break down institutional dogma and structures. 
Further research into small-scale initiatives within their discursive environment will 
contribute to this. Another interesting FDA study would be to explore the material 
organisation of space within healthcare services and the implications of this. 
A further limitation of FDA is to do with subjectivity. In FDA participants’ words – 
attitudes, opinions, beliefs and experiences - get “treated as nothing more than 
manifestations of discourses” (Burr, 2003, 174). Whereas it seems plausible to argue 
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the influence of discourse on a sense of personal identity, it is more questionable 
whether it is all that is required for it to be formed (Willig, 2001). FDA focuses on 
the constitutive force of discourses on subjectivity, but further research could 
broaden the methodology to explore individual differences and contradictory 
motivations. Hollway (1989) designed a qualitative research method that explores 
discourses and subjectivity combining a macro discourse analysis approach with 
Lacanian psychodynamic interpretations. Key to her analysis is the relationship 
between the two. Whilst a purely FDA approach limits the role of desires, wants, 
hopes and fantasies to a “side-effect” of discourse, Hollway’s approach explores 
these processes more deeply (Burr, 2003). Such an approach could be useful in 
further exploring these research transcripts. This could be a helpful way of further 
linking discourse to practice. For example, Luyten et al. (2012) explores “MUS” in 
relation to attachment theory and proximity seeking behaviours. Dismissive 
constructions of “MUS” are likely to feed into this framework and it would be 
interesting to explore further the relationship between external discourse and internal 
psychological processes. Likewise the issue of emotional expression discussed 
earlier. Further research, using fresh or current transcript material, could be done 
using this method. 
The transcripts were rich in discursive material and it was not possible to explore 
thoroughly all the discourses within the constraints of this research. One discourse 
that deserves further exploration is a discourse of lack. Both patients and 
professionals have to deal with lack: lack of diagnosis, lack of location, lack of 
profession dedicated to the mind-body, lack of interest, lack of certainty and so on. 
Research focusing more specifically on this area would be an interesting topic for 
further study. 
Considering this research recommends a more holistic approach to working 
therapeutically with illness, it would be important to investigate the implications of 
doing this. For example, a worthwhile further study could be to focus on holism as 
the discursive object and explore how it is being constructed within healthcare and 
the implications of this. As Willig (1998) points out it is important to counteract the 
reification of alternative discourses (e.g. holism) with the recognition that this kind 
of work is “an on-going, never-to-be-completed project” (p.391). 
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5.4  Reflexive Statement: Part 4 
I began this research very sure that I wanted to take a social constructionist stance 
and use Foucauldian discourse analysis to explore the topic. It seemed so appropriate 
for deconstructing a term that was in wide use but seemed to have such fluid, yet 
influential meaning. What I was less aware of was the challenge of taking a 
personally and epistemologically reflexive approach to the task. I had begun the 
research with the idea of adopting epoché (Langdridge, 2007), but soon realised that 
to do justice to my epistemological stance I would need to explore more intimately 
and reflexively my own role, position and personal bias. I had to recognise that my 
subjectivity was a resource to be mined rather than a problematic bias (Hore, 2014; 
Parker, 1992). This meant acknowledging, respecting and endorsing my own voice, 
and remaining constantly critical of its role in the production of the discourse I was 
analysing. 
Although one appeal of social constructionism was the notion that there is no one 
“correct” way to do anything, I became very caught up in the right way to do the 
research. I realise I remained implicitly influenced by a positivist research discourse, 
despite my explicit rejection of it. My own anxiety about doing it right limited my 
creativity and spontaneity. For example, on meeting Maggie I learnt that she was a 
psychotherapist as well as a GP. Instead of embracing this within the interview as an 
opportunity to learn from this interesting combination, I kept the focus very much on 
Maggie-the-GP (in my research proposal and ethics review I had said I was 
interviewing two GPs!) and ignored Maggie-the-psychotherapist. I did not want 
Maggie-the-psychotherapist to taint the experience of interviewing a GP, as if GPs 
are homogenous creatures with no other external influences.  It was ironic that I was 
using a discourse analysis approach because it appealed to me as open, curious, 
pluralistic and challenging of universal truths, and yet I was being highly influenced 
by an “academic upbringing” in scientific psychological research that wanted to 
separate and categorise my participants and attempt to control variables. It was only 
as I analysed Maggie’s transcript that I realised the richness her experience could 
bring. As I developed my ideas about the disadvantages of the discrete expert, I 
viewed my neglect as a missed opportunity.  
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Another potential missed opportunity was my decision not to use a focus group to 
collect material (see 7.3). I did consider it at the time of designing the research, but it 
appeared more logistically challenging in terms of getting participants together in 
one place at the same time and perhaps (in hindsight) more challenging for me, as 
the interviewer, to control. However, what is most significant is that, at that time, I 
could not see the added value of a focus group in the way that I could towards the 
end of the research.  
My own thinking about “MUS” had not developed to the extent that I could see 
particular value in exploring multidisciplinary perspectives. As discussed in 2.6, my 
own thinking at the research design stage was that “MUS” was a psychological 
problem being unhelpfully treated in a medical world. My thinking about “MUS” 
was focused around the issue of dualism and the limitations and restrictions of the 
biomedical discourse. My ideas about the problem of the discrete expert, the 
discourse of separation, the problematisation of the psychological and the need for a 
more holistic approach did not exist and only started to develop as I undertook the 
analysis. Therefore , I did not recognise the value of stepping back and allowing 
participants from different practitioner backgrounds to interact with each other, put 
forward and respond to ideas and suggestions and challenge them within a group of 
interested practitioners. However, as my ideas developed, the value of a focus group 
became both apparent and a missed opportunity.  
Analysing the transcripts was at times an agonising process. Having thought of 
myself as a social constructionist, I realised this was not how I routinely viewed the 
world (nor my transcripts) and I had to be mindful of my approach at every step. I 
had to learn to look at things differently (to look for the social construction). This 
should have been inevitable. Critical, social constructionist, discourse analytic 
approaches developed out of recognition of the power of dominant discourses and 
their implicit influence on everyday life. Nevertheless, I was taken by surprise at 
how difficult it was at times to use a social constructionist lens. 
For instance, I found myself striving for coherence and consistency in the narratives 
produced by my participants, in the same way as Hollway (1989) frames research 
participants themselves as doing in their talk. Hollway sees this as “one effect on 
subjectivity of the dominant Western assumption of the unitary rational subject; we 
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attempt to construct our experience within its terms” (p.43). Hollway sees the vast 
majority of discourses being underpinned by the principle of unitariness, including 
much psychology training. Multiplicity and contradiction get suppressed. My desire 
for coherence and consistency in the face of multiplicity and contradiction became a 
significant battle in the choice of material to use, the discourses to highlight 
(privilege) and the structuring of my analysis chapter. However, as I allowed myself 
to recognise the multiplicity and contradiction within the topic, I realised that my 
struggle mirrored that of others experiencing “MUS” and it enabled me to engage 
with the topic in what I believe is a more useful manner. In a similar way, at first I 
attempted to implement Willig’s guidelines dutifully, following each step in a linear 
fashion. As the analysis progressed I was able to adopt a more fluid approach, which 
meant I remained guided by Willig’s method, but did not always write about each 
stage. For example, sometimes I focused more on action orientation and positioning, 
at other times practice or subjectivity. I worried less about identifying every stage 
every time and was able to embrace a less rigid, linear approach which better 
reflected how my participants talked. 
Sometimes I struggled with naming the discourses. Burr (2003) points out how the 
identification of discourses can become a labelling exercise in which everyday 
categories of events are turned into discourses. I found myself struggling to move 
outside of both psychological and medical discourse. I was pulled in by counselling 
psychology discourse which guided my critical thinking, but also by medical 
discourse which provided me with the language of illness, e.g. “patient”, 
“treatment”, within which to talk about the issue. This reflects the significance of 
“there is no meaning outside discourse” (Foucault, 1972). I could not move outside 
of discourse. Therefore it was necessary to ask at every stage, not only what 
discourses are the research participants using, but what discourses am I drawing 
upon in order to identify these.  
Part of the research process was therefore to reflect on how this research is a product 
of myself, the participants and our relationship (Finlay, 2002). As a trainee CoP I 
was drawn in by the discourses of social constructionism, critical social psychology, 
social justice, pluralism and holism. I therefore acknowledge that the analysis 
occurred through these lenses. This by no means detracts from its contribution; part 
of its worth is in acknowledging the personal and counselling psychologist stance 
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that critically guided it. This research makes no claims to “truth”, but is one version - 
one social construction - of this research process and its usefulness lies within that. 
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Appendix B: Call for research participants 
 
 
 
Call for research participants:  
GPs and Counselling Psychologists working with 
people with “medically unexplained symptoms” 
 
I am a trainee counselling psychologist currently studying for a Professional 
Doctorate in Counselling Psychology at London Metropolitan University. I am 
exploring experiences of GPs and Counselling Psychologists working with people 
with “medically unexplained symptoms” (“MUS”) as part of my doctoral research. 
This research will consider in depth what guides and influences practice and what 
might be some of the implications of this.  
I am interviewing GPs and Counselling Psychologists who: 
 Have an interest in “medically unexplained symptoms” (“MUS”) 
 Have experience of working in a professional capacity with people with 
“MUS”  
 Are registered either with the General Medical Council (GMC) or the Health 
and Care Professions Council (HCPC) 
 Have at least 2 years post-qualifying experience of working in the UK. 
Participation would involve attending a face-to-face interview which would last 
approximately 1.5 hours at a time and location convenient to you. You would be 
expected to discuss, in-depth, your experience, views and perspectives about 
working with people with “MUS”. The interview transcripts will be audio-recorded 
and analysed using discourse analysis. The personal identify of participants will be 
kept anonymous. 
This study has been approved by London Metropolitan University’s Research Ethics 
Review Panel and adheres to the British Psychological Society’s ethical guidelines 
Research title: Discourses, their uses and implications: exploring 
medically unexplained symptoms with GPs and counselling psychologists. 
A Foucauldian Discourse Analysis. 
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as set out in the Code of Human Research Ethics (BPS, 2010). The research is 
supervised by Dr. Russel Ayling (r.ayling@londonmet.ac.uk). 
If you meet the above criteria I would really appreciate your participation. If you are 
interested in taking part and would like an information sheet with further details 
please contact me via email at the address below. I look forward to hearing from 
you. 
Marianne Seabrook 
Contact email: mas2145@my.londonmet.ac.uk 
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Appendix C: Participant Information Sheet 
Participant Information Sheet 
Research Title 
Discourses, their uses and implications: exploring “medically unexplained 
symptoms” with GPs and counselling psychologists. A Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis 
Brief description of the research 
This research is exploring GPs’ and counselling psychologists’ experiences of 
working with people with “medically unexplained symptoms” (“MUS”) and how 
they make sense of this experience. It will investigate in depth what guides and 
influences the practice of four practitioners and what might be the implications of 
this. The interview transcripts will be analysed using discourse analysis. 
This research will contribute towards the researcher’s Professional Doctorate in 
Counselling Psychology at London Metropolitan University. 
For this research I am interviewing GPs and counselling psychologists who: 
 Have an interest in “medically unexplained symptoms” (“MUS”) 
 Have experience of working in a professional capacity with people with 
“MUS”  
 Are registered either with the General Medical Council (GMC) or the Health 
and Care Professions Council (HCPC) 
 Have at least 2 years post-qualifying experience of working in the UK. 
What would participation involve? 
Participation is voluntary. It would involve attending a face-to-face interview, at a 
time of your convenience, which would last approximately 1.5 hours (including a 
brief introduction before the interview and a debriefing afterwards including an 
opportunity to ask questions), at a private location convenient to you. You would be 
expected to discuss, in-depth, your experience, views and perspectives about 
working with people with “MUS”. You would have the right to request breaks, 
refuse to answer questions or terminate the interview at any point during the 
interview process without having to give a reason. 
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I would like to hear from you if you feel comfortable talking about your 
experience(s) of working with people with MUS. It is not anticipated that the 
interview questions will arouse difficult feelings or emotional distress; however, if 
you believe that talking about your experiences might be distressing or upsetting in 
any way and for whatever reason, then you might want to consider whether your 
participation is appropriate.   
If you do decide to participate you will be asked to sign a consent form. You can 
withdraw consent at any time up to two months following the interview. As data 
analysis will begin after this it will not be possible to withdraw after this date. The 
interviews will be audiotaped and transcribed, and the transcripts will be commented 
on and quoted from in the study. Any identifying information, including your name, 
place of work, client/patient details will be removed or altered from the data and will 
not appear in the study. All data will be stored in password protected files and 
transcripts will be stored in a secure location. Consent forms will be stored 
separately. It is possible that the research will be published. This would mean the 
anonymous transcribed material would be publicly available.  
Following the interview participants will be debriefed and provided with follow up 
contacts should they feel any distress or require further information. This will 
include the research supervisor’s contact details.  
This study has been approved by London Metropolitan University’s Research Ethic’s 
Review Panel and adheres to the British Psychological Society’s ethical guidelines 
as set out in the Code of Human Research Ethics (BPS, 2010). 
If you are interested in taking part in the study please contact me via email. Either 
myself or my research supervisor will be happy to respond to any further queries.  
Name of researcher: Marianne Seabrook 
Contact email: mas2145@my.londonmet.ac.uk 
Name of research supervisor: Dr. Russel Ayling 
Contact email: r.ayling@londonmet.ac.uk 
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Appendix D: Consent Form 
 
Title of research: Discourses, their uses and implications: exploring “medically 
unexplained symptoms” with GPs and counselling psychologists. A Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis 
 
Researcher: Marianne Seabrook 
Email: mas2145@my.londonmet.ac.uk 
 
Brief description of the research 
This research is exploring GPs’ and counselling psychologists’ experiences of 
working with people with “medically unexplained symptoms” and how they make 
sense of this experience. It will investigate in depth what guides and influences the 
practice of four practitioners. The interview transcripts will be analysed using 
discourse analysis. 
This research will contribute towards the researcher’s Professional Doctorate in 
Counselling Psychology at London Metropolitan University. 
Consent statement 
 I confirm that I have read and understand the information set out in the 
participant information sheet and have had the opportunity to ask questions. I 
have been given enough time to consider my participation.  
 
 I am aware that I can withdraw my consent to participate at any point up to 
two months following the actual interview. I understand that as data analysis 
will begin shortly after this it will not be possible to withdraw from the 
project following this date.  
 
 I understand that data will be held securely and presented in written form 
anonymously. 
 
 I give consent to the audio recording of the interview. 
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 I understand that the research could be published and that anonymous 
transcribed material would be publicly available. I am happy for my data to 
be published on the understanding that confidentiality is maintained. 
 
 I agree to participate in the above study. 
 
 I have been offered a copy of this consent form to keep for my own 
reference.  
 
…………………………………………     ………………………………………… 
(Signature of participant)   (Signature of researcher)  
 
…………………………………………      ……………………………………… 
(Print name)     (Print name) 
 
…………………………………………     ………………………………………… 
(Date)      (Date) 
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Appendix E: Debrief Form 
Debrief Form 
Title of research: Discourses, their uses and implications: exploring “medically 
unexplained symptoms” with GPs and counselling psychologists. A Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis 
Thank you for your participation in this study. The aim of the research is to better 
understand the social, historical and political context in which “medically 
unexplained symptoms” (“MUS”) are situated and what are the implications of this 
for those involved, e.g. doctors, psychologists and patients, in different ways and at 
different levels. With a better understanding of the way we use the term “MUS” it 
might be possible to influence support and services for people with “MUS”. It is 
possible that counselling psychologists could play a wider role in this area.  
If you have any issues or complaints that you would like to raise about this study, 
please contact my supervisor on the details provided below. I would like to remind 
you that you have the right to withdraw from this study for up to two months 
following the interview.  
Should you experience any distress as a result of your participation, the following 
organisations are useful sources of help and support: 
Mind 
www.mind.org.uk (Tel:0300 123 3393) 
 
British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP)  
www.bacp.co.uk (Tel: 01455 883300) 
 
The British Psychological Society (BPS) 
www.bps.org.uk (Tel: 0116 2549568) 
 
Samaritans (24 hours a day) 
www.samaritans.org (Tel: 08457 909090) 
 
Contact details 
Researcher:  
Marianne Seabrook 
Trainee Counselling Psychologist 
Email: mas2145@my.londonmet.ac.uk 
 
Research supervisor: 
Dr. Russel Ayling 
Research Supervisor 
Professional Doctorate in Counselling 
Psychology 
London Metropolitan University 
Faculty Of Life Sciences and Computing 
School of Psychology 
Room T6-20, Tower Building 
166-220 Holloway Road 
London N7 8D 
Tel: 020 7133 2140 
Email: r.ayling@londonmet.ac.uk 
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Appendix F: Interview Schedule 
The interview discussion will be flexibly supported by four open-ended questions. 
Additional probing questions have been developed as prompts for the discussion. 
The questions have been developed to provide a flexible framework for discussion, 
but will only used as and when deemed helpful by the researcher. The conversation 
will be allowed to flow freely and take on its own direction. 
 
Research Question Potential interview questions 
How do GPs and counselling 
psychologists construct “medically 
unexplained symptoms”? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is your experience of working with 
people with “medically unexplained 
symptoms” or “MUS”? 
 What does “MUS” mean to you? 
 How would you define “MUS”? 
 How would you describe your 
role? 
 Are there challenges to working 
with people with “MUS”? 
 What motivates you to work with 
people with “MUS”? 
 
What language do you use to talk about 
“MUS”?  
 How would you talk to your 
patients/clients about their 
symptoms? 
 How would you talk to other 
professionals about “MUS”? 
 There is this notion of a 
medical/psychological split. What 
does this mean to you? 
 How do you relate to the medical 
dimension? 
 How do you relate to the 
psychological dimension? 
 Is it possible to work with both the 
medical and psychological 
aspects? 
 What opportunities do you see for 
working at the 
medical/psychological interface? 
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What might be the implications of 
this? 
 
What influences how you work with people 
with “MUS”? 
 What do you turn to or draw on to 
guide your practice? 
 Are you influenced by particular 
models, frameworks or protocols? 
 What is it like working within 
existing structures? 
 What opportunities do you see 
within existing structures for 
working with people with “MUS”? 
 What constraints do you see within 
existing structures for working 
with people with “MUS”? 
 Are you limited in how you work 
with people with “MUS”? 
 
 
How might counselling 
psychologists respond to this? 
 
Which professional roles do you see as 
important in working with people with 
“MUS”? 
 How do you see the role of your 
own and profession?  
 How do you see the role of other 
professions?  
 Who do you believe has overall 
responsibility for working with 
people with “MUS”? 
 Do you see this area as 
multidisciplinary? 
 Do you see opportunities for 
multidisciplinary working? 
 Do you think contributions from 
any professions are missing? 
 Do you see a potential role for 
counselling psychologists?  
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Appendix G: Historical, Cultural and Theoretical Frameworks 
Historical, Cultural and Theoretical Frameworks 
The task of locating “MUS” within historical, cultural and theoretical frameworks is 
complex and involves recourse to some fluid and dynamic terminology. To do it 
justice would require a much deeper focus than is possible within this review. 
Nevertheless, I have tried to outline some specific historical and theoretical shifts 
and conceptions within western society that are particularly relevant to this 
discussion. 
Modernism 
The beginning of the modernist period is marked by “the Enlightenment”, a cultural 
movement in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries. Reason and rationality displaced 
Christianity as the basis of knowledge and the means to understanding truth and 
morality. Knowledge was separated from religion through an emphasis on 
objectively verifiable “facts” influenced by the philosophies of empiricism and 
positivism (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010; Burr, 2003). 
The emerging belief in the power of science extended to the scientific understanding 
of human bodies and had a significant influence on modern medicine and modern 
psychology. Whereas previously health had been conceived as directly relating to the 
patient’s emotional and spiritual life, it became something that occurred in the body 
independently of this (Radley, 1994). There was a drive to uncover the specific 
aetiology of a disease by examining the human body. Findings were named and 
medical labels were constructed. This laid the basis for the biomedical model which 
is still dominant in medicine today (Stacey, 1988). The biomedical model looks to 
biological factors – physiology, anatomy and biochemistry - for diagnosis and 
treatment (Radley, 1994). Medicine’s recourse to science led to its establishment as 
the dominant healing system and the elevation in status of the practitioners working 
within it. Yet “MUS” poses a direct challenge to the biomedical model as the 
physical symptoms and the suffering occur without medical explanation. 
Modern psychology has been profoundly influenced by this emphasis on objectivity 
and observability, arguably at the expense of a more reflective or philosophical focus 
(Orlans, 2013). This is apparent in the behavioural focus which aimed to apply 
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scientific methods to the study of human beings and is still perceptible in 
experimental psychology and the cognitive behavioural therapeutic approach 
(Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010).  
Within modernism two significant movements developed which extended the 
modern focus on the study of human beings. 
Humanism 
The development of humanist psychology in the mid-twentieth century challenged 
the appropriateness of using the same methods to study the natural and human world 
(Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). Its emphasis on free-will and human potential was a 
challenge to the determinism of behaviourism, psychoanalysis and the biomedical 
model. By the 1960s this emphasis was viewed as a serious challenge to the 
predominant positivist empiricist philosophy. In the emerging human science model, 
human beings were viewed as self-conscious and reflective with the capacity for 
choice and personal responsibility.  
Donati and Legg (2011, p.261) see the parallel development in counselling as “a 
reaction against the disease model of mental distress that divided people into those 
with problems and those without, in the same way that physical medicine divides the 
population into the sick and the healthy.” What this suggests is that humanistic 
counselling was developing in reaction to the polarising organisational structure of 
biomedicine, and positioning itself as different. However, like most other 
psychological therapies, in focusing on mental distress it maintained a body-mind 
dualistic conception of therapy, separating itself from medicine which dealt with the 
body to deal with the psychological problems of the mind. The development of 
counselling psychology was influenced by the humanistic focus on the whole person, 
rather than just their symptoms or illness (Orlans, 2013). 
Structuralism 
Structuralism, originating in the early 1900s and revived mid-century, saw the 
humanistic perspective as neglecting the impact of social and historical processes on 
the human psyche. It emphasised that understanding human nature was dependent on 
recognising its relationship to larger, overarching systems or structures (Strawbridge 
& Woolfe, 2010). For example, both Freud and Piaget proposed the existence of 
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underlying psychic structures to explain psychological phenomena. These 
frameworks were constituted and brought into reality via language (Burr, 2003). 
Language was considered the link between individual psychology and social 
structures (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). 
The biopsychosocial model reflects a structuralist framework. Engel (1977) believed 
the biomedical model limited because it neglected psychological and socio-cultural 
factors in determining illness and treatment. The biopsychosocial model recognises 
the impact of these factors on a person’s health. Nevertheless, although the 
biopsychosocial model is widely recognised within the social sciences and healthcare 
fields (Burr, 2003), the biomedical model is still dominant in medical practice. 
Although humanism and structuralism represented shifts within modernism, they 
still encompassed the idea of grand theories or metanarratives espousing ultimate 
truths and underlying structures. 
Postmodernism 
Postmodernism is a cultural and intellectual movement which represents a challenge 
to, as well as a rejection of, the fundamental assumptions of modernism (Burr, 
2003). Postmodernism stresses pluralism or the co-existence of a multiplicity and 
variety of situation dependent ways of life (Burr, 2003). Polkinghorne (1992) 
stresses the relevance of postmodern thinking for psychological practice. He argues 
that academic psychology provided limited usefulness for practitioners in responding 
to clients; therefore they turned to a fragmented and discordant body of knowledge 
that was informed by actual therapeutic interactions. Polkinghorne sees this type of 
generation of knowledge as epistemologically postmodern. Counselling psychology 
embodies a postmodernist perspective in the context of approaches to “truth”, 
encouraging the deconstruction of arguments and the questioning of notions of 
universal truths (Orlans, 2003). This suggests counselling psychology may have a 
useful role in relation to “MUS”, partly because of its arguably postmodernist 
characteristics which reject generalised theories, such as the biomedical framework, 
in favour of subjective and intersubjective narratives. 
Several theoretical orientations have developed against the backdrop of 
postmodernism, sharing its fundamental rejection of the idea of universal truths. 
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Poststructuralism 
Poststructuralism viewed structuralism’s notion of rules and structures underlying 
the real world as deterministic (Burr, 2003). The idea of meta-narratives and 
overarching conceptions of reason and truth were dismissed. Instead 
poststructuralists argued that all thinking and evaluation are limited by perspectives 
(Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). Although language remains central in 
poststructuralism, the meanings carried by it are always open to question, always 
contestable and always temporary (Burr, 2003). Language is seen to operate within 
smaller systems or “discourses”. Foucault (1972, p.49) described discourses as 
“practices which form the objects of which they speak” which emphasises the 
relationship between language, practices and things.  Burr (2003) suggests a 
discourse refers to a set of meanings and representations which together construct 
versions of events. Within a discursive framework “MUS” would be seen as a 
discursive object influenced by and influential on various discourses. 
Foucault saw the Enlightenment as a shift (rather than a development) in the 
structure of knowledge. The science and practice of medicine developed within this 
wider structure of organising knowledge which in turn rationalised its structure and 
experience (Foucault, 1973, 1976, 1979). These wider epistemological structures or 
discourses enabled medical investigation, diagnosis and treatment to become 
acceptable, respectable and expected under the “medical gaze”. Foucault argues that 
this biomedical way of viewing the body is connected to a system of ordering related 
to social control (Burr, 2003). Work, domestic and political behaviours are regulated 
using classifications such as normal, abnormal, healthy, sick, sane or insane. For 
example, without a sick note from a doctor a person may be forced to work. It is 
arguable that “MUS” has thwarted the existing biomedical structure by eluding the 
current criteria for investigation, diagnosis and treatment. Therefore post-structuralist 
thinking and discourse analysis are useful frameworks for exploring “MUS”. 
Social constructionism 
Poststructuralism, along with critical psychology, discourse analysis and other 
approaches in the social sciences and humanities, has a social constructionist 
orientation (Burr, 2003). Social constructionism has no one fixed definition but is 
applied to approaches which share the following assumptions: a critical stance 
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toward assumed knowledge; that knowledge is historically and culturally specific; 
that knowledge is constructed through social processes and that constructions of 
knowledge sustain or exclude patterns of social action (Gergen, 1985). This fits with 
counselling psychology’s model of not assuming “the automatic superiority of any 
one way of experiencing, feeling, valuing and knowing” (Orlans, 2013, p.2). Social 
constructionism is a useful approach for exploring how and why meanings are 
constructed and what are the implications. From both a social constructionist and 
counselling psychology stance it is inappropriate to accept “MUS” as a concept just 
because it is deemed the most suitable term and widely used. Instead it is recognised 
that “MUS” has been constructed through social processes with a wider social 
purpose within a historical and cultural context. Most importantly, it is recognised 
that this has real consequences for social action and power (Burr, 2003). 
Social constructionism argues that illness is a social, not a physiological, matter 
(Burr, 2003). What is deemed illness is only partly dependent on physical 
experience. Disease can be established without the physical experience of illness; 
“illness” can be granted to a person or to the self via individual judgements. A 
judgement of illness is seen as dependant on cultural prescriptions, norms and values 
around our ability to function as usual. Therefore, Hardey (1998) argues that it is the 
reaction to symptoms rather than the experience of them that depicts illness. If illness 
is socially created then “MUS” needs to be explored within its wider social context. 
To explore “MUS” it is necessary to explore the social, historical and relational 
discourses within which it is located. Therefore this research will adopt a social 
constructionist approach to exploring how practitioners construct “MUS” and the 
implications of this, particularly in relation to counselling psychologists. 
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Appendix H: Transcription rules and transcript excerpt 
The interviews were transcribed verbatim using the following conventions: 
 Dots enclosed in brackets indicate a pause in talk. The number of dots 
indicates the length of the time gap in seconds equal to the number of dots, 
e.g. (…) indicates a pause of three seconds. 
 Significant or potentially relevant non-verbal activity is written in italics and 
recorded in brackets, e.g. (laughs). 
 Square brackets between adjacent lines of concurrent speech indicate 
overlapping talk, e.g. [Marianne: Mm hm] 
 Speech that is difficult to make out is replaced with (inaudible). 
 Words in capitals indicated speech which is noticeably louder in volume than 
the speech surrounding it. 
 Square brackets around three dots, i.e. […], are used in the analysis chapter 
to indicate that part of the verbatim speech has been removed for purposes of 
relevance to the point being made in that instance. 
A sample extract from one interview transcript is included below for illustrative 
purposes:
 1 
I: So the first thing I’d like to ask you is what does “medically unexplained symptoms” mean to you? 2 
P: OK. So, medically unexplained symptoms, in my understanding, means that a patient or client 3 
presents with symptoms to which there is no known organic explanation. So (…) the medical 4 
establishment to date are not able to provide for themselves or for the client an explanation of why the 5 
client/patient should be suffering with symptoms. 6 
I: So, can you tell me a bit about your experience of working in this area?  7 
P: Ok. So, as a psychologist in what’s, erm, what’s come out of, or emerged from the old er liaison 8 
model I work in the acute general hospital. And so I would see people, um, typically at the most acute 9 
end of the medically unexplained spectrum. So, typically these would be people um in wheelchairs. 10 
Typically, but not always. Or people with unexplained pain, in the sense that they may well have, er, a 11 
physical condition, but the level of pain they report or the frequency or the intensity is not explained 12 
by medical doctors, by their diagnosis, their their condition. So they would be in the hospital. So they 13 
would have gone to accident and emergency complaining er generally of pain. It could be respiratory 14 
disorders. It could be gastric disorders. Those are the ones we get. And gynaecological ones, actually. 15 
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They’re the ones that we tend to see most frequently as inpatients. And then they would be seen by us 16 
as the liaison, as the psychological service, psychiatric service, in the hospital. And they would come 17 
to, erm, me as outpatients if they wanted to follow up. [I: Ok] So my experience is working with 18 
people who’ve agreed to a follow-up.  19 
I: Mm hm mm hm. And what makes you interested in in this area?  20 
P: I think what makes me er interested, and it’s more than an interest, it’s absolutely fascinated, it’s 21 
because it’s an area of medicine that causes huge anxiety among treating clinicians 22 
I: Mm 23 
P: And I’m talking about medical er clinicians. So, there’s no consensus as yet, there doesn’t seem to 24 
be any successful model of treating these patients. And what the research suggests is that anything, 25 
and it’s very unclear, between 30 and 70 per cent of patients er who attend GP surgeries are, have 26 
medically unexplained symptoms. Which is huge. 27 
I: Mm 28 
P: My understanding of the research is that this is the patient group that causes the most 29 
dissatisfaction among GPs because you cannot apply this, what they call the house model, this idea 30 
House as in the Hugh Laurie character, of find it and fix it. There’s a symptom we will find er a 31 
solution. So, really, it really tests people who um espouse those kind of pure science approach, who 32 
try and problematize everything according to anatomy 33 
[I: Mm] 34 
P: (..)physiology. And become hugely frustrated when their knowledge doesn’t explain the, the 35 
patient’s presentation. And when they’re then unable to comfort the patient in a way that the patient 36 
needs without colluding with them. And there’s all these words, I’m sure that in your analysis words 37 
like collusion are going to be huge. Um. And I think that so that’s one part one reason why it 38 
fascinates me. And the other reason I think just goes to the heart of being human which is that we are 39 
(..) connected, we are we are (…) one system. We’re not discreet systems. And to pretend that 40 
everything is either in the body or in the mind (..) is, is ridiculous. And so the evidence is there (points 41 
to painting). And I know that you can’t bring that up but this painting here is a fantastic piece of work 42 
that shows the distress of the person through the body. It’s a self-portrait by Schiele, and I just love it 43 
and erm, and you can just see how kind of contorted and twisted he is. But it’s emotional distress. [I: 44 
Yes.]  45 
P: And it kind of typifies everything I think about erm and we can’t call them medically unexplained 46 
symptoms. I think that’s very stigmatising as well.  47 
I: Mm 48 
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P: So, even in the title, what’s my interest, it’s just this is such a um a conflicted area both for patients 49 
and for those treating them.  50 
I: Ok. Can you say a bit more about that? 51 
P: I thought I’d just exhausted all I could say. [I:(laughs)] Well it comes down to the fact that, it’s not 52 
just GPs, it’s erm it’s GPs who then might (..) refer on. And I suppose what I’ve learnt very recently 53 
and started thinking about, very  recently, last couple of weeks, is that the role of the GP is pivotal, 54 
and if you ask G, GPs, when you have difficulties like this, what he or she wants to do it’s, “I have to 55 
maintain the therapeutic relationship, with my patient”. And in a way that really constrains what 56 
they’re able to do. And I’ve seen it so many times. So, some GPs, who get frustrated with their own 57 
inability, but they kind of project it onto the patient, will just say “There’s nothing wrong with you. 58 
You’ve had this test.” And be very dismissive. 59 
I: Mm hm 60 
P: Which is just a very alienating erm (…) comment to make. It’s not great for the therapeutic 61 
relationship. Others will collude with the patient. And they’ll send them for test after test in the full 62 
knowledge that (..) the earlier tests have ruled out possibilities of disease, of physical disease, yeah.  63 
I: Um hm. Um hm. 64 
P: And that means that the higher order tests, if you like, are not going to find anything, but they’ll 65 
keep doing it because what they’re trying to do is protect the relationship. But actually protect the 66 
relationship at the expense of the patient’s well-being. 67 
I: Mm hm. Mm hm. 68 
P: And (..) the third group are those that try what I think is called empathic confrontation. Which is to 69 
help the patient understand that the symptoms are real, the distress is real, the cause is real, it’s just 70 
not a medical cause.  71 
I: Mm hm. Mm hm. 72 
  
Appendix I: Sample analysis workings  
The excerpts below are examples of an annotated transcript and more detailed 
workings illustrating the process of identifying constructions of MUS, discourses, 
action orientation, positionings, practice and subjectivity according to Willig’s 
(2001) procedural guidelines. 
The following colour code was used: 
Medically unexplained symptoms (MUS) 
Constructions of “MUS” 
Discourses 
Action orientation 
Positionings 
Practice 
Subjectivity 
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In order to attempt to demonstrate how I analysed the transcripts, I shall describe 
how I applied Willig’s guidelines for FDA to lines 35 to 41 of the above extract. 
Following Willig’s guidelines I identify the discursive construction of “MUS” as  
difficult or challenging (line 37). In this extract it is constructed as challenging 
because the models and pathways cannot appropriately accommodate it. I use this 
notion to attempt to locate the challenge within wider discourses. The use of 
“management pathways” and “medical model” for me resonates with biomedical, 
institutional and management discourse. These seem the most appropriate choices 
available to me, all slightly different, but overlapping and influential on each other as 
well. I will need to reflect further on which to use.  
I then ask what the function of constructing “MUS” in this way might be? It appears 
to highlight management restraints and limit the options available to Helen, to other 
doctors and to patients as well. It also appears to guide expectations. Within these 
restrictions there appear to be no free agents. These discursive constructions seem to 
position both patients and doctors as objects within a correct way of working. It 
seems as if these constraints require doctors to take up the position of dutiful 
protocol driven practioner. Helen seems to both take up this subject position and 
resist it, perhaps in order to emphasise the limitations on her (how she is pushed into 
a medical model) but also to highlight the problems with them.  
A biomedical discourse seems to require Helen to apply a medical model to the 
symptoms her patients are presenting to her and to follow protocol in her practice. 
However, at this point I identify alternative discourses that might be available to 
Helen. She seems to draw on a biopsychosocial discourse to recognise the 
complexity of the challenge – “there’s a whole lot of stuff going on” – and this opens 
up the option of resisting the biomedical frameworks and considering what else 
might be going on. A discourse of patient satisfaction also seems to be driving her 
practice: the patient wants an MRI. To this extent it seems the patient is aligning his 
or herself to a biomedical discourse which is promoting a cultural version of 
headaches which suggests they must have a biological cause and need biomedical 
investigation. The biomedical and satisfaction discourses put pressure on Helen to do 
an MRI, even when she thinks the patient does not have the symptoms to require it. 
However, she does not do this without recognising the conflict between surrendering 
to the biomedical discourse or opening up the situation to working within a broader 
holistic framework. All this in turn leads back to and sustains the construction of 
“MUS” as challenging and, when considering subjectivity, may involve senses of 
both duty and frustration.  
The diagram below is an illustration of my workings at one stage in the process of 
analysing lines 35 to 53 of Helen’s transcript.  
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